Perimeter Protection

 

 

https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/YouTube-HQ-Shooting-What-We-Know-So-Far.aspxASIS Physical Security Council Reacts to YouTube ShootingGP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652018-04-05T04:00:00Zhttps://adminsm.asisonline.org/pages/holly-gilbert-stowell.aspx, Holly Gilbert Stowell<p><strong>YouTube Headquarters Perimeter Security Questioned</strong><br></p><p>​By Lilly Chapa​<br></p><p>The ability of the shooter to gain access to YouTube's office courtyard via the parking garage raises questions about the building's physical security. ASIS International Physical Security Council secretary <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/dave-pedreira-daoc-cdt-cspm-fdai-leed-green-assoc-7a533110/" target="_blank">David Pedreira​</a>, a Distinguished Architectural Openings Consultant (DAOC) and door opening consultant for ASSA ABLOY, tells Security Management that when it comes to Deter, De​tect, and Delay security principles, the role of perimeter security is to deter—and that didn't happen at YouTube headquarters.<br></p><p>"I wonder why there wasn't more electrified locking access control doors to keep people out at the parking garage," Pedreira says. "Why was it free entry, why was she able to get right in?"</p><p>With properly-function fail-secure electrified locking devices at perimeter points of entry, authorized personnel would gain entry through an access control card or their mobile device, and visitors would be rerouted. Pedreira notes that many companies leave doors unlocked during normal business hours to cater to visitors.</p><p>"In this day and age, we don't need to do that," Pedreira says. "There's video doorbells, there's so much that could be done with intercoms and video surveillance cameras that could easily be set up so that a visitor could be at any location and be allowed in via the remote unlocking of a door."</p><p>Pedreira advises organizations to make sure all points of ingress are locked regardless of business hours, but to make sure points of ingress are never blocked, which would prevent the quick escape of people ​during an incident like Tuesday's shooting.</p><p>After the shooting, YouTube released a statement saying that ​the shooter entered through the parking garage to the outside courtyard, and committed the violence there. "Thanks to the security protections in place, she never entered the building itself," the statement said. ​However, one employee tweeted after the shooting that he had seen blood stains on the floor and stairs of the building. ​​</p><p>The shooter exhibited unusual behavior in the days following up to the incident, leaving her home in San Diego and staying in her car in Mountain View. Her family filed a missing person report in San Diego on Saturday, and when officers found her sleeping in her car, she told them she had left home due to family issues. Mountain View police said they contacted her family to let them know she had been found. She also visited a gun range prior to carrying out the shooting Tuesday afternoon.</p><p>Pedreira notes that when it comes to these types of events, hindsight is 20/20 and the police appear to hav​e acted appropriately.  "So she was sleeping in her car, how would they know of her intent unless her handgun was visible on the dash or something?" he asks. Even then, "who would think that all of a sudden, just because she has a grudge against YouTube, she's going to take out a handgun and attack their office?" he asks.</p><p><strong>What We Know So Far:</strong></p><ul><li><p>A shooting at the YouTube headquarters in San Bruno, California, occurred on Tuesday morning around 12:46 p.m. local time.  </p></li><li><p>The assailant has been identified as<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/04/us/youtube-hq-shooting/index.html" target="_blank"> Nasim Najafi Aghdam, 39, of San Diego.</a> The Iranian-born woman blogged about veganism and made heated claims online that YouTube was limiting viewers of her videos, CNN reports.</p></li><li><p>"We know she was upset with YouTube, and now we've determined that was the motive," San Bruno Police Chief Ed Barberini said. </p></li><li><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/04/youtube-shooting-suspect-was-upset-with-some-of-the-practices-or-policies-the-company-had-police-say/?utm_term=.2673a7a48b24" target="_blank">Aghdam had an encounter with police in Mountain View, California</a>, in the early hours before the shooting when they found her sleeping in her car, "but did not set off any alarms during their interaction," the<em> Washington Post </em>reports. She then went on to a gun range to practice shooting. </p></li><li><p>Using a 9mm semiautomatic handgun, Aghdam critically wounded a man and seriously injured two women. Two of the three victims been released from the hospital. The shooter appeared to target her victims at random at the campus that houses about 2,000 employees, according to police. </p></li><li><p>Her<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/04/youtube-shooter-was-vegan-blogger-who-accused-site-of-discrimination.html" target="_blank"> family says they warned police before the shooting.