Museums and Cultural Properties

 

 

https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/UN-MUSEO-DEL-MUNDO-Y-PARA-EL-MUNDO.aspxUN MUSEO DEL MUNDO Y PARA EL MUNDOGP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652017-06-03T04:00:00Zpor Ann Longmore-Etheridge; Traducido por Ari Yacianci<p>En una mañana lluviosa a comienzos de primavera, un grupo de profesionales de seguridad se hizo camino a través de la calle Great Russell, en el moderno y animado barrio de Bloomsbury en Londres. Pasaron por bolardos que separan vehículos, entraron a través de la puerta de una gran valla negra de hierro, y recorrieron un vasto patio para llegar a un edificio neoclásico que data de la época georgiana.​</p><p>Después de una inspección de seguridad, los profesionales visitantes atravesaron el Gran Patio Reina Elizabeth II con su elevado techo, formado de mosaicos azules de vidrio. Previamente siendo el patio al aire libre en la salida de la sala de lectura de la Biblioteca Británica, el área fue remodelada en el año 2000 para convertirse en un épico recinto digno del tesoro ubicado en las galerías circundantes.​</p><p>“El Museo Británico es del mundo y para el mundo” dijo a los profesionales de seguridad David Bilson, CPP, jefe de seguridad y atención al visitante, durante una congregación por un programa especial en el Salón de Conferencias BP del Centro Educativo Clore. Fue el día anterior a la apertura de la 15ta Conferencia y Exhibición de Seguridad Europea de ASIS International, de la que Bilson fue el anfitrión y el primer presentador. “La gente a veces cree que el museo trata de la historia de Gran Bretaña, pero no es así”, explica. “Trata de la historia de la humanidad.”</p><p>Sólo algunos de los objetos invaluables que cuida el Museo Británico son: la Piedra de Rosetta, una estela de roca con la misma inscripción en tres idiomas, que ayudó a resolver los jeroglíficos egipcios; el tesoro de los restos del barco funerario anglosajón Sutton Hoo; las clásicas esculturas griegas de Partenón; cabezas enormes de granito del templo Ramesseum en Tebas, Egipto; el Ajedrez de la isla de Lewis del Siglo XII, una figura gigante de la Isla de Pascua (Hoa Hakananai’a); y un par de toros con alas y cabeza humana de Khorsabad, Irak, que datan de alrededor del 710 a.C. (en Febrero de 2015, extremistas del Estado Islámico destruyeron un par similar, en la antigua ciudad de Nínive).​</p><p>En el museo, dijo Bilson, “presentamos objetos que datan de hace dos millones de años atrás al día de hoy, en una colección que continuamos construyendo”. El físico y emprendedor del Siglo XVIII Dr. Hans Sloane sentó la base para la colección. Tras su muerte en 1753, le heredó todo al Rey Jorge II. Una lotería pública recaudó los fondos para la construcción del edificio original. “Le dimos la bienvenida aquí a nuestros primeros visitantes en 1759, así que éste es nuestro cumpleaños número 257”, añadió Bilson. Desde entonces, el museo ha crecido hasta albergar más de ocho millones de objetos.</p><p>“Somos una de las casas del tesoro de la nación”, le contó Bilson a su audiencia. “Actualmente recibimos 6,8 millones de visitantes por año, lo que nos hace la fuente de atracción principal de visitantes del Reino Unido, y no lo digo a la ligera, porque ésto nos trae grandes asuntos de seguridad interna y pública. Somos uno de los ‘espacios concurridos’ de Londres, por lo tanto tenemos importantes riesgos de seguridad”.</p><p>Los ladrones de arte también son una amenaza. Por ejemplo, el precio del arte chino en subastas se ha disparado, permitiendo a los ladrones vender fácilmente objetos robados en el mercado negro. En 2012, la Policía Metropolitana de Londres New Scotland Yard interceptó a una pandilla que tenía en la mira artículos de una de las galerías públicas del lugar. Trabajar junto a las fuerzas de seguridad pública es un aspecto clave de las operaciones de seguridad en el museo.</p><p>Además, Bilson dijo que el museo “es un lugar que se transforma de noche. Si te paras en el salón frontal del museo a las 5 o 6 de la tarde, verás a todos mis colegas de seguridad escoltando a los visitantes hacia afuera y agradeciéndoles por venir. A las 6 de la tarde, entran todos los contratistas, y cinco minutos antes de las 7, el lugar entero se ve transformado con mesas para cenas o eventos corporativos… lo que es para nosotros otra demanda de los servicios de seguridad que proveemos”.</p><p>Más tarde ese mismo día, los profesionales de seguridad visitantes presenciaron tal transformación cuando la Galería de Esculturas Egipcias fue la sede de una recepción de ASIS. Los variados aspectos del programa de seguridad del museo estaban presentes y funcionando durante todo ese tiempo, pero aún para los practicantes de seguridad invitados, éstos fueron imperceptibles.</p><p>Luego, Bilson se sentó con Security Management para conversar sobre el programa de seguridad del museo y su abanico de preocupaciones de seguridad.</p><p>Panorama. El contexto de seguridad cambió tremendamente para todos los museos, dice Bilson, nombrando como ejemplos el ataque al Museo Judío de Bruselas en Mayo de 2014, el asalto frustrado en el Louvre de París también en 2014, y el ataque en Marzo de 2015 al Museo Nacional del Bardo en Túnez.</p><p>Durante los últimos cuatro años, el Museo Británico invirtió en varios aspectos de su infraestructura de seguridad. Una parte de la inversión se completó en Abril de 2016 cuando el personal de seguridad actualizó sus comunicaciones: “cambiamos a un nuevo sistema de radio digital con mucha mejor cobertura a través de nuestras diferentes ubicaciones”, dice Bilson.</p><p>También se implementaron defensas vehiculares. “Espero que cuando ingresaron por la entrada frontal esta mañana, hayan admirado nuestros bolardos de alejamiento de vehículos, los cuales son una significativa mejoría para nuestra resiliencia”, añade.​</p><p>En 2013, el museo se volvió una zona en construcción con la creación del Centro Mundial de Conservación y Exhibición en el rincón noroeste de la hacienda. Éste consta de laboratorios científicos, instalaciones de oficinas, y un gran salón de exhibiciones, “el cual nos da el espacio mucho más grande y flexible que alguna vez hayamos tenido, y en el subsuelo, tenemos un área segura para almacenar las colecciones”, él cuenta.</p><p>El área de seguridad se vio involucrada en el diseño de las nuevas instalaciones, menciona Bilson. “De hecho, hemos subido de categoría nuestra seguridad en gran parte por la naturaleza de esa construcción. Éso se ha vuelto nuestro punto de referencia para la seguridad en todo el resto de la finca. Integra toda nuestra moderna tecnología de cámaras, alarmas, control de accesos, y ahora el nuevo sistema de radio.”