Supply Chain Chain StrategiesGP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652017-02-01T05:00:00Z, Holly Gilbert Stowell<p>​Take almost any product you have purchased in a store or used at home or work in the last week. Chances are, that object moved thousands of miles from where it was originally manufactured to the place where it was ultimately purchased or delivered to you. Organizations have intricate supply chain networks that are constantly moving every day around the world, and having an efficient supply chain security program ensures that movement of goods is not interrupted or compromised. </p><p>Security professionals must take a detailed look at the vendors who supply their assets and understand how those goods will be handled and ultimately implemented into their company’s operations or services. Following is a look at how a children’s hospital in Alabama applied supply chain security best practices to weather an unexpected storm, as well as provide for day-to-day operations. In addition, supply chain experts discuss lessons learned from their own experience of conducting risk assessments, following standards, and vetting suppliers and transporters to better protect company property. ​</p><h4>Alabama Children’s </h4><p>When a snowstorm hit Birmingham, Alabama, on January 28, 2014, the city was caught unawares. The snowfall, which quickly turned to ice, left thousands stranded on highways or in their offices. Children were stuck at school, their parents unable to pick them up. The event became known as “Snowpocalypse,” and news service called it “the winter storm that brought Birmingham to its knees.” </p><p>Hospitals were affected by the storm as well, including Children’s of Alabama. The pediatric center encountered vulnerabilities in its supply chain during that event it hadn’t previously considered, says Dennis Blass, CPP, PSP, director of safety and security at the hospital. </p><p><strong>Lessons learned. </strong>Every year the hospital conducts a hazards vulnerability assessment for its supply chain to find out where it can improve safety and security. “Once you identify your hazards and your vulnerabilities–the things that are dangerous to you or the things that you’re weak in–then you start peeling those back,” he says. “If we identify hazards that we need to correct, then we probably are going to create a management plan to correct those issues.” </p><p>Many displaced people in the community turned to the hospital for shelter when they had nowhere else to go. “We have a very prominent position in the Birmingham skyline, so if things look bad, the hospital looks like a place to go and get help–as it is,” Blass says. There were also clinic patients who had come to the hospital that morning for a routine checkup, planning to leave; many of them were stuck because of the snowstorm, which began around 10:30 a.m. local time.</p><p>Instead of being filled to the normal capacity of 300 people—the number of beds in the hospital—there were roughly  about 600 people who spent about 48 hours at the facility to ride out the storm.</p><p>The number of people at the hospital exposed one unforeseen vulnerability—obtaining clean linens from its supplier, which is separated from the hospital by a chain of mountains. “The supplier can wash the linens, but they can’t deliver them to us…we ended up making it, but that was a close call,” says Blass.</p><p>“We could handle supplies for patients, but we had a lot of people who just came to the hospital because it was a warm place to be,” according to Blass. “That had impacts on the amount of food that got consumed, and it had impacts on the amount of linens we went through. Just things that people need, supplies like toilet paper, things you don’t think a lot of.” </p><p>For those who weren’t patients, the hospital served smaller meals than normal; “sandwiches and soup, as opposed to meat and potatoes,” Blass says, to stretch resources. </p><p>The main drug supplier for the hospital is located in the same region, so obtaining critical medicine was not a concern during the storm. The hospital also has plenty of diesel fuel tanks, and can go for days without restocking. Only the insufficient linens, which must be sent off to a facility for proper sanitation before being returned to the hospital, turned out to be an issue.</p><p>“We did an after-action report on that experience, so we…put it in our emergency management plans for the future,” he notes.</p><p>The hospital’s emergency plans help ease any supply chain shortages. The institution follows the hospital incident command system (HICS) which assigns temporary duties to leadership during an emergency. For example, during the snowstorm, the chief operating officer of the hospital assumes the role of incident commander; an information officer is assigned to keep the community informed of hospital activities; and the plan also incorporates a medical officer, logistics chief, and planning chief. </p><p>During the incident, this system helped ensure proper patient care and as few gaps in the supply chain as possible. “Food was getting tight,” Blass says, and the food warehouses are not located near the hospital. “Because of the command structure, leadership can say, ‘okay you have a company credit card, we’ll contact the bank and raise your limit from $500 to $5,000 or whatever you need.’”