</a> "Californian media reported that Aghdam's family had warned authorities that she could target YouTube prior to the shooting," according to CNBC. "The San Jose Mercury News quoted her father, Ismail Aghdam, as saying he had told police that she might go to YouTube's headquarters because she 'hated'​ the company."                </p></li></ul><div><p><strong><br></strong> </p><p><strong>FBI Data: Female Shooters are Rare  </strong></p><p><strong><img class="ms-rtePosition-2" src="/ASIS%20SM%20Article%20Images/nasim-aghdam%20headshot.jpg" alt="" style="margin:5px;width:440px;height:240px;" /></strong></p><p>As CNN reports, FBI data shows that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/04/health/female-shooters-youtube/index.html" target="_blank">female active shooters are rare.​</a> Only 220 U.S. active shooter incidents identified by the Bureau between 2000 to 2016–roughly four percent–were carried out by women. </p><p>"The women in those shootings were usually armed with handguns and opened fire inside colleges, businesses, their current or former workplaces, according to the list," the article states. </p><p>In addition, 2016 FBI data shows only 7.6 percent of murder offenders that year were female.</p><p>The YouTube shooting may not end up being classified as a mass shooting, as one victim has been released and two remain in the hospital. ​</p></div><div>                                                                                                                                                                        <strong><em> Photo: San Bruno Police Department</em></strong></div><p><strong>Google Announces Security Increases at YouTube Offices Around the Globe</strong></p><p>Google announced on<a href="https://twitter.com/Google_Comms/status/981669726593019904/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5etfw&ref_url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/05/youtube-to-increase-security-at-its-offices-worldwide-after-shooting.html"> Twitter that it will increase security at its YouTube offices </a>around the globe after the shooting at the video platform's headquarters in San Bruno, California. The attack, which took place around 12:46 p.m. local time, left three people wounded. A female assailant–identified as Nasim Najafi Aghdam, 39, of San Diego–entered the campus's courtyard through a parking garage. Soon after police responded, she was dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Internet giant Google, which owns YouTube, said in a statement that Tuesday evening's events were "shocking and disturbing," and also praised San Bruno law enforcement as well as YouTube employees for "acts of heroism" during the attack. The company is also encouraging employees to take time off work to recover, and ensures that "wellness services are readily available." </p><p>​</p><div class="ms-rtestate-read ms-rte-wpbox"><div class="ms-rtestate-notify ms-rtestate-read 43cc8fa0-fcc6-4ec3-a833-770583ef80ed" id="div_43cc8fa0-fcc6-4ec3-a833-770583ef80ed"></div><div id="vid_43cc8fa0-fcc6-4ec3-a833-770583ef80ed" style="display:none;"></div></div>​

Perimeter Protection

 

 

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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Active-Assailant,-Unarmed-Officer.aspxActive Assailant, Unarmed Officer<p>​The concept that small acts can have large ramifications is called the butterfly effect. The phrase, based on a thesis by American mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz, refers to the idea that a butterfly's wings could create tiny changes in the atmosphere that may ultimately delay, accelerate, or even prevent the occurrence of a tornado in another location.</p><p>The level of awareness exhibited by security personnel can have a butterfly effect on an active assailant's perception of risk. Active shooter attacks often end when the perpetrator is apprehended or killed by law enforcement, or when the attacker commits suicide—rarely do assailants run or escape. Having security guards onsite may mitigate the chances of an attack, but this type of embedded response is no guarantee that the attacker will be deterred or stopped.  </p><p>In the case of the Orlando Pulse Nightclub massacre, for example, there was a uniformed Orlando police officer onsite providing security. At Mandalay Bay where a gunman opened fire on the crowd below, killing 59 people, a security officer exchanged gunfire with the assailant during the massacre. And most recently, an armed school resource officer was on campus during the February shooting that killed 17 people at a high school in Parkland, Florida. </p><p>However, security officers can also focus on the events that occur before an attack. People who intend to commit violence often give themselves away by their physical appearance or behavior. By engaging people with simple hospitality principles, a security officer is more likely to observe warning signs. This enhanced awareness allows the guard to implement security methods that may deter the attacker. </p><p>Even when the worst-case scenario occurs, a security officer's situational awareness is critical. Early detection enables officers to respond more quickly and help others by providing instructions that can mitigate the attack. By observing physical and behavioral cues, acting upon concerns, and implementing effective response methods, unarmed guards can help prevent or mitigate active assailant attacks.