Guard Force Management the Control Room of TomorrowGP0|#69b4a912-eafa-43d2-b6a4-8aed47f69245;L0|#069b4a912-eafa-43d2-b6a4-8aed47f69245|Security Technology;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652018-12-01T05:00:00Z<p>​At the center of an enterprise organization’s security op­eration stands its nucleus, arguably one of the most important pieces for overall functionality and efficiency: a command center or security operations center (SOC). A place where a variety of systems and solutions come together, the command center exists to provide a common operational picture, mitigate threats, and promote enhanced communication during an incident.</p><p>The goal of any command center is to monitor, assess, and respond to a variety of threats and incidents. As technologies advance and trends develop, so too do the strategies in place to meet this goal. There are several considerations that must be made when designing the control room of the future. </p><p><strong>Space</strong>. For many companies, a control room may be allotted space in a basement or small windowless room chosen as an afterthought. While some companies are limited by space, many decide the SOC’s location is unimportant. This can be a big mistake when designing a control room that will serve the company now and into the future. It’s critical for this space to be large enough to house important equipment that allows operators to view the relevant incoming data and make informed decisions, but it’s also necessary for the space to be scalable as needs change, technology evolves and coverage increases, and a company grows.</p><p><strong>Operator comfort</strong>. Space isn’t the only consideration when designing an SOC or control room. Central to the success of any organization is the ability for security operators to quickly and efficiently take information coming into an SOC and act on that information to identify risks and mitigate threats. Operator comfort, as a result, should be central to the design of a control room, taking lighting, console comfort, ergonomics, ambient noise, and temperature into careful consideration. If operators are uncomfortable or distracted, in pain with a sore neck due to bad viewing angles, or too warm in a room without proper ventilation, they can miss out on critical events or emergencies. Addressing these before they become problematic is crucial in the design stage of an SOC.</p><p><strong>Technology. </strong>When it comes to building a mission-critical SOC, there's a reason why large-scale video walls that showcase a number of incoming data points are dominant. Uniform and integrated visual elements are imperative to the success of an SOC or control room, because operators and first responders require the most up-to-date and complete information regarding incoming security-related events. Additionally, the technology needed to bring multiple data streams together in a single-pane-of-glass view is an important consideration to make, and hiring a control room integrator that specializes in this technology can streamline the process and result in better situational awareness across the board.</p><p><strong>Data convergence</strong>. Command centers today combine a number of security components, but as end users demand an emphasis on the full umbrella of security rather than small silos, facilities are focused on including additional pieces, such as risk and threat assessment, employee travel, and social media monitoring. Data incorporation is also a critical element, and command centers must be able to collect any number of data points for effective data aggregation. Dashboards that can make sense of a large amount of information can streamline decision-making and response.</p><p><strong>Innovation</strong>. While words like artificial intelligence and machine learning are often whispers around the industry, for innovative companies, these terms are becoming more commonplace as they enter a new frontier in how data is collected and analyzed to deliver information to security operators. The control room of the future brings innovative software and systems to the forefront, taking existing sensors that are providing a wealth of information and layering an additional method by which to understand what is happening and make decisions about the organization’s health. </p><p>Enterprise organizations rely on their SOC for business operations. In times of an emergency, and as risks become more severe, a complete situational picture is necessary. Taking into consideration the space, operator comfort, technology, data convergence, and future innovation can set security managers up for success in protecting their enterprises.  </p><p>Dan Gundry is director of national control room sales at Vistacom.</p><p><br></p>

Guard Force Management the Control Room of Tomorrow,-Individual-Wellness.aspx2018-08-01T04:00:00ZOrganizational Health, Individual Wellness Balk on Bud,-Unarmed-Officer.aspx2018-04-01T04:00:00ZActive Assailant, Unarmed Officer the Force and the United Nations in the Workplace Are People First Technology with a Personal Touch a Professional Guard Force Education Sessions Address Security Challenges Thanks: National Security Officer Appreciation Week Kicks Off Color Theory 2 Peer Protection Guard Scheduling Conundrum¡PRESTA-ATENCIÓN!.aspx2017-07-13T04:00:00Z¡PRESTA ATENCIÓN! Role of School Resource Officers and Security: The Risks of Arming Security Officers Next Tase Phase Arm or Not to Arm?