</p><p>The U.S. Joint Commission, which certifies and accredits healthcare bodies, requires that hospitals have a group with representatives from various divisions that evaluates the standard of care they are providing to patients. Alabama Children’s has an environment of care committee that meets once a month to complete this requirement. “Our environment of care committee looks at things like safety, security, and resource management,” says Blass. “We have to meet the Joint Commission’s standard, and it surveys us every three years.” </p><p>Representatives on the team at Alabama Children’s include staff from the pharmacy, medical team, facilities, human resources, dining services, and more. This team ensures that there aren’t any gaps in the supply chain that would interrupt the hospital’s daily operations. As a rule, Blass says that having enough supplies for 96 hours will allow the facility to continue operating smoothly and efficiently. This includes a variety of items that the environment of care team must carefully think through and document. “You’re talking about water, fuel, basic sanitary supplies, and then you start talking about medicine and those things necessary for a hospital to run,” he says. </p><p>And there can be more than one type of each supply, a detail that, if overlooked, could mean life or death. “We have pumps that pump air, we have pumps that pump blood, we have pumps that pump saline, we have pumps that do many different things. You have to have all the things needed to make those supplies work for 96 hours,” he notes. </p><p>Keeping track of inventory is critical to determine whether the hospital has a sufficient supply of each item. Blass says that the hospital is moving toward a perpetual inventory system, where a new item is ordered as soon as one is pulled off the shelf. </p><p>There is a downside to stocking too many items, which is why it’s a delicate balance between having 96 hours’ worth of supplies and more than enough. “Space is expensive. And if you want to have enough water for four days, how much water is that? Where do you put it? How do you keep it fresh?” He adds that the hospital must be thoughtful in its policies and procedures on maintaining its inventory to avoid any issues.  </p><p>Thankfully, Blass notes, t​he 2014 snowstorm only lasted 48 hours. “The size of the surge exceeded our plan, but the length of the surge was shorter than our plans, so it all worked out,” he says. </p><p>And not every element of securing the supply chain is tangible; the information and communication pieces are also critical. “Every day we’re getting blood supplies in, and other kinds of materials that must be treated very carefully,” he says. Special instructions need to be followed in many cases. For example, there may be medicine that must be stored at a precise temperature until 30 minutes before it’s dispensed. That information must be communicated from the pharmacist to the supplier, and sometimes to security, who can give special access to the supplier when it delivers the drugs. </p><p>Blass is a member of the ASIS International Supply Chain and Transportation Security Council. He helped develop an American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ASIS standard for supply chain security, Supply Chain Risk Management: A Compilation of Best Practices Standard (SCRM), which was released in July 2014. The standard provides supply chain security guidelines for companies, and has illustrations of what exemplary supply chain models look like.</p><p><strong>Best practices.</strong> Marc Siegel, former chair of the ASIS Global Standards Initiative, also participated in the creation of the ANSI/ASIS standard, which provides explanations of how to look at managing risk in the supply chain. “It’s based on the experiences of companies that have very sophisticated supply chain operations,” he tells Security Management. “The companies that put it together were really looking at having a document that they could give to their suppliers, to help them look at themselves and think of things that they should be doing and preparing for.” </p><p>Siegel is now director of security and resilience projects for the homeland security graduate program at San Diego State University. He promotes supply chain mapping, which takes a risk management–based approach to supply chain security. “Traditionally, a lot of security people have looked at supply chain as logistics security,” he says, “whereas companies with major supply chain considerations have been moving more into an enterprise risk management perspective.” These organizations take an across-the-board look at risks that could create a disruption in the supply chain, asking themselves what the specific things are that could interrupt or prevent them from manufacturing or delivering their product. </p><p>Siegel says there is a disproportionate focus on bad actors and intentional acts as threats to the supply chain, when more often it’s a natural disaster or accident that causes the most significant disruptions. “The broader risk management perspective is also looking at, ‘Is there a potential for a storm, is there a potential for political disorder, or instability in a region, that can cause a delay in processing?’” Only then, he says, are companies efficiently mapping out all the factors that could introduce uncertainty.