​</p><h4>Preattack Indicators </h4><p>Because most attacks represent the killer's first and last act of violence, the assailant often exhibits telltale signs of the incident to come. With little to no prior criminal record or experience in extreme violence, they may show behavioral and physical indicators that give their bad intentions away. Looking out for these early warning signs, or preattack indicators (PAINs), can alert the security practitioner to potential trouble and possibly thwart attacks. </p><p>PAINs are physical actions that include movement patterns, carried objects, appearance, or dress. They are also behavioral elements, such as facial expressions or demeanor. PAINs do not automatically indicate danger, because they can be consistent with perfectly innocent explanations. By carefully and prudently observing people who are determined not to be a danger, the officer can learn how to better distinguish future threats.</p><p>In the rare instances when PAINs are associated with imminent danger and immediate action is required, awareness will greatly improve response, because the element of surprise that may elicit the fight-or-flight response is removed. </p><p><strong>Normalcy bias.</strong> Trying to look for someone in a crowd who could be an attacker is like looking for a needle in a stack of needles. Since active assailant attacks are rare, there is a tendency to discredit PAINs in favor of the norm. Effective security requires a certain level of paranoia that avoids the "it can't happen here" mentality.</p><p>Establishing a thorough understanding of what is normal allows the guard to have a baseline. Then the security officer remains alert and vigilant during normal activities, and can easily transition to a heightened state of alert when a change occurs to the baseline.</p><p><strong>Customer service.</strong> Proactivity on the part of the guard is not to be confused with aggression, because customer service is still a priority. Security should view each person as a customer, not a suspect, until a significant change to the baseline occurs. Professional and nonthreatening behavior from security is more likely to elicit cooperation. </p><p>In customer service, the 10-5 Rule is a gold standard. The rule states that when the staff member is within 10 feet of guests, staff should make eye contact and smile to acknowledge them. Within five feet of a guest, a sincere greeting or friendly gesture should accompany the eye contact and smile. </p><p>The 10-5 Rule reminds others of the presence of a professional security force while keeping the security officer engaged with visitors. </p><p>Making eye contact with a person is an effective first step to determine if a basic level of mutual trust exists. At around 10 feet, make brief eye contact with a pleasant demeanor, then scan for PAINs. (See infographic, page 41.)</p><p>If PAINs are observed, engage the person in a focused conversation. In this context, professionalism is key. A focused conversation should not resemble interrogation. </p><p><strong>Active engagement.</strong> The purpose of a focused conversation is to determine if the person poses a risk. A polite "where are you heading?" to learn that person's trip story can be an effective conversation starter.  </p><p>There are two types of trip stories—past and future. A past trip means the person has completed the purpose of the trip, and a future trip means the person is on their way to a specific place. This basic framework helps the officer determine whether the trip story is verifiable by providing specific details of sights seen and actions taken. A vague, unverifiable trip story does not indicate imminent violence, but it does indicate deception.</p><p>Officers should expect occasional negative reactions and be prepared to encounter individuals who refuse to cooperate. Appropriate measures should be taken to deal with such persons, including asking for another officer to help and continuing to question the individual.</p><p><strong>Low-risk groups.</strong> Just as there are universal indicators of imminent danger, there are groups of people that, absent an overt hostile act, can be statistically discounted as a threat. These low-risk groups can be removed from the 10-5 Rule, including families, children, people older than 70 years, known guests of the facility, and people known and trusted by the officer. </p><p><strong>High-risk people. </strong>After the focused conversation, those not eliminated as a possible threat must be monitored. Ideally, the person can be denied access and escorted out of the area. If not, supervisors need to be alerted and the person should be followed by an officer. Using video surveillance is also a possibility. The officer should be prepared to document their concerns and articulate—based on PAINs and the focused conversation—why the person was considered a threat.