</p><p>Fuerza de Guardias. Desde que el Gran Patio fue construido hace 16 años, el número de visitantes anuales del museo se ha disparado por casi 3 millones de personas. “Estamos encantados de recibir más visitantes pero, por supuesto, ésto impacta nuestras operaciones; queremos asegurarnos de que los visitantes vivan una experiencia disfrutable y segura”, dice Bilson.</p><p>La orientación en la gestión de eventos en el Reino Unido también sufrió cambios. Ésto llevó a una modernización (aún en curso) de la fuerza de guardias, que consiste de 300 agentes propios a tiempo completo. “Estamos buscando tomar lo mejor de esa orientación, así como de alzar los estándares de seguridad para todos nuestros agentes, hasta llegar a un alto nivel de profesionalismo”, agrega. “Todos ellos son excelentes personas, y queremos seguir llevándolos hacia nuevas maneras de trabajar.”</p><p>“En el Reino Unido, hay dos categorías de agentes de seguridad: pueden ser propios si están trabajando en tu organización y en tu espacio, pero si provees un servicio de seguridad a un tercero… debes estar autorizado”, explica. “Por el momento también estamos usando personal licenciado de apoyo mientras llevamos a cabo nuestras mejorías.”</p><p>En el museo hay una sala de comando central de seguridad manejado por personal las 24 horas del día. “No sólo hacen vigilancia de seguridad, también custodian los sistemas del edificio y la condición en la que se deja el lugar durante la noche, mientras cumplen su función primaria de proteger la colección”, señala.</p><p>Inspección de Equipaje. Mientras que el terrorismo es una amenaza clave para el museo, “El mayor desafío de seguridad afectándonos por el momento es la inspección de los visitantes”, dice Bilson. “No es precisamente preciado por mí. Estamos trabajando duro para mejorarlo, pero es un desafío cuando en un día ingresan 20.000 visitantes que pueden llegar en cualquier momento, por lo que tenemos ciertos picos con gran demanda. Más del 50 por ciento de ellos llevan algún tipo de bolso o mochila.” Las revisiones se reforzaron en el museo, resultando en un aumento en el descubrimiento de armas. </p><p>“Por supuesto, la mayoría de nuestros visitantes son respetuosos de las leyes y están aquí para disfrutar la colección”, cuenta. “Pero me sorprendió que una minoría haya traído objetos inapropiados que podrían posar ciertos riesgos.”</p><p>Para asegurarse de que el museo pueda protegerse de armas traídas en equipaje a través de las entradas, se instalaron recientemente nuevas instalaciones de inspección en las afueras del edificio. La dirección ejecutiva apoya decisiones como ésta. “Tenemos un gran apoyo aquí. La junta directiva que supervisa las operaciones del museo está en favor de hacer más en torno a la seguridad, pero manteniendo un balance”, explica Bilson. “Queremos que los visitantes sepan que están ingresando a un espacio seguro, pero también que están accediendo a una experiencia amigable.”</p><p><strong>Seguridad Perimetral.</strong> Bilson cuenta que la seguridad perimetral experiencia cambios dependiendo del estado del museo en diferentes momentos del día.</p><p>Por ejemplo, explica que cuando el museo está completamente cerrado por la noche, cuentan “con una clara definición de límites por la disposición de las paredes y las barandillas. Estos límites están protegidos por tecnología 24 horas al día. Usamos una gran gama de medidas tecnológicas, ya sea se trate de detección de intrusión, vigilancia, cerraduras o control de accesos”.​</p><p>Cuando el establecimiento abre, el perímetro se vuelve abierto, pero con límites para el público, cuenta. “Hay diferentes capas de defensa dentro del lugar.” Cuando los visitantes parten, el perímetro se endurece nuevamente. “Al explicarle ésto al personal, les digo que actuamos de la misma manera que un aeropuerto: el lado aire, que es el seguro, y el lado tierra”, explica. “Por lo que la condición de las áreas dentro del museo cambia, pero en términos generales el área ‘tras bastidores’ permanece segura las 24 horas del día, los 7 días de la semana.”</p><p>La planificación y la coordinación anticipadas entre el personal de seguridad y el del museo son “extremadamente importantes”, declara. “Trabajamos muy duro con la gestión de las instalaciones y con la organización de cada evento para pensar en diferentes niveles de detalle.”</p><p>Protección de la Colección. El personal de seguridad del museo protege su colección en una manera muy similar a como un negocio protege sus propios activos. “La tecnología de seguridad ayuda, pero también necesitamos la intervención de personas”, dice Bilson.</p><p>Como en todos los grandes museos, se montan allí grandes exhibiciones temporales, como Life and Death: Pompeii and Herculaneum, que atrajo durante la mayor parte de 2013 a 400.000 visitantes; y la más reciente, Sunken Cities: Egypt’s Lost Worlds, que cerró en Noviembre y rompió récords de visitas.</p><p>La llegada y partida de exhibiciones especiales es constante y el área de seguridad juega un importante rol. Antes de que se le realicen préstamos al museo, “tenemos que hacerle a los prestamistas un informe sobre la calidad de nuestros procesos ambientales y de seguridad”, cuenta Bilson.</p><p>El museo también presta artefactos y hasta grandes colecciones a otros museos alrededor del globo. “Aplicamos todos nuestros propios estándares de seguridad en el sitio al que va una exhibición”, explica. “A veces ésto es una experiencia de aprendizaje para quienes reciben el préstamo, y nosotros tratamos de ayudarlos para que lleven su nivel de seguridad a tal estándar que en el largo plazo puedan tener un establecimiento más seguro para ellos mismos y que puedan recibir préstamos de aun más colecciones a lo largo del mundo.”</p><p><strong>Viajes.</strong> “El museo está constantemente en cambio, siempre alimentándose de nuevas ideas y cosas para hacer”, declara Bilson. “Es una organización atareada que se encuentra estudiando, investigando y evolucionando continuamente.”</p><p>Bilson cuenta que las políticas y los procedimientos relacionados con el personal trabajando en el exterior no estaban para nada cerca de lo robustos que tendrían que ser. Un incidente que involucró empleados del museo en otro país causó que el museo reconsidere este asunto. “Nos preguntamos, ‘¿Dónde está nuestra gente hoy? ¿Sabemos en qué país se encuentra? ¿Está asegurada? ¿Pensamos sobre su seguridad y sobre las medidas que se han tomado?’”, explica.