</p><p>Maintaining a broader perspective will keep organizations from fixating on two of the most common hangups in supply chain security. “You have people who fixate on ‘everything is a threat,’ and you have people who fixate on ‘everything is a vulnerability,’ and if you only fixate on those two things you’re going to miss a lot of stuff,” Siegel says.</p><p>Blass agrees. “When we start that annual hazards vulnerability assessment, I’m going to look through the standard and notes I’ve written myself to make sure I’ve got everything covered,” he notes. “You can never rest and say, ‘well, we’re safe and secure and we don’t have to do anything else,’ because the threats keep changing.”   ​</p><p>--</p><h4>Sidebar: assess risk<br></h4><p> </p><div>​For the co​rporation that produces the F-35 fighter jet and other advanced technologies for the U.S. government, supply chain security is of utmost importance. “The threats that we face are universal in nature due to the size and the complexity of our supply chain,” says Vicki Nichols, supply chain security lead for Lockheed Martin’s Aeronautics business. </div><div><br> </div><div>Lockheed Martin Aeronautics assesses the supply chain in a number of categories, but Nichols works most closely with cargo security. “The threats there are cargo disruption, unmanifested cargo, and anti-Western terrorism,” she notes. </div><div><br> </div><div>The division conducts a risk assessment of its international suppliers. “We look at what type of products they provide us and how vulnerable that product is to manipulation or intellectual property theft, and we look at country risk,” she says.  </div><div><br> </div><div>The company sends a questionnaire to its suppliers, and comes up with an overall score for each of them based on 10 criteria, including country risk and transportation mode. In many cases, it also sends field personnel to evaluate the supplier’s facility. “If we know we have eyes and ears going in and out of the facility, and those people are trained to recognize red flags, then we know we have a lower threat because of our presence,” she says. </div><div><br> </div><div>After one such site check at a facility in Italy, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics determined that the use of technology was warranted to further enhance security. “The concern was that the area was known for introduction of unmanifested cargo—weapons, cargo disruption,” she notes. “We began to look at tamper-evident technologies, and track-and-trace devices that would allow us to know if someone had opened or tampered with the freight.”  </div><div><br> </div><div>Lockheed Martin has a corporate supply chain security council that meets at least once a month to provide updates and discuss any issues that arise. Representatives from the company include human resources, personnel security, physical security, and counterintelligence. Stakeholders from major partner organizations are also invited to participate.</div><div><br> </div><div>Lockheed Martin Aeronautics also works closely with law enforcement and federal intelligence sources who disseminate relevant information to the company. “We subscribe to some intelligence data that is cargo-specific, so we issue a spotlight report about three times a week just to keep people engaged and aware of the threats in the supply chain,” she notes. </div><div><br> </div><div>Supplier engagement is also critical, Nichols says, so the company stays in touch with about 120 suppliers internationally. </div><div><br> </div><div>Sometime in 2017, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics plans to purchase a software management tool that will release supplier questionnaires in the native language for countries it does business with. It will tap existing resources such as “Supplier Wire” to offer training to the supply base. “This will be another evolution on how we can engage, rather than just sending them to a website,” Nichols says. “I think it’s important for our supply base to see how seriously we take security, so they will take it seriously as well.”​</div><div><br> </div><h4>sidebar: consult standards<br></h4><p> </p><p>​Laura Hains, CPP, operations manager, supply chain security and consulting at Pinkerton, member of the ASIS International Supply Chain and​ Transportation Security Council, says that companies should research whether their partners and suppliers are following major supply chain security protocols, like those put out by ASIS, and others such as the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) standards for trucking companies. “TAPA is one of the big authorities on trucking, so if a company says they are TAPA certified, that to me says that they follow protocol,” she says. </p><p>Other standards include the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security which U.S. President Barack Obama signed in 2012 and was designed to enhance public-private partnerships. Arthur Arway, CPP, author of Supply Chain Security: A Comprehensive Approach, says the framework seeks to combine input from government and industry on protecting the transport of goods to and from the United States. “I think the government is far more willing to seek out subject matter experts and all the different modes and companies that may transport goods into the United States for their help,” he says. Arway adds the document is relatively recent, and that it could take a while before it is widely adopted. </p><p>Though terrorism is an uncommon threat to the supply chain, it must always be a consideration. Hains gives the example of vehicular attacks. In Nice, France, on July 14, 2016, Tunisia native Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel drove a 19-ton cargo truck into a crowd of Bastille Day festival-goers. That attack killed 86 people and injured more than 400. New York police also warned of possible vehicular terrorism against the 2016 Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade. “A small company truck—that could be a target,” notes Hains. “So everybody has to think about terrorism because it’s out there.”