</p><p>If it becomes apparent that the person is dangerous, immediate action should be taken. The first step is to alert others and request assistance. The following actions will be based upon the perceived threat and the location. Options may range from initiating heightened security procedures and observing the subject to an immediate evacuation of the area.​</p><h4>Attack Response</h4><p>Regardless of the specific factors leading up to the situation, it is imperative that security officers understand how to respond to a violent attack.  </p><p>Some responses require compartmentalizing occupants away from the assailant, which is associated with the lockdown concept. However, not all situations call for these measures. Lockdown or compartmentalization is a valid tactic, but it lacks the flexibility needed to adequately mitigate all active assailant attacks. A lockdown does not help people in areas that cannot be secured or those having direct contact with the perpetrator. In an active assailant attack, these are the people at the greatest risk.</p><p>Not every human-based threat or intrusion requires Run. Hide. Fight. decisions. Under these far more common nonactive shooter events, using the word "lockdown" can cause a high percentage of occupants to falsely assume there is an active shooter, creating unnecessary panic and anxiety. Instead, these scenarios require heightened security procedures.</p><p><strong>Heightened procedures. </strong>Situations requiring heightened security can range from a threat of school or workplace violence to civil unrest. What measures are taken to increase security depend on several factors, including the nature of the threat, the mission of the facility, the architecture and layout of the facility, and law enforcement presence or response time. </p><p>Based on these factors, leaders must determine which measures are most prudent given the circumstances, and security officers should be prepared to guide facility occupants. </p><p>When necessary, guards should communicate the fact that security has been heightened in simple language, such as "Attention, guests: we have a situation that requires heightened security. Please move inside a secure location." These messages get people's attention without causing unnecessary panic. Additional information can be shared as needed. </p><p><strong>Attacks.</strong> All leading U.S. federal preparedness and response organizations, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Education, and the U.S. Department of Justice, recommend the option-based Run. Hide. Fight. approach. This recommendation is not limited to U.S. government agencies—Run. Hide. Fight. can be applied to many organizations and settings.</p><p>When deciding which option is best, determining whether the guard has direct or indirect contact with the shooter is essential. Direct contact means there are no barriers between the guard's location and the attacker, and the assailant is close enough to pose immediate danger.</p><p>With indirect contact, the attacker is inside or near the facility or general area, but distance or barriers delay the attacker's ability to cause harm.</p><p>After determining the level of contact, the survival options of the protocol are applied. 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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Surveillance-and-Stereotypes.aspxSurveillance and Stereotypes<p>​Juveniles make up 40 percent of the shoplifters in the United States. Shoplifters, in total, contribute to billions of dollars of loss each year, according to the National Association for Shoplifting Prevention’s 2014 report <em>Shop­lifting Statistics.</em></p><p>To combat adolescent shoplifting, according to the report, retailers depend on private security officers combined with other security measures, including security cameras, observation mirrors, and radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. </p><p>The key to apprehending juveniles during or after shoplifting, however, is to correctly determine whom to surveil. Security personnel often rely on a combination of common underlying physical characteristics—race, gender, and age—and behavioral indices—glancing at clerks nervously, assessing security measures, and loitering—to distinguish shoppers from potential shoplifters. </p><p>Are these surveillance decisions a result of bias? To find out, the authors conducted original academic research funded by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York on how stereotypes play into who is suspected of shoplifting, how that suspect is dealt with, and what private security can do to limit discriminatory practices.