</p><p>Bilson descubrió que había servicios complementarios al seguro del museo y los servicios de viaje que no habían sido utilizados previamente, incluyendo “reportes de riesgo, informes sobre países, acceso a servicios que pensamos que alguna vez necesitaríamos… Ahora hacemos planes de emergencia en caso de tener que traer equipos de vuelta desde el extranjero”, dice. “Pusimos en marcha un buen plan personal de emergencias para todos, buen apoyo de Londres en el área de casas, y evaluaciones de riesgos, asesorando al personal antes de marcharse.”</p><p>Colaboraciones. El museo se asocia activamente con la policía, “ya se trate del nivel operacional o de antiterrorismo, servicios de inteligencia, o consejeros de diseño de seguridad”, comenta Bilson. “Tenemos fuertes vínculos con especialistas relacionados con delitos contra el arte y las antigüedades. Contamos con el Grupo Nacional de Seguridad en Museos, y más recientemente, establecimos una mesa de debate europea con directores de seguridad de manera que podamos conectar entre colegas. Luego de los acontecimientos terroristas en París y Bruselas, apoyamos a nuestros aliados a través de ese grupo, intercambiando consejos y ayudándolos con cosas para hacer en sus museos.”</p><p>El área de seguridad también trabaja con los equipos de patrullaje que funcionan alrededor del establecimiento. Además, el museo interactúa con sus vecinos, involucrándolos en planes de emergencia y avisándoles sobre eventos especiales que podrían afectarlos, como cuando Una Noche en el Museo fue filmada en el lugar o cuando se proyectan películas en el césped exterior durante las noches de verano.</p><p>Bilson asegura que como caso de estudio, la seguridad del Museo Británico es especial porque éste alberga una colección mundial que debe ser protegida junto un gran número de visitantes y personal, más un edificio histórico de 200 años.</p><p>Mientras que el museo no habla en detalle sobre sus sistemas de seguridad, insiste Bilson, los visitantes quieren saber que la seguridad está en orden. “Los visitantes pacíficos y obedientes de la ley están buscando ese tipo de protección”, dice. “Cuando inspeccionamos su equipaje, somos agradecidos por hacerlo y sabemos que les da alivio.” ​</p>

Museums and Cultural Properties

 

 

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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Communal-Protection.aspx2017-04-01T04:00:00ZCommunal Protection
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Surveillance-is-Instrumental.aspx2017-02-01T05:00:00ZSurveillance is Instrumental
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/A-Museum-of-the-World-and-for-the-World.aspx2017-01-01T05:00:00ZA Museum of the World and for the World
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Culture-in-Crisis.aspx2016-11-01T04:00:00ZCulture in Crisis
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Soft-Target-Trends.aspx2016-09-01T04:00:00ZSoft Target Trends
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/A-New-Mandate-for-the-Modern-Library.aspx2016-07-01T04:00:00ZA New Mandate for the Modern Library
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Book-Review---Religions-Institutions.aspx2016-06-01T04:00:00ZBook Review: Keeping Religious Institutions Secure
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/All-Secure-on-Set.aspx2016-06-01T04:00:00ZAll Secure on Set
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Book-Review---Library-Security.aspx2016-06-01T04:00:00ZBook Review: Library Security
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Protection-on-Display.aspx2016-05-01T04:00:00ZProtection on Display
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Smithsonian-To-Host-Conference-on-Cultural-Property-Protection.aspx2016-04-26T04:00:00ZSmithsonian to Host Conference on Cultural Property Protection
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/IFCPP-Symposium-Focuses-on-Collaboration.aspx2015-11-04T05:00:00ZIFCPP Symposium Focuses on Collaboration
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Artful-Engagement.aspx2015-07-06T04:00:00ZArtful Engagement
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Dynamically-Securing-Cultural-Heritage.aspx2014-03-01T05:00:00ZDynamically Securing Cultural Heritage
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/cultural-property-security-protecting-museums-historic-sites-archives-and-libraries-0012870.aspx2013-11-01T04:00:00ZCultural Property Security: Protecting Museums, Historic Sites, Archives, and Libraries
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/digital-edition-cover-story-uncovering-art_E2_80_99s-dark-past-0012457.aspx2013-02-01T05:00:00ZDigital Edition Cover Story: Uncovering Art’s Dark Past
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Museum-Quality-Protection.aspx2012-10-01T04:00:00ZMuseum Quality Protection
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/No-Artistry-in-These-Crimes.aspx2011-07-01T04:00:00ZNo Artistry in These Crimes
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/priceless-how-i-went-undercover-rescue-worlds-stolen-treasures-008577.aspx2011-06-01T04:00:00ZPriceless: How I Went Undercover to Rescue the World's Stolen Treasures

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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/negligent-security-0012815.aspxCourt Case: Negligent Security<div class="body">  </div><p class="body">The family of a civilian contractor who was killed during the terrorist attack against the Marriot Islamabad hotel in 2008, filed a negligent security lawsuit claiming that Marriot failed to protect its guests and employees. A federal appeals court has dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that the case must be brought in Pakistan, where the attack occurred.</p><div class="body"><ul><li><a href="/ASIS%20SM%20Documents/DiFederico_v_Marriott%20International.pdf">DiFederico_v_Marriott International.pdf</a></li></ul></div><p> </p> GP0|#28ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997;L0|#028ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997|Strategic Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Private-School-Public-Protection.aspxPrivate School, Public Protection<p>​<span style="line-height:1.5em;">Until Sandy Hook, elementary schools seemed immune to the gun violence plaguing the nation. But after the Sandy Hook Elementary shooting in 2012, the administrators of Harding Academy carefully studied the incident to determine how to better prepare for the unthinkable.</span></p><p>Harding Academy, located in the city of Searcy, Arkansas, is a private school instructing almost 700 students from pre-kindergarten through 12th grade. The school is owned and operated by Harding University, which maintains an armed security force responsible for the safety and security of the academy.