</p><p>Another standard at the national level seeking to combat terrorism within the supply chain is the U.S. Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The program is voluntary for private industry, but Arway says the national standards as a whole are seeing global adoption.​</p><p>“Standards have come a long way in how they’ve been able to incorporate security into the movement of goods,” he notes. “Many countries have accepted these programs into their own supply chain security programs.”​</p>

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Hains and her team opened the back of the container and began unloading it. As the supervisor, Hains offered to climb in first. It took almost two hours of rearranging and removing boxes to reach the center of the container, and each step Hains took destroyed the cargo beneath her feet. She dug down, looking for the anomaly…and discovered a crate of wine the shippers had sent as a Christmas present. </p><p>Hains has seen a lot in her 20-plus years in the port security industry, and fortunately most of her experiences have been as benign as the Christmas incident. However, she says it’s only a matter of time until some group takes advantage of the maritime supply chain to debilitate a U.S. port, or worse.</p><p>“The fear is that out of the 4 million containers that arrive in U.S. ports each year from around the world, all it takes is one to bring a dirty bomb,” Hains said during a maritime security session at the ASIS International 60th Annual Seminar and Exhibits.</p><p>And Hains is not the only one with concerns about port security. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently published reports and testified before Congress about the challenges faced by port security programs, as well as the need for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to address port cybersecurity. </p><p>Stephen Caldwell—who last month retired as director of homeland security and justice at GAO—spearheaded the two reports, Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security Programs and DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity. He says that one issue plaguing U.S. ports is the failure to assess various security programs.</p><p> “There are a lot of challenges in developing meaningful performance measures,” Caldwell says. “In terms of the security measures you have in place and your ability to measure the things you have in place, there are real difficulties in measuring things like deterrents and security.”</p><p>That’s not surprising, considering the activity that takes place at U.S. maritime ports. More than $1.3 trillion in cargo enters the country by sea annually, and approximately 90 percent of the goods consumed in the United States come by vessel, Hains said. Two ports, the Port of New York and New Jersey and the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach, receive half of all those containers.</p><p>“As security experts, that should be a little alarming to you, because that means that if those two ports got hit, 50 percent of our container traffic would go down,” Hains noted.</p><p>DHS is the lead federal department when it comes to port security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) controls who can enter the ports. The U.S. Coast Guard conducts facility and vessel inspections at ports, and the CBP is involved in screening throughout the global supply chain process.</p><p>Port security, and maritime supply chain security in particular, is dictated by a number of laws and regulations intended to enhance security. Some of these regulations were analyzed in the GAO reports. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE), along with the 9/11 Commission Act, requires DHS to implement 100 percent screening of all cargo that enters U.S. ports, as well as 100 percent physical scanning of high-risk cargo. And the Container Security Initiative (CSI) places CBP officials at selected foreign ports to assess the risks of shipping out of that country. </p><p>Here’s how a shipping container moves from overseas to a U.S. port under the various shipping regulations: Before the cargo container is loaded onto a vessel, its manifest—the list of cargo in the container—is screened by CBP and a risk score is assigned to the container by an automated targeting system. Where it’s coming from, whether it’s from a trusted shipping company, and the type of cargo being shipped are all factors considered. If the score passes a certain threshold, it’s flagged for extra radiation and x-ray scanning, in accordance with the SAFE Port Act. If it passes, the vessel is then sent on its way and eventually arrives in a U.S. port, where, depending on the targeting system score, it may undergo another x-ray or radiation scan. </p><p>This current method concerns Hains. The risk score is based on the manifest, not the cargo itself, and it doesn’t necessarily account for a stop in another country before arriving in the United States. For example, a container could be shipped from Pakistan to Spain, then from Spain to England, put on a new boat in England, and sent to the United States. The CBP officials at the receiving port will only know that the container came from England and may not screen it as thoroughly, Hains explained. </p><p>“These containers and ships move by trust, based on what’s on the manifest, passenger list, and port assessments,” Hains said. “Every day in the United States, vessels arrive and containers arrive, and we believe what it says on the manifest.”