 You May Also Like... Panacea or Problem<p>Closed-circuit television (CCTV) is the most vibrant color on the security engineer’s and integrator’s palette, but it can also be the most wasteful.  It all hinges on whether you understand its limitations.  I’ve designed, specified, or surveyed hundred’s of CCTV systems and, in my opinion, from 25% to 50% of video cameras represent wasted money, depending on the application. In some cases, there are serious hidden legal liabilities.</p><p>CCTV sales exploded after 9-11.  No one has definitive numbers and industry-generated estimates vary wildly, but annual revenues from CCTV sales are likely to range from $1.3 to $2.4 billion.</p><p>According to Security Sales & Integration Annual Installation Business Report (2006), CCTV installations experienced the second highest increase ever recorded.  (The highest was in 2003, a little more than a year after 9-11.)  Moreover, companies reported average gross profit margins of 39%. That’s pretty good.</p><p>Schools are not the largest market by any means, but they are the most troubling. There is a virtual pandemic of schools installing video cameras willy-nilly in the aftermath of Columbine and Virginia Tech. The lay public, unfortunately, doesn’t understand the technology and ignorantly believes that the simple act of installing cameras stops crime.  Cash-starved high schools, in particular, may be choosing video surveillance over higher teacher pay, text books, or afterschool programs for students.  CCTV is a superb investigative tool after something terrible occurs, but then again, the identification of the shooters in the recent incidents at schools didn’t require video to identify the perpetrators.  With very few exceptions, it is almost a useless tool to prevent serious crimes in most schools because they rarely—if ever—have the staff to effectively monitor the cameras. Too often, the monitors are tucked beneath the counter at the main reception desk.</p><p>I recall a marketing interview I had with a major New England university.  I told their chief of security and the consultant selection committee that they were planning to buy many more cameras than they needed. I didn’t get that job. It’s not what he wanted to hear.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%;"> <strong>Crime Prevention Pitfalls</strong></p><p>Video is ineffectual because it only has crime prevention value under two circumstances: a human continuously monitors it and can call on an almost instantaneous response when a crime occurs.  Few organizations (save the CIA and similar high-security facilities) have the resources to effectively implement these two prerequisites. </p><p>In addition to the potentially exorbitant costs of buying and installing a full coverage video system, the consequent life-cycle costs (labor, repair, and maintenance costs) are massive over time if the video system is properly managed. The alertness of security console operators peaks in 20 minutes, according to many studies.  It is necessary to change monitoring duties every two hours for optimal surveillance—hence, the very high labor costs.  Moreover, a human can’t efficiently and reliably watch more than 9 to 12 monitors—let alone the dozens of monitors that can be found at some security monitoring centers. There is a paradox at play. CCTV is potentially the most valuable security resource as well as the most misused and wasteful.  It is the familiar story of having too much of a good thing. </p><p>Getting back to cost, as a rule of thumb, each indoor camera averages $1500 (as a complete, installed cost, including power, wire, and conduit) and each outdoor camera, $3500.  If all the bells and whistles are added, per camera costs for outdoor, day/night units can easily approach $9,800 per position and up to $60,000 for very exotic capabilities and for very difficult locations. For a very large school, university, hospital, shopping mall, parking garage, or office building, the final costs for complete video systems can range from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars. Sometimes these expenditures are like flushing money down a toilet.</p><p>To put what I have been saying into a useful context, a very short tutorial is called for.  CCTV serves three primary functions: perform surveillance; support post-incident investigations, including identification; and automate a function, such as at remotely controlled doors or vehicle entrances. It has momentous value for crime investigation.  Most organizations, however, purchase video systems with the generally unrealistic expectations that it will prevent crime. Often, they have little understanding of security console operations or ergonomics.</p><p>There are some interesting and growing secondary applications that are mostly benign.  The increasing popularity of “nanny cams” is well known. The use of CCTV to catch red light runners at busy intersections, to read license plates at tollbooths and airport parking garages, and to catch speeders is also common now.  Similarly, video cameras can reduce bad behavior on school buses. Cameras also work well for law enforcement sting operations. Police park a “bait” automobile in an area known for high incidents of car theft and car-jackings.  When the miscreant enters the vehicle, the police can remotely lock the doors and record the event on video. But as valuable as these various uses are, these kinds of applications rarely involve thwarting serious crimes. Moreover, they document a crime; they don’t prevent it.</p><p>The use of CCTV in conjunction with very sophisticated facial recognition software is an interesting case study.  Every city that has installed these extremely expensive systems, such as Tampa and Virginia Beach, eventually shut them down.  