​</p><h4>Existing Data</h4><p>A 2003 Journal of Experimental Psychology article, “The Influence of Schemas, Stimulus Ambiguity, and Interview Schedule on Eyewitness Memory Over Time,” which discussed research findings and lawsuits against retailers, concluded that stereotypes of juvenile shoplifters may unduly influence security officers to target juveniles on the basis of their physical characteristics, rather than their behaviors.</p><p>Over the past 20 years, the media has reported on cases in which the retail industry engaged in discriminatory practices. This is known as consumer racial profiling (CRP), “the use of race and or ethnicity to profile customers.” According to a 2011 study in the Criminal Justice Review, “Public Opinion on the Use of Consumer Racial Profiling to Identify Shoplifters: An Exploratory Study,” officers sometimes use CRP to determine which juvenile shoppers are potential or actual thieves. </p><p>Most people develop negative stereotypes about juvenile thieves through exposure to various types of media, particularly when they reside in areas that contain few minorities. The media has the unique ability to both shape and perpetuate society’s beliefs about which juveniles typically commit offenses through its selective coverage of crimes. </p><p>It is also common for the media to portray adolescents—particularly boys—as criminals. Biases are then used, whether consciously or unconsciously, in the private sector by retailers and security officers to target shoppers, and in the public sector by those in the legal system, including law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and even legislators, to arrest and prosecute thieves.</p><p>The consequences of applying discriminatory practices can be seen in the private sector through lawsuits against retailers. Ethnic minority shoppers purport that they were targeted through excessive surveillance—and even through false arrests. </p><p>Researchers have shown that this automated bias occurs even when observers were trained to focus on behavioral cues, and it persists despite findings that shoplifting occurs across racial and ethnic groups, according to the 2004 Justice Quarterly article “Who Actually Steals? A Study of Covertly Observed Shoplifters.”</p><p>Stereotypes also affect retailers’ decisions on how to handle shoplifters, either formally by involving the police, or informally. The results of accumulated discrimination, accrued during each step in the legal process—initial involvement of police, decision to prosecute, conviction, and sentencing—continue in the legal system. This is evidenced by the disproportionate number of African- and Latin-American boys shown in the apprehension and arrest statistics of juvenile thieves, compared to their representation in the population, according to Our Children, Their Children: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Differences in American Juvenile Justice, a book published by the Chicago University Press. ​</p><h4>Current Research</h4><p>To test the premise that there is a widespread stereotype of the typical juvenile thief and shoplifter, our research team obtained information from young adults in two diverse areas:  97 psychology-major college students in a small city in the U.S. state of Kansas, and 156 security and emergency management majors at a college in a large city in New York state. </p><p><strong>Shoplifter profile. </strong>The psychology-major students were 83 percent European American. The rest of the students were represented as follows: 5 percent African American, 2 percent Asian American, 1 percent Latin American, and 9 percent of mixed or unknown descent.</p><p>The security and emergency management major students—72 percent of whom were male—came from a variety of backgrounds: 31 percent European American, 37 percent Latin American, 19 percent African American, 9 percent Asian American, and 2 percent Middle Eastern American.</p><p>Participants in both locations were asked to guess the common physical characteristics of a typical juvenile shoplifter—age, gender, ethnicity or race, and socioeconomic status. </p><p>The stereotypical juvenile shoplifters described by both the Kansas and New York respondents were remarkably similar: male, aged 14 to 17, and from lower- to middle-class families of African-American, Latin-American, or European-American descent. The two samples also indicated that the stereotypical thief was likely to have short or medium length brown or black hair and an identifying mark—such as a piercing. </p><p>These findings show commonality in the prevalence of certain physical characteristics, despite the diversity of the two groups of respondents, and demonstrate that American society has a well-developed juvenile shoplifter stereotype.</p><p><strong>Decision processes. </strong>After determining the stereotype, the research team considered whether juvenile shoplifter stereotypes affected respondents’ decisions. The goal was to determine the degree to which the respondents believed that physical characteristics influenced the security guards’ decisions regarding whom to surveil, and what consequences to apply when a youth was caught stealing.