</p><p>Prior to December 2012, Harding Academy maintained an open campus, allowing parents and other visitors to access the building by obtaining a visitor pass from one of the administrative offices. Access was granted through unlocked main entrance doors; however, there were many times when visitors could gain access to the school through an unobserved door thanks to helpful students. There was video surveillance in some areas of the school, but the video was not actively monitored by administrative personnel. Nor was there a practical way for school staff to be alerted to an open or propped door. </p><p>Immediately after Sandy Hook, Harding Academy administrators met with security experts from the Harding University Department of Public Safety, which serves both the university and the academy, to review existing security measures at the school and to recommend needed changes. </p><p>Academy officials also surveyed all parents with children attending the school to gauge how its security was perceived and whether parents recognized the need for increased security. “The Sandy Hook incident hit a nerve of vulnerability with parents here, across the nation, and world,” says James Simmons, Harding Academy superintendent. </p><p>Faculty, staff, and parents agreed that security took precedence over open access to the school. Harding Academy officials and public safety personnel determined that changes were needed to better secure the facility. The dilemma was finding a balance between an open, inviting feel to the campus and properly securing the facility.</p><p>Key to securing the facility was implementing the security principles of deter, detect, and delay. Harding Academy needed a level of security that would deter wrongdoers from attempting harm. If a person was intent on harm, then a method to detect the person before he or she breached the facility was crucial. Finally, realizing that completely denying entrance to a determined intruder was impractical, the last layer of perimeter defense would be designed to delay entrance to the school long enough for first responders to arrive.</p><p>To properly evaluate the security needs at Harding Academy, public safety personnel conducted a risk analysis survey. The survey sought to identify the risk to the facility and its occupants, assess the impact of the risk were it to occur, prioritize the risk according to implementation costs as well as the impact of the event, and lead to the creation of a risk mitigation plan based on the highest-priority risks.</p><p>The goal was to find the most cost-effective solution that would provide the highest level of security possible. For example, bullet-resistant glass was found to be a poor choice because the delay it would provide was minimal and the glass was expensive. Reinforced glass was cheaper and provided similar amounts of time for responders to arrive on scene. </p><p>A proposal was drafted, and public safety and academy administrators met with Harding University’s president to determine what measures were appropriate to ensure that the school was inviting, yet safe. The proposed measures were prioritized according to greatest impact on securing the facility while being fiscally responsible. The goal was to mitigate the most realistic threats or threats that would have the greatest impact—not to get caught up in the minutiae of “what ifs.” </p><p>The group chose seven of the recommendations: installing more video surveillance cameras, updating the intercom system, adding handheld radios for academy administrators, installing networked access control, replacing door hardware, installing reinforced glass at entrances, and placing panic buttons in administrative offices.</p><p>The key factors of the security upgrades at Harding Academy were effectiveness, ease of use, and comprehensiveness. Each piece of the layered security approach was carefully considered using those key factors. The system was designed with the knowledge that in an active shooter situation, every second counts. The upgrades were designed to provide instant notification of an emergency in the building and provide responders with valuable time.​</p><h4>Implementation</h4><p>The improvements made to Harding Academy’s physical security were implemented over a two-year period. They were designed in a layered approach to provide physical security from the exterior of the building to the classrooms. </p><p>Surveillance. The first phase of the project included the installation of additional video surveillance cameras. Cameras were added to all of the entrance points to the buildings and in many of the hallways. The academy added six Honeywell analog cameras that were compatible with its existing Nuvico DVR system, increasing its number of cameras from 10 to 16.</p><p>The video system is networked over the existing IT system, providing instant visual imaging of the school to both Harding Academy personnel and to the public safety office. Personnel are able to quickly assess exterior door alarms via the video cameras to determine the source of the alarm as administrators are sent to the area. This enables school personnel to ensure that the building remains secure and that any breach of security is dealt with quickly.</p><p>The academy plans to add additional cameras soon and transition its analog cameras to a digital networked system from Milestone, which is used on the university campus and can be integrated into the school’s access control system.</p><p>Access control. Before beginning the two-year improvement process, the academy did not have an access control system for the building. Instead, mechanical locks were used. To harden the facility, the academy decided to switch to a networked access control system that allows academy administrators to have complete control over access, eliminating old keys that may have been unaccounted for.</p><p>The new access control system includes networked access control at main entrance points and video intercom systems at the main entrance doors. The access control installed in the school building is part of the Open Options DNA Fusion platform. The system is networked, allowing both the public safety office and Harding Academy administrators to see and control the exterior doors to the building. </p><p>Proximity card readers were placed beside most of the main doors. School faculty and staff, as well as public safety and maintenance staff, can now use these cards to access the building. The remaining exterior doors were wired with alarm monitor contact points. This allows Harding Academy and public safety officials to be instantly notified of unauthorized access to these doors or of doors propped open. </p><p>The system was chosen because it was already in use at Harding University and had a track record of reliable, effective service. Also, Harding personnel had been trained to install and program the equipment themselves, resulting in substantial cost savings.