Facial recognition isn’t ready for prime time yet. This new technology fits the same pattern: the consumer does not understand the limitations of unfamiliar technology.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%;"><strong>CCTV in Public Places</strong></p><p>The installation of massive video nets in public spaces is another mounting trend, especially in light of the remarkable success the British had on several occasions in identifying and then tracking suspected terrorists after an attack.  Bear in mind that the United Kingdom has 4.2 million CCTV cameras in place.  There is a camera for every 14 people and an average Londoner is seen on camera 300 times each day.  The United States isn’t even close to that kind of surveillance saturation on a per capita basis, but we’re catching up fast. City after city is embarking on public video surveillance programs. By some accounts, downtown Manhattan already has 4,200 public and private sector video cameras. The NYPD would like to install 3,000 new cameras by the end of 2008. Police departments in Baltimore, Hollywood, Houston, Memphis, Newark, San Diego, Tampa, Virginia Beach, Washington, D.C., and in many other cities are installing video cameras and connecting to feeds from private sector CCTV systems. This is a great idea if the objective is to support post-incident investigations. Whether these systems contribute to crime reduction is still controversial—and in my view, dubious.</p><p>With the recent Federal trend toward design-build contracts, government bodies at all levels typically uses companies that sell and install video systems to determine how much CCTV they need, rather than impartial security engineers and consultants. It’s not exactly a surprise that these companies want to sell and install as many CCTV systems as they possibly can. Moreover, this is a partial explanation of the exponential growth of citywide video systems. Yet another reason for this growth is the ever-mounting pressure from the Department of Homeland Security for more and more video. Bear in mind that the British didn’t prevent any of their terrorist attacks as a result of video surveillance.  Could it happen in the future? Sure, even a blind hog can find an acorn now and then.</p><p>The effectiveness of CCTV in public spaces to reduce crime is counterintuitive and controversial. It is not at all clear that crime rates are reduced. Some criminologists think that crime is only displaced by video systems.  When studies do claim CCTV does reduce crime, the reduction is usually marginal.</p><p>In 1995, a study was conducted to determine the deterrent value of various crime prevention factors for convenience stores. These variables included how much cash was kept on site, retreat distance, police patrolling, an armed clerk, and so forth. The researcher interviewed robbers and asked them to rank the most important factors in deciding whether or not to commit the robbery. Of 11 factors, a camera system ranked tenth and video recording, eleventh. These findings were compared to a similar study that was conducted in 1985: the rankings had hardly changed. The finding was also similar to the results from a study completed in the 1970s.  The top two reasons a robber would decide against holding up a store were too little money kept on site and a long or complicated escape route.</p><p>Another phenomenon that could be at play in determining if CCTV deters crime is something called the Hawthorne Effect (or variously, the Westinghouse Effect), a term coined by a study conducted in 1939 at the Hawthorne Plant of Western Electric Company. Efficiency experts wanted to determine the optimal working conditions for maximum production.  Among various techniques, the researchers found that increasing lighting increased production. But there was a surprise. When they later reduced lighting levels to bracket peak efficiency—to the point that workers couldn’t see (some even brought in lamps from home)—production still increased. The explanation is a variant of the famous Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, well known to Star Trek fans. The Principle states that “the act of observing alters that which is being observed.”  This can occur in various ways. There may be direct interference. There can be unconscious bias in reading or collecting the data. There can be factors interacting with the situation that are undiscovered.</p><p>Washington, D.C., conducted a number of lighting studies following the city-wide riots in April 1968 following the Martin Luther King Jr. assassination.  They wanted to learn what type of lighting was best to fight crime: low-pressure sodium, high-pressure sodium, mercury vapor, metal halides, etc. The study seemed to demonstrate that all lighting reduced crime.</p><p>It wasn’t until years later when the results were scrubbed by social psychologists and criminologists that the results became suspect.  Was it the lighting or was it because squad cars were parked on every street to observe the effects? Or, were police officers subconsciously (or consciously) motivated to underreport crime if their performance was being evaluated?  Which played the greatest role? That notwithstanding, few authorities would dispute the conclusion that lighting (and CCTV) can effectively displace crime. </p><p>Displacement is a very good thing if you happen to live or work in a high crime area.  