</p><p>The New York respondents read a brief scenario describing a juvenile shoplifter as either male or female and from one of five backgrounds: European American, African American, Asian American, Latin American, or Middle Eastern American. However, the description of the overt behaviors by the juvenile was the same for every scenario—selecting and returning shirts in a rack, glancing around the store, and stuffing a shirt into a backpack.</p><p>Respondents provided their opinions about the degree to which the security officer in the scenario relied on physical characteristics in surveilling a juvenile, and whether the retail manager and security officer should impose informal or formal sanctions on the shoplifter. Researchers reasoned that respondents should draw identical conclusions for surveillance and sanctions if they were simply evaluating the juvenile shoplifters’ behaviors, but that students would have different recommendations for these choices if their racial or ethnic stereotypes were activated.</p><p>Respondents who indicated a preference for applying informal sanctions did so more frequently for girls of African-American and Middle Eastern-American descent. These respondents also assessed that the officer described in the scenario based his or her surveillance decisions on physical characteristics. No other gender differences for race or ethnicity were notable when considering reliance on physical characteristics.</p><p>Stereotypes also affected decisions on how to sanction the shoplifter. Respondents were given the option of implementing one of four informal sanctions: speak to the juvenile, call parents to pick up the juvenile, get restitution, or ban the youth from the store. Their selection of the least severe sanction—talk to the juvenile—was doled out at a higher rate for boys than for girls of each ethnicity except European Americans, which did not differ.</p><p>The moderate level sanction—call the youth’s parents—was selected more for girls than for boys of African and Latin descent. The most severe level sanction—ban the youth from the store—was selected more for boys than for girls of African descent. However, it was selected more for girls than for boys of Asian, European, and Middle Eastern descent.<img src="/ASIS%20SM%20Callout%20Images/0417%20Feature%202%20Chart%201.jpg" class="ms-rtePosition-2" alt="" style="margin:5px;width:510px;" /></p><p>Respondents who indicated a preference for applying formal sanctions attributed physical characteristics to the guards’ surveillance decision for girls more than for boys of Latin descent; gender differences were not apparent for the other ethnicities. </p><p>Respondents were also given five formal sanctions for the youths: involve the police, prosecute the theft as larceny, impose a fine, give the youth diversion or community service, or put the incident on the youth’s criminal record. Their selection of the least severe sanction—involve the police—was endorsed more for boys than for girls of Asian, European, and Latin descent, but more for girls than for boys of African descent. No gender difference was apparent for youths of Middle Eastern descent.</p><p>The most severe sanction—diversion or community service—was preferred more for boys than for girls of African descent. A small percentage of respondents endorsed a criminal record for the theft of a shirt, but only for girls of African and European descent and for boys of Middle Eastern descent.</p><p>Finally, a comparison of our data revealed that respondents believed informal—rather than formal—consequences should be imposed for girls rather than for boys of Asian and European descent, and for boys rather than for girls of Latin descent. ​<img src="/ASIS%20SM%20Callout%20Images/0417%20Feature%202%20Chart%202.jpg" class="ms-rtePosition-2" alt="" style="margin:5px;width:519px;" /></p><h4>Lessons Learned</h4><p>Our findings clearly demonstrate that people have stereotypes about juvenile shoplifters. They also showed that people unconsciously use the typical physical characteristics of gender and race or ethnicity associated with their criminal stereotypes to make decisions and recommendations, such as whom to surveil and how to handle a shoplifting incident. Otherwise, there would not have been a difference in how the juvenile shoplifter was processed or punished, because the behaviors exhibited by all of the juveniles were identical across scenarios.</p><p>Consumer racial profiling is a defective filtering system that may direct private security officers’ attention to characteristics that are not reflective of actual shoplifting conduct. Our data suggests that CRP not only hurts retail businesses by discouraging minority consumers from shopping in their stores, but also simultaneously prevents security officers from apprehending shoplifters.