</p><p>Tied into the networked access control system are video intercom stations at each of the main entrance doors. The intercom system has dramatically changed the way that parents and other visitors are granted access to the school. The entrances to the building remain locked at all times, and visitors are allowed in only after identifying themselves and the purpose for their visit through the video intercom system. </p><p>School employees can then look for any type of threat before releasing the magnetically controlled lock on the entrance door to let the visitor enter. Once inside, the visitor is immediately directed to the office where he or she is instructed to sign in and obtain a visitor badge before proceeding into the school.</p><p>Target hardening. The school installed several target-hardening devices including push-button locks for classroom doors, panic alarms in the administrative offices, a schoolwide emergency annunciator system, and reinforced glass at the main entrances to the building. </p><p>The reinforced glass at the main entrances does not have bullet-resistant properties, but it does deter and delay intruders intent on gaining access to the school. It also adds valuable seconds of response time for public safety and local law enforcement.</p><p>The key locks on classroom doors were replaced with push-button locking mechanisms. The new devices allow teachers to quickly lock classroom doors from inside the classroom, eliminating the need go into the hallway to secure the door. This is both a time-saving measure, designed to allow for quick and efficient lockdown, as well as a safety measure—teachers no longer need to venture into potentially dangerous situations.</p><p>Panic alarm buttons were placed in all administrative offices. The buttons are tied into the access control system, allowing public safety officers to receive an immediate alarm notification if the buttons are pressed. The panic alarms were installed to allow officers to respond quickly without alerting the intruder in the room that help would be coming. Using a silent alarm could also assist in the de-escalation of tense encounters between administrators and upset, or even violent, visitors in the administrative offices. </p><p>As the final security improvement, a schoolwide annunciator system was installed in the building. Harding personnel knew that the ability to communicate an emergency message schoolwide was an important feature of emergency management for the school.</p><p> Prior to the installation of the annunciator, the school used an intercom system, but the high school and elementary sides were separate from each other. Therefore, there was no ability to speak to the entire school at one time. The annunciator system allows for simultaneous broadcast to the entire building.</p><p>Various methods of communication, such as intercom systems, were considered, but the vendor that Harding University used for its fire alarm systems proposed the solution: a Notifier First Command NFC-50/100 system tied into the Notifier fire alarm system. </p><p>The annunciator uses the fire system speakers to broadcast prerecorded messages in case of an emergency. With the touch of a single button from any of the administrative offices at Harding Academy, administrative personnel can instantly notify the entire school of an emergency. Outside speakers were also installed so children on the playground or visitors coming to the school can be notified immediately of an emergency and can follow the proper protocols. </p><p>In addition to the one-touch buttons for prerecorded messages, the Notifier First Command NFC-50/100 System allows a person to speak through a microphone to give more specific information about an emergency or to provide further instructions.</p><p>Communication. Additionally, Harding Academy officials were provided with two-way radios, which enable them to communicate directly with the Harding University Department of Public Safety during an emergency, such as a school lockdown. Public safety officials ordered radios identical to the ones carried by public safety personnel to ensure that communication is reliable. The radios are used daily for internal communication among Harding Academy administrators for routine matters. </p><p>The radios are also programmed with a channel that allows direct communication with the Harding University Department of Public Safety for emergency situations. This allows public safety officers responding to an emergency scene to obtain as much information as possible before arriving at the site. Additionally, it allows for coordination and better information flow once public safety officers arrive. </p><p>Harding Academy officials were also concerned about accountability in the event of an emergency, such as a tornado or building lockdown. The solution was a simple one: a Google document shared with all faculty. </p><p>The document can be used to convey information to administrative officials to account for all children in the classroom, as well as any other children who were in the hallway and are now sheltered in each particular room. Information regarding the condition of each person in the classroom, such as any medical issues associated with the emergency, can also be conveyed via the Google document.</p><p>The Google document solution allows for simultaneous accountability from all areas of the school. This also replaces the need for the separate intercom systems on the high school and elementary sides of the school for accountability purposes.</p><p>In addition, teachers can now communicate with administrators over the Internet, which saves secretarial personnel from checking in with classrooms individually over the intercom system. It also allows office personnel to remain in a safe place, instead of tied to the intercom system in the main offices.