It’s not such a good thing if you live in the area the crime is moving to. The chief question is, “Does CCTV actually reduce crime?” City politicians are more than willing to glom onto crime statistics to suggest that this or that program they championed reduced crime. When crime reductions do occur, a pantheon of factors likely causes the decline. The state of the local and national economy, for example, plays a major role.</p><p><strong>Civil Liberty and Liability Concerns</strong>.There is another very important question that some people feel very strongly, if not fanatically, about. Does saturation video surveillance in public areas violate the right to privacy? Or, is it a Fourth Amendment issue, which governs against unreasonable searches and seizures? The U.S. Supreme Court  in United States vs. Knotts  put part of this matter to bed by determining that surveillance was constitutional when conducted in areas where there should be no expectation of privacy.  However, the other shoe still hasn’t dropped.  Does CCTV surveillance represent unreasonable search? Ever? Sometimes?  Most authorities believe that the Supreme Court will continue to rule in favor of public video surveillance, but it isn’t a dead issue.</p><p>Legal liability is yet another volatile issue related to video surveillance. In our ever litigious society being a crime victim (or faking it) can sometimes be like winning the lottery. Negligent security torts are common and increasing in frequency.  The lawsuits spawned by the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in Manhattan were only finally settled earlier this year—14 years later. The defendants paid millions. Lawsuits pertaining to the 9-11 attacks are going to the courts now.</p><p>Sometimes lawsuits are, and will be, deserving, because there is true gross negligence at work. I know of one smallish company that couldn’t afford a complete video surveillance system, so they only purchased the cameras.  There were no wires or monitors.  The idea was that the sight of the cameras along the roofline watching a dark and unfenced employee parking lot would deter theft, robbery, and rape. If someone is assaulted in spite of the cameras, someone at that company should not only pay the future victims handsomely; they should probably go to jail.</p><p>Despite their many limitations and problems, CCTV systems can also be an extremely powerful weapon in the security arsenal.  It is of critical importance in a post-incident criminal investigation: sometimes it provides the only clues available to law enforcement. The British success in identifying and then finding terrorists is phenomenal. </p><p>Video can support other important uses as well.  Security guards can do virtual tours of a large building or outdoor area without leaving the guard booth. Some cameras can see in the dark.  If you are using an access card to unlock a door on a cold, rainy night, and if for some reason it doesn’t unlock, the availability of an intercom and a camera showing you to a security guard is priceless. License-plate readers have been a boon to toll booth operators and small towns needing more revenue from speeders and red light runners. Now that technology has taken us to digital video and IP-networked surveillance, the varying applications for CCTV are spectacular. The key for security managers is to understand the system’s limitations so they choose the right system for their organization, without squandering too many resources and without making grandiose claims that only create a false sense of security.</p><hr width="100%" size="2" /><p>John J. Strauchs, CPP, is Senior Principal of Strauchs LLC.</p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465 Review: The Process of Investigation<p>​<span style="line-height:1.5em;">The process of investigation is relevant for a wide array of security professionals </span><span style="line-height:1.5em;">both in the private and public sectors, including corporate investigators, attorneys, loss prevention specialists, and law enforcement personnel.</span></p><p><i>The Process of Investigation</i> sets out to address the needs of today’s private sector investigative professionals. Through 24 chapters, the authors provide a practical guide to conducting comprehensive investigations. Five main sections take the reader through fundamentals, methods, building a case, applying strategies, and using technology and other specialized investigative techniques. Among the topics explored in detail are qualities of the investigator, surveillance, interviews, report writing, and targeted violence.</p><p>The book has something interesting for all readers who work with investigations or just want to know more about the art and science. There is a lot of information for people new to the investigative area, and there is also something for the more experienced practitioner. Examples from real investigations help readers place the theory into a practical context. A point well made is that investigative success often comes from “applying common sense and uncommon persistence.”</p><p>Although the book takes an American view of investigation, most of the material is applicable for international use, and it should find a well-deserved place on the investigative professional’s bookshelf.</p><p><em><strong>Reviewer: Poul Nielsen,</strong> PCI, is an intelligence analyst and OSINT consultant at The Copenhagen Police Department. He has previously worked as a robbery detective and investigative consultant for several international companies. He serves on the ASIS International Investigations Council.