</p><p>Other research, such as from “Juvenile Shoplifting Delinquency: Findings from an Austrian Study” published in the 2014 Journal for Police Science and Practice, shows that only 10 percent of juveniles are caught shoplifting. Even more disconcerting, the typical shoplifter steals on average 48 to 150 times before being apprehended. Clearly, retailers need a better strategy if they are to reduce loss due to shoplifting.</p><p>Another issue that was addressed was the decision to involve the legal system. Many businesses, despite having posted prosecution warnings, reported only about half of the adolescent shoplifters they caught to the police. </p><p>Retailers instead focus on minimizing loss and negative publicity, and may rationalize against reporting the offense to the police because they do not want to stigmatize the adolescent or because they consider it a one-time incident, particularly when the juvenile admits to the theft and then pays for or returns the items, according to the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services.</p><p>These beliefs, however, may be misguided. Though current research is scarce, a 1992 study—The Sociology of Shoplifting: Boosters and Snitches Today—indicated that 40 to 50 percent of apprehended adolescent shoplifters reported that they continued shoplifting. </p><p>There are benefits for retailers who involve the legal system, especially for informal police sanctions. </p><p>First, criminal justice diversion programs and psychological treatment and educational programs treatment may reduce recidivism. For example, shoplifters who attended and completed a diversion program had significantly fewer re-arrests compared to those who failed to complete or did not attend, a DOJ study found.</p><p>Second, the private sector needs the support of the public sector to reduce shoplifting. Shoplifters can be given an opportunity to participate in first offender programs and, upon completion of classes on the effects of shoplifting, have their charges dismissed or even erased. ​</p><h4>Recommendations</h4><p>Retailers and private security officers need training to make them aware of their own biases and how their stereotypes affect their choices. They also need training to learn which behavioral indices are most effective in distinguishing shoppers from shoplifters. </p><p>If retailers do not make significant changes in guiding their employees—particularly security officers—towards objective measures of vigilance to prevent shoplifting, their financial loss will continue to be in the billions of dollars. </p><p>Private security officers must be taught how to treat all potential shoplifters, regardless of their gender, in the same way to prevent making mistakes and subjecting retailers to lawsuits for discriminatory security practices.</p><p>Overcoming unconscious biases is difficult. Prior to specialized training in bias identification and behavioral profiling, it is important to determine the biases of security officers. Self-assessment measures similar to the ones the researchers used in their study can be administered. </p><p>The officers should also keep records that specify each incident of shoplifting, what behaviors drew their attention to warrant surveillance, what act occurred to provoke them to approach the juvenile shoplifter, the items that were taken, the method used, the shoplifter’s demographics, how the situation was handled, who made the decision, and reasons for the decision. The officers should then review these records with their retail managers.</p><p>Retailers should also implement a mandatory training program to provide private security officers with the tools needed to identify shoplifting behaviors to increase detection and reduce shrink. </p><p>The incident records could be introduced and used to help identify the impact biases have on private security professionals’ decisionmaking about juvenile shoplifters. It would also help security guards learn the various types of suspicious behaviors that shoplifters exhibit, such as juveniles who make quick glances at staff, examine items in remote aisles, monitor security cameras and mirrors, and purposefully draw employees’ attention away from others.</p><p>Additionally, a practical component would be to show surveillance videos of the behaviors exhibited by juvenile shoplifters of different gender and race or ethnicity. In this way, the findings of past studies showing the insignificance of race, ethnicity, or gender can be learned through real-world examples.  </p><p>--<br></p><p><em><strong>Dr. Lauren R. Shapiro </strong>is an associate professor in the Department of Security, Fire, and Emergency Management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She has published several journal articles and chapters on the role of stereotypes in perception and memory for crime and criminals. <strong>Dr. Marie-Helen (Maria) Maras</strong> is an associate professor at the Department of Security, Fire, and Emergency Management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She is the author of several books, including Cybercriminology; Computer Forensics: Cybercriminals, Laws, and Evidence; Counterterrorism; and Transnational Security.   ​</em></p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465