​</p><h4>Testing </h4><p>The emergency management plan for the school was thoroughly evaluated, and several adjustments were made in accordance with the physical security improvements to Harding Academy. Quick reference flip charts were placed in each classroom to provide specific instructions to follow in the event of various types of emergency situations. </p><p>The academy and the university routinely conduct drills and exercises. Harding Academy administrators use the Notifier First Command NFC-50/100 System to activate drills. Public safety officers are present at the drills to ensure appropriate response. </p><p>The panic buttons in the administrative offices have been tested regularly to ensure that they are functioning properly and that an alarm is being triggered in the public safety office. School officials routinely monitor and respond to open or propped doors to ensure that the facility is secured. Video surveillance is also monitored for building security. </p><p>As part of the testing, training for all faculty and staff at Harding Academy was conducted to ensure familiarity with emergency procedures and policies. In addition, Harding University public safety officers presented specific information on what to do in case of an active shooter. </p><p>Furthermore, a survey of all parents was conducted at the end of the two-year period to gauge parent satisfaction with the numerous security improvements that were made at Harding Academy. Parents noted the many positive measures that were taken to increase the security of their children, Simmons says, adding that parents “feel very confident about and appreciative of our efforts.”</p><h4>Training</h4><p>Three key training pieces were introduced at Harding Academy. First, Harding Academy administrators and public safety professionals revised the school’s lockdown policies and procedures to make them applicable to the new physical security improvements. </p><p>For instance, the addition of networked access control allows school administrators or public safety to lock down all of the exterior doors to the building with the click of one button. This relieves school administrators from the burden of locking exterior doors manually.</p><p>Additionally, the annunciator system allows for simultaneous notification of a lockdown of the entire building, alleviating the need for administrators to make separate announcements on the high school and elementary sides. The two-way radios also come into play by allowing academy administrators to speak not only with each other, but also with public safety responders.</p><p>Drills were then conducted quarterly to ensure that the entire school population understood their roles and responsibilities during a lockdown. The drills also tested the new physical security improvements to make sure they were properly used in an emergency. Students, faculty, and staff responded favorably to the drills, recognizing the importance of preparedness. </p><p>The second training piece, introduced by public safety professionals, was in-service training for all faculty and staff at Harding Academy using the Run.Hide.Fight. concept developed by the City of Houston in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This training was designed to allow faculty and staff to quickly analyze a situation and make the best decision possible for their classroom about evacuating or sheltering in place. Physical security improvements were key to the “hide” portion of the training, allowing teachers to better protect their classrooms while first responders were en route to the scene.</p><p>The final piece of training was a continuation of live active shooter simulated response training that was previously conducted by the Harding University Department of Public Safety. Public safety officers were equipped with protective gear and simulation weapons that fired paint projectiles at simulated active shooters. </p><p>Hallway movement and room entry practice are conducted periodically to ensure that officer response is quick and efficient. Officers respond to various encounters at Harding Academy, using the entire building. This allows officers to be extremely familiar with the layout of the building, saving valuable time in the event of an actual incident. </p><p>Public safety officers conduct active shooter, armed intruder, and other incident-based scenario training at Harding Academy regularly. The training is conducted with simulation pistols, starter pistols, and blue guns—inoperable plastic replicas of weapons. </p><p>The responding officers practice quickly identifying the situation and responding rapidly and effectively to neutralize the threat to the school. Public safety officers also practice building searches to locate a threat in the event that shots are not currently being fired. This training, especially the building search training, allows officers to become intimately familiar with the layout of the building. It allows officers to know potential danger areas such as recessed corners and to identify ways to best respond to those areas.</p><p>Harding Academy personnel also work closely with public safety officials to ensure that the new physical security improvements, as well as the policy and procedure updates at the academy, provide a safe environment for students, faculty, staff, and visitors. </p><p>--<br></p><p><em><strong>Kevin Davis, J.D., CPP</strong>, is the assistant director of public safety for Harding University in Searcy, Arkansas. He is a member of the ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, A former vice chairman for the Arkansas Chapter, and a member of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators.</em></p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/The-Evolution-of-Airport-Attacks.aspxThe Evolution of Airport Attacks<p>​The bustling Brussels Airport in Zaventem, Belgium, handles more than 500 flights a day, bringing more than 27,000 passengers into the facility with approximately the same number departing. Mornings are particularly busy at the airport, and amid the flurry of activity, it is little wonder that on March 22, 2016, three men emerging from a taxi outside of the departures hall passed through unnoticed. </p><p>The trio loaded their heavy suitcases onto baggage carts and entered the flow of people heading through the doors toward the ticket desks. Shortly after they entered the departures hall, the three split up to take their places in separate ticket lines.