</em></p>GP0|#28ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997;L0|#028ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997|Strategic Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465 an Antipiracy Program <p>​The indicators are all over company balance sheets: counterfeiting and piracy are siphoning off incredible amounts of revenue from legitimate businesses.<br> <br>The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, released in 2007, estimated that international trade in counterfeit and pirated products could have reached as high as $200 billion in 2005. The estimate does not take into account the number of domestically produced and consumed counterfeit products nor does it include music, video, software, games, and printed materials increasingly being distributed online. The United States Chamber of Commerce estimates that Intellectual Property (IP) makes up more than one-half of all U.S. exports, driving 40 percent of the countryメs growth. Clearly, as manufacturing jobs move to developing countries, intellectual property becomes more critical to the economic survival of developed countries. The FBI estimates that the theft of IP costs the U.S. economy $250 billion per year and has resulted in the loss of 750,000 jobs. <br>The loss of jobs and both tax and corporate revenues results in less money for critical research and development and funding for much needed government programs  and is especially harmful during the current recession. Unfortunately, the economic impact is only part of the problem: counterfeiting discourages innovation and undermines good governance, provides real risks to consumers in the form of dangerous and unregulated products, and generates profits that go directly to fund organized crime and terrorism.<br> <br>The Argument for Strong IP Enforcement<br> <br>Security managers need to provide a business justification to develop a brand protection program in any company, so the broader arguments in favor of enforcement are worth considering.<br> <br>Public perception and attitudes towards piracy pose a challenge in that piracy and IP infringement are often perceived as victimless crimes.  However, international research and the 2007 report by the OECD provides evidence to the contrary and shows that the negative effects of piracy are broadly distributed among rights holders, consumers, and government.  In addition to the legal considerations reflected in copyright and trademark laws, counterfeiting and piracy have economic and social consequences in that they discourage innovation and inhibit economic and technological growth.  Innovators are less inclined to devote time, money, and intellectual capital to developing new products if their ideas are likely to be stolen or copied by someone else. Investment funds will not be forthcoming if the business climate doesnメt protect IP, resulting in little or no return on investment.  Ironically, developing countries that are often the source of counterfeits are hardest hit in the long run by failure to enact and enforce IP protection laws.  <br> <br>Research and historical trends show that countries with effective IP protection regimes enjoy stronger and more rapid economic development than those that do not. Furthermore, counterfeiters do not pay taxes, are often connected to criminal organizations, and operate in underground economies.   When IP is not adequately protected, rights holders suffer from decreased sales and diminished brand value resulting in a loss of consumer confidence and commercial viability.  Consumers have fewer choices and often must choose between either very costly authentic products or cheap and inferior knock-offs that not only perform poorly but also carry inherit risks to health and safety.  The ever-expanding list of counterfeit products that ranges from pharmaceuticals to car and airplane parts has increased consumer risk with the rise of the globally integrated economy. After-market car or airplane parts manufactured in China, often without appropriate quality control, can end up in the U.S.<br> <br>The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reported an 83 percent increase in the number of seized items for 2005-2006 and a total value of $196.5 million for 2007 seizures representing a 27 percent increase over 2006. Between 2000-2006, the European Union reported an 88 percent increase in the seizures of counterfeit goods.  The World Health Organization estimates that 7-10 percent of all pharmaceutical products sold in the world are possibly counterfeit, with a rate as high as 30-40 percent in some African countries. The Business Software Allianceメs 2008 Annual Report asserts that the worldwide PC software piracy rate was 38 percent in 2007. Clearly the trend is toward more counterfeiting which poses higher risks to the public and has a significant impact on legitimate commerce.  Lastly, the impact of counterfeiting, often controlled by organized crime, on governments in the form of corruption and weakened public institutions disrupts global commerce and erodes public confidence in government.<br> <br>Making the Internal Business Case <br>Corporate security directors are often presented with a host of challenges when it comes to brand protection and IP enforcement.  In many cases, CEO, CFOs, and other corporate executives do not see the need to fund antipiracy programs, regarding them as an unnecessary cost rather than a priority to protect the companyメs brand and recover lost sales.  In todayメs climate of limited budgets, security managers are under pressure to articulate a sound business justification and a return on investment (ROI) for all programs.  <br>Demonstrating that counterfeit items in the market represent a potentially displaced sale of genuine product requires reliable data. An impact assessment that examines market potential, the availability of counterfeits, and current sales of genuine products can help to provide such data.  For example, the software industry estimates piracy rates by looking at the number of new computers shipped versus the number of genuine software operating systems sold and activatedラthe discrepancy is an indicator of pirated software installations since in most cases software operating systems (Original Equipment Manufacture  versions) are installed at the factory.  A sudden decrease in sales of a genuine product in a given market is another indication that piracy may be a factor and is often pointed out by sales personnel or distributors. Aggressive IP enforcement is not only a necessary deterrent but can also be a potential source of revenue to fund anti-counterfeiting programs through civil asset forfeiture and out of court settlements, while at the same time preserving brand integrity.  <br> <br>Often the sudden appearance of a particular counterfeit product on the market, a dramatic drop in sales, or a major seizure by law enforcement alerts the corporate leadership to the need for greater antipiracy enforcement. Unfortunately, when such an incident occurs, people often react by reaching for very costly モBand Aidヤ solutions. Instead, having an effective antipiracy program in place that consists of sustained enforcement effort and consumer education is a much better corporate strategy in the longer term. An added benefit of this approach is that law enforcement agencies are more inclined to work with companies that have well-developed programs and demonstrate a serious commitment to antipiracy enforcement.  <br> <br>The Assessment Phase<br> <br>Because most managers need facts and figures to support budget and resource requests, an initial assessment is recommended to determine the scope and magnitude of the problem. Depending upon the type of product and the brand, on-site visits to sales outlets as well as Internet searches for the companyメs products are critical. The latter has increasingly become a means of モdirect- to - customerヤ sales and has changed the business model for counterfeiters, by eliminating the need for wholesale distributors. <br>One large organized crime group that operated from Russia sold thousands of モburnedヤ or copied CDs of software programs directly to retail customers in the U.S. via the Internet, thereby circumventing wholesale distributors. They used thousands of affiliate sites as well as spam tactics to generate sales.  Pirated or counterfeit software and games are sold in shops, flea markets, or so called swap meets, which are essentially the same as flea markets.   Pirated goods are also offered on the Internet through independent web sites or auction sites. An online search for cheap software will produce hundreds of results. Other types of products such as batteries, razor blades, or car parts are often available on business-to-business (B-to-B) sites, while counterfeit or unapproved generic pharmaceuticals are sold on both B-to-B sites and illegal online pharmacies.<br> <br>Many sites selling pirated goods are hosted in countries where cybercrime and IP enforcement are almost non-existent, making it very difficult to identify, much less go after the criminals.  There are many companies that perform Internet searches, often called モweb crawlingヤ, to help locate where the imposter products are being sold.  The searches are based upon specific search terms or logos or both provided by the IP rights holder. One often finds that spamming and the sale of counterfeit items and pornography on the Internet are ultimately controlled by the same organizations. It is important to find a search company with expertise and reliable baseline data in a specific industry to avoid the expense and time in the learning process.<br> <br>In order to get an accurate picture of the size and nature of your companyメs piracy problem you should have an experienced antipiracy investigator conduct a series of test purchases (TPs) from sales outlets and Internet sellers.  Based upon guidance provided by the brand owner, the investigator should gather specific information regarding the seller, the product, the make, the model, the design, the title, the version, and other key characteristics, including product authenticity. <br>Proper product authentication by the IP holder is critical, since sales are not limited to counterfeits. So called モgrey marketヤ items that have been diverted from the intended distribution channel are one of the many challenging issues in the brand protection domain.  The TP is designed to obtain samples and to determine origin, price, quantity, quality, accepted payment methods, shipping, and return policies.  Once there is enough information to permit a good sampling of the products most often pirated, an analysis and interpretation of the data should be conducted with an eye towards identifying commonalities and vulnerabilities. They may be in violation of laws other than those related to copyright and trademark infringement.<br> <br>For example, is the seller of your companyメs pirated product also liable for wire fraud and money laundering offenses or involved with the sale of child pornography? These additional factors often make them more attractive targets for a law enforcement investigation. But it is important to remember that the initial goal is to assess risk and damages and not to conduct an investigationラthat can come later.  