</p><p>The GAO also found flaws in the current system. The agency notes that the automated targeting system used to rate containers is based on outdated intelligence information, and Caldwell says the organization is auditing the ranking program to learn more about how effective the practice is. </p><p>Another concern the GAO raised in its reports is the effectiveness of screening mandated by the SAFE Port Act. The law was initially supposed to be implemented in July 2012, but in May 2014 the secretary of homeland security extended the deadline until May 2016. However, only an estimated 4.1 percent of containers are currently x-rayed before they come to the United States. </p><p>“DHS’s position is that this is not doable and not something that really makes sense, but it’s still a statutory requirement and will remain so until the law is revised,” Caldwell explains.</p><p>GAO found that some international privacy laws prevent the sharing of screening information, which makes the SAFE Port Act challenging to implement, Caldwell says. After a container is scanned overseas, communicating the findings becomes difficult due to issues such as who owns the data, whether it can be shared with the United States, and even whether CBP, a private company, or the host government should do the scanning. DHS believes that scanning all cargo, including trusted or low-risk containers, is not the best use of its resources, he explains. </p><p>“Even if you went to that 100 percent scanning, until you look at the details of the implementation, it’s hard to know if it would even improve security,” Caldwell asserts. “If there’s no training standard, then you get the Pakistanis or Indonesians, as well as others, like the Brits and New Zealand, and do they have the same training? Do they have the same level of skill in interpreting those x-ray images?”</p><p>The CSI, which places border patrol officials in foreign ports to conduct risk assessments, is “the biggest boondoggle that the CBP has,” Hains said. According to the GAO report, CBP has not assessed the risks posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States since 2005, which means that many of the 58 foreign ports that participate in the initiative haven’t been assessed for threats in a decade. Both Caldwell and Hains question how well the foreign ports are managed by CBP officials.</p><p>Another concern Caldwell has is the sustainability of the current port security systems. Budget cuts have caused both CBP and Coast Guard personnel to be pulled from port security. </p><p>In June of last year, the GAO released an entire report on port cybersecurity. Like most critical infrastructure, maritime stakeholders rely on numerous types of information and communications technologies to manage cargo, the report states. Port owners and operators are responsible for the cybersecurity of their operations, but the report found that ports are receiving little to no guidance from the federal government. </p><p>The report cites a 2011 cyberattack on the Port of Antwerp as an illustration. In that incident, hackers accessed the computer systems of two container terminals, which allowed them to track and control the movements of certain containers. Criminals in another country would place illegal goods in a container, and once it arrived in Antwerp the hackers could divert it so it would not be screened before it left the port. This went on for two full years until officials arrested nine members of the criminal group in 2013 and seized almost a ton of heroin, as well as firearms and other contraband. </p><p>Caldwell says he was surprised at how weak maritime cybersecurity initiatives are. “There have been national-level strategies and presidential directives that have clearly said, ‘Hey, federal government, you need to start looking at the cyber as well as the physical aspects of security.’ And yet the Coast Guard was not moving smartly.” Since the cybersecurity report came out, Caldwell says the Coast Guard has agreed to take steps to address the cybersecurity threat. </p><p>One way to make the supply chain more secure and consistent is proper training, Hains said. Due to budget cuts and CBP reorganization, it’s increasingly common for immigration officials with little to no customs and shipping training to be put in charge of interpreting the cargo risk assessments. </p><p>A well-trained official should be able to consider not only the manifest and the automated risk assessment score, but the origin of the products, the weight of the crate, and more. Hains said that an experienced official may notice that the container weighs more than it should as indicated by the manifest, or that it’s from a first-time shipping company, even though it’s from a trusted country. These would make the container high-risk, and officials could further scan the cargo before it gets to U.S. shores.