</p><p>Three minutes later, one of the men detonated his suitcase bomb, which had been packed with nails, as he stood in one of the check-in lanes. Approximately nine seconds after that, the second man detonated his suitcase bomb in another lane. The third suitcase bomb did not detonate immediately; surveillance camera footage showed that after being thrown to the ground by the second blast, the third man, Mohamed Abrini, simply got up and walked away from the airport toward the city center. </p><p>It is unknown whether he left because he got cold feet or because his device failed to detonate, but he was later arrested and charged with participation in the attack. Police bomb technicians destroyed Abrini’s bomb-filled suitcase, which they report may have been the largest of the three, in a controlled explosion. </p><p>The attack at Zaventem resulted in 17 deaths. Another 14 victims were killed when a fourth suicide bomb was detonated an hour later in a subway train at the Maalbeek metro station in Brussels. The coordinated attack was the deadliest in Belgian history. It was also a lethal reminder of the continuing threat to the soft parts of airports outside security checkpoints. ​</p><h4>Evolving Tactics<img src="/ASIS%20SM%20Callout%20Images/0417%20Feeature%204%20Infographic.jpg" class="ms-rtePosition-2" alt="" style="margin:5px;width:466px;" /></h4><p>The air transit system has been considered a prime target since the beginning of the modern era of terrorism. From a terrorist’s perspective, hundreds of people trapped inside a pressurized metal tube at 30,000 feet are ideal targets not only because the victims are so vulnerable, but because of the heavy media coverage such attacks generate. </p><p>For example, the photos of TWA 847 pilot John Testrake in the plane’s cockpit window being held at gunpoint by a Hezbollah hijacker became some of the most iconic images of 1980s terrorism.</p><p>Terrorist threats to aircraft spurred a series of security improvements, which were in turn answered by changes in terrorist weapons and tactics. The evolutionary—and deadly—game of cat-and-mouse between terrorist planners and aviation security officials has been occurring since the 1960s.</p><p>Initially there was very little security provided to the air transportation system, but a sharp increase in commercial airline hijackings in the 1960s and early 1970s led to enhanced airline security in the United States and Europe. High-profile hijackings led to greater and more widespread improvements to aviation security worldwide. </p><p>As hijackings became more difficult to conduct, terrorists began to direct their attention to aircraft bombings. Palestinian bombmakers created plastic explosives to look like everyday items in increasingly elaborate efforts to bring them onto aircraft undetected. The result was a number of airline bombing plots in the 1980s using concealed devices. </p><p>In 1987, North Korean agents destroyed a plane using a device hidden inside a radio to set off liquid explosives hidden in a liquor bottle. In another incident in 1986, explosives and the detonating device were hidden in a suitcase under a false bottom and a pocket calculator. Security detected the device before it could be taken aboard the plane. </p><p>Perhaps the most famous of these bombings was Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, a bombing that killed 243 passengers, including two of my colleagues, U.S. Diplomatic Security Service Special Agents Dan O’Connor and Ron Lariviere. </p><p>Despite security improvements, terrorists continued to focus on attacking aircraft. In 1994, an attacker assembled a bomb in the aircraft lavatory and left it on board when he deplaned at an intermediate stop on the flight’s course. The bombing was a dry run for a more complex strike against multiple airlines. </p><p>When security measures were improved in the 1990s to defend against this style of attack, terrorists adapted once again. While planning the 9/11 attack, hijackers used permissible carry-on items—like box cutters—to hijack planes and turn them into human-guided cruise missiles. </p><p>In response to post-2001 security crackdowns to protect against that type of attack, jihadists again shifted their tactics toward onboard suicide attacks with hidden bombs. The first of these was the failed December 2001 shoe bomb attack. When security officers began screening shoes routinely, aspiring airline bombers then shifted to a plot to fill camouflaged toiletry containers in carry-on baggage with liquid explosives.</p><p>The U.S. Transportation Security Administration subsequently intro­duced restrictions on the quantity of liquids that passengers could bring aboard an aircraft, and, in turn, a jihadist attempted an attack with a device that was sewn into a suicide operative’s underwear. </p><p>Once security measures were amend­ed to address the threat of underwear bombs, attackers turned to cargo aircraft, hiding improvised explosive devices in printer cartridges bound for the United States. </p><p>And the deadly escalation continues today. In November 2015, a bomb concealed in a soda can was smuggled onto an airliner in Egypt, killing 217. Three months later, another bomb, this one disguised in a laptop, was smuggled aboard a flight in Somalia. Fortunately, that bomb only killed the suicide operative when it detonated and the aircraft was able to return to the airport for an emergency landing.</p><p>However, not all attacks on aviation involve hijacking or smuggling bombs aboard aircraft. Just as terrorists adjusted for heightened security at embassies by targeting traveling diplomats, attackers have found ways to attack airline passengers even as it has become more difficult to attack aircraft. </p><p>Back in the mid-1980s, terrorists attacked crowds of airline passengers beyond the confines of airport security at ticket counters in Rome and Vienna. In November 2002, al Qaeda operatives attempted to attack an Israeli airliner in Kenya with a surface-to-air missile. A 2011 attack at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport took advantage of the facility’s soft areas, as did the Brussels attack. </p><p>In the wake of the Rome and Vienna attacks, perimeter security at airports in Europe was temporarily increased, but due to the cost and effort involved, soon reverted to business as usual. </p><p>Similar short-term increases in security posture at airports across the globe were seen in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and to a lesser extent following Domodedovo.  </p><p>The targeting of the soft side of airports is especially attractive to grassroots groups and individuals who lack the ability to construct bombs sophisticated enough to be smuggled through security. </p><p>The July 4, 2002, armed assault against a ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport and the June 2007 attack against the Glasgow Airport using a poorly constructed vehicle bomb are examples of attacks against the soft side of airports by poorly trained grassroots jihadists.​</p><h4>Expanding Danger</h4><p>In response to recent attacks in Brussels and Istanbul against the soft side of airports, security has again been increased. However, in many places this increased security is not much more than a show of force intended to reassure the traveling public and to perhaps deter poorly trained would-be terrorists. Without names or bag checks, it is difficult to keep a professional terrorist—especially one who has a ticket—away from the facility. </p><p>In some places, more thorough checkpoints have been established away from the airport to conduct initial screening. This tactic can be quite effective at smaller airports, but cumbersome at larger, busier airports where the heavy volume of travelers causes a backlog at the inspection point, thus effectively pushing the target away from the building to the crowd of people awaiting screening.   </p><p>It is important to remember that the objective of terrorist planners is to create a high body count and a large amount of publicity. This means that an attack against the soft side of an airport can be almost as good as an attack against an aircraft, and a successful attack against an airport is better than a failed or thwarted attack against a harder target. </p><p>As the security at airports is pushed outward in response to attacks against the soft sides of airports, and checkpoints are established away from the building, this merely moves the real target—the vulnerable group of people awaiting screening from inside the building—to an area outside of it.   </p><p>This principle was demonstrated during the June 28, 2016, attack against Istanbul’s Ataturk International Airport. In that attack, three operatives armed with AK-47s and suicide vests launched an attack on the soft side of the airport. Coming in the wake of the Brussels attack, and due to the overall high terrorist threat inside of Turkey, security was increased at Turkish airports, and armed security checkpoints were established at the entrances to the departure hall to prevent terrorists from entering the hall like they did in Brussels. </p><p>Shortly after the three attackers exited their cab outside the departure hall, they were confronted by police and a firefight erupted between the police and the attackers. The first operative was able to approach the security checkpoint and detonate his device amid the crowd. This device shattered a large window that permitted the second attacker to enter the building and begin searching for a crowd of people to target with his suicide bomb. </p><p>Fortunately, the second attacker was shot and immobilized before he could do so. The third attacker was pursued by the authorities and detonated his device in a parking lot, causing minimal damage like the second bomber. Between the gunfire and the first bomb, however, 45 victims were killed—nearly three times more than in Brussels. The bulk of the victims were outside the security checkpoint at the door to the departure hall. ​</p><h4>Staying Ahead of the Game</h4><p>Moving the security checkpoint outward from the airport simply moves the chokepoint outward, and the crowd of people waiting to get through that checkpoint remains vulnerable. This principle applies to many circumstances and locations beyond airports as well, posing a significant challenge to security professionals. While not an easy problem to address, some methods exist to mitigate the threat.</p><p>First, static security checkpoints themselves are not enough. It is necessary to establish outward-looking protective surveillance that extends beyond the property line. This surveillance also needs to focus on preoperational surveillance rather than just attack recognition. Once the attackers start shooting or detonating bombs, it can be helpful to quickly counter them and limit their access to additional victims, but it is far better to catch them at an earlier phase of the terrorist attack cycle. </p><p>Many large international airports are using surveillance technology that identifies suspicious behavior and alerts operators. The information collected by these programs can be shared with nearby airports, allowing them to keep an eye out for similar activity on their premises. </p><p>Terrorists often follow an attack planning cycle and are vulnerable to detection as they conduct the surveillance they require to carry out an attack. Terrorist operatives generally possess poor surveillance tradecraft and are not difficult to spot if people are looking for them. </p><p>But cops or soldiers manning a checkpoint at a door are not normally well positioned to spot such activity. This, ideally, needs to be accomplished by specialized units that have been trained in the craft of detecting surveillance and who are not tasked with manning checkpoints. Teams such as these will patrol parking areas and other spaces further away from the airport to identify potential threats.</p><p>This type of technology and information sharing between airports is imperative because attackers may scope out multiple facilities in a region. It is important for security teams at different airports to foster information sharing by alerting their counterparts to anomalous behavior.</p><p>Surveillance must also go beyond the use of cameras and should use a combination of human agents and cameras integrated with analytic software that can be used to help expand and direct the efforts of the humans. Cameras with nobody watching them are little better than no cameras at all. They may be useful for investigating an attack after the fact, but will be of little help in preventing an attack.  </p><p>Even in a case where the preoperational surveillance is missed and an attack is underway, personnel located beyond checkpoints can help to see problems as they are developing rather than allowing attackers to gain tactical surprise by permitting them to have free rein in areas where they can assemble and coordinate their attack.  </p><p>Furthermore, undercover operators can enjoy tactical surprise themselves and are in a great position to turn the tables on the attackers. Action is always faster than reaction, and if the attackers are permitted to draw and shoot first, it gives them a significant advantage over security forces. </p><p>A failed attack against a soft target venue in Garland, Texas, in May 2015, showed that security personnel manning the door of a facility can gain a life-or-death advantage in a firefight if they have advanced warning and a description of a potential threat. </p><p>In the Garland case, the FBI alerted local authorities of a potential threat to the event and provided the suspect’s vehicle description. This passing of critical intelligence prepared local officers for an impending attack. It also highlights the importance of intelligence sharing both horizontally and vertically within the law enforcement and security communities as they seek to secure airports and other soft targets.  </p><p><em><strong>Scott Stewart </strong>is vice president of tactical analysis at Stratfor.com and lead analyst for Stratfor Threat Lens. ​</em></p>GP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465