</p><p>Another solution Hains advocates for is the implementation of container security devices. She notes that the technology is still new and expensive, but the sensors can be retrofitted onto any container and would alert officials to the presence of numerous chemical tracers, as well as carbon dioxide to detect humans, light sensors to detect whether the container has been compromised, and geofencing to make sure the container or its contents aren’t stolen. </p><p>“It’s the only way we’re going to make ourselves safe,” Hains said.</p>GP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465 Review: Workplace Safety<p>Butterworth-Heinema​nn;; 180 pages; $49.95.</p><p>The threat of workplace violence is a continuous issue affecting the well-being of the American workforce. Horrific reports and images of violent acts in the workplace appear far too often in the media, disrupting the safety, well-being, and productivity of the general public. </p><p>In an attempt to help businesses and organizations deter or deflect these violent acts, Randall W. Ferris and Daniel Murphy authored <em>Workplace Safety: Establishing an Effective Violence Prevention Program. </em>This is a well-intended book designed to help organizations with the development of policies and practices to prevent violence in the workplace. The book offers information on applicable topics, including relevant definitions, justifications for workplace violence procedures, explanations of various types of violence, environmental causes, and possible motives behind the attacks, as well as details for creating and implementing methods to prevent violent incidents. The authors draw from the guidelines presented in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s standards for the prevention of workplace violence as their primary source of creditable information.</p><p>The book reads more like a how-to manual than a professional publication. The chapters are consistently formatted with a motivational quote, chapter contents, an abstract, and applicable key words. The chapters include various personal experiences from the authors, fictitious scenarios, and bulleted or numerical lists pertaining to the chapter’s content. Further diluting the professionalism is the use of common or slang terms in text that is often brash or casual. </p><p>There is value here for some audiences. For organizations that have not developed procedures to deter or respond to violent incidents in the workplace and those that do not understand the concept of these issues, this could be a helpful guide. Those working in human resources or facility management and individuals who are new to security management can gain some useful information. Also, managers desiring to completely redesign or reevaluate their workplace violence policies might use this book as a starting point. However, it should be viewed as a supplemental publication and not a primary source. Workplace Safety: Establishing an Effective Violence Prevention Program will not impress the educated or experienced reader or introduce new concepts that have not been previously explored. </p><p><em><strong>Reviewer: Joseph Jaksa, Ph.D., CPP, </strong>is an associate professor of criminal justice at Michigan’s Saginaw Valley State University. He is a member of ASIS International and the Saginaw Valley Chapter of ASIS.  </em></p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465 Chain Security: A Comprehensive Approach <p dir="ltr" style="text-align:left;">​<em>CRC Press;; 189 pages; $69.95.</em></p><p dir="ltr" style="text-align:left;">Author Arthur Arway brings the reader into the world of supply chain security by looking at the why, the what, and the how in Supply Chain Security: A Comprehensive Approach. He also demonstrates how important it is to instill a culture of security in and around the supply chain, showing how a weak link in the chain can bring the rest of it crashing down.</p><p dir="ltr" style="text-align:left;">One section of the book is devoted to the regulations and resources available to a security practitioner; this is especially valuable to people who are new to the field. Additional value is brought to the text by including sample documents such as plans and budgets that can be used in a supply chain security program. Lastly, the addition of real case studies helps to dem­onstrate the lessons taught by this book.</p><p dir="ltr" style="text-align:left;">Based on my own experience at the third-largest seaport in the United States, I can confirm that the enormity and complexity of the supply chain can become overwhelming, even to a seasoned security manager. This book certainly earns a place on the bookshelf of the security professional looking to explore the world of supply chain security, as well as the practitioner just starting in the field who needs a solid reference.</p><p dir="ltr" style="text-align:left;"><em><strong>Reviewer:</strong> Bill Crews, CPP, served as the director of port security and emergency operations at the Port of Houston Authority in Texas. He is a member of the ASIS International Houston Chapter.</em></p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465