Some key considerations one should consider: Is there a health and safety risk? Are the products high-quality copies designed to deceive or cheap knock-offs?  To what extent are they displacing sales of genuine products? What are the estimated losses of legitimate sales and which products and markets are most impacted? Are the products perhaps original equipment manufacturer (OEM) versions or stolen or fraudulently obtained genuine items?  <br> <br>If so, this may be an indication of an integrity problem within the distribution chain and with third-party manufacturers, distributors, or transporters and at some point a complete audit of manufacturing plants and distributors may be advisable. One company, for example, uncovered a huge problem with モleakageヤ of genuine products from its supply chain because they were leaving the plant marked as モscrap.ヤ An investigation revealed that several warehouse employees had been compromised by an organized criminal group. Thanks to good liaison and private-public cooperation with the FBI, the case was thoroughly investigated and the organized criminal gang was brought to justice.  In addition, the company recovered some of its losses by bringing civil action against a third party manufacturer.<br> <br>This case also pointed to an internal management problem. The account representatives for the third-party manufacturing plant had failed to conduct regular audits as prescribed in their vendor contracts. Such audits would have discovered that the use of raw materials did not correspond with the amount of finished product and that the plant had failed to properly account for the destruction of surplus goods.   In another case, during the closing of a plant, numerous master モstampersヤ for digital media, each with a value in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, had gone missing and were being sold for a high price on the illicit market. Thanks to an FBI informant and good liaison efforts the stampers were prevented from getting into the hands of counterfeiters.<br> <br>One of the challenges in the assessment phase is obtaining reliable information concerning counterfeiting or piracy. Sharing and comparing trend information with various internal corporate entities can often provide useful information and insights. An internal company survey might also surface good information about piracy and lets employees know that the company is protecting its valuable IP. Coordination with the legal, sales, marketing, product development, packaging, and manufacturing teams is highly recommended and is indicative of a holistic approach to antipiracy.  Corporate stakeholders can also become allies in the quest for executive support and budget for antipiracy operations. As the program develops, an antipiracy advisory board comprised of key company players and stake holders ensures that proper information sharing and coordination across the company are being accomplished.<br> <br>Building the Team and the Program <br>Once the assessment is complete and executive sponsorship and budget are obtained for an antipiracy program, the next step is to build a good in-house team or to have a combination of in-house experts and external consultants devise an antipiracy strategy. Antipiracy programs can be costly, particularly with regard to investigative and legal support, and will inevitably involve corporate attorneys as well as outside counsel to develop legal strategies. Finding the right talent is crucial; many security managers have expertise in a variety of areas but not necessarily for antipiracy strategies and operations. Outside consultants can help develop the program in the early stages. Ideally, an in-house team under the Director of Corporate Security consists of a senior manager for investigations or an antipiracy manager, an attorney with prosecution or civil litigation and asset forfeiture experience, investigators with a physical and Internet investigations background, a paralegal, and a business analyst. <br>The analyst plays a critical role in analyzing and interpreting the information collected from the investigations, performing trend analysis, and preparing briefing materials.  It is important to ensure that the teamメs goals and brand protection efforts are in keeping with the overall company strategy. A monthly scorecard of metrics, highlights, and trends that can be shared with company stakeholders is essential in maintaining internal support for your teamメs efforts.  Often good work goes unnoticed because it isnメt properly presented and consumed at the right executive level.  I was involved in one situation where millions of dollars were spent on Internet Piracy programs which were well-documented in monthly progress reports that were apparently never read by the senior executive in charge of the program.  Not only was he unable to articulate the return on investment for the company, but also his subordinates who managed the program were unable to ascertain if the program was achieving managementメs desired goals and objectives. We often felt as if we were on the proverbial rudderless ship.<br> <br>While AP investigations are not vastly different from other types of investigations, there are some unique challenges. For example, identifying and prioritizing high-impact targets, managing a test purchase (TP) program and vendors, and analyzing data are key components.  In addition, product identification, data and evidence collection and analysis, and coordination with attorneys and law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution or civil litigation are all part of the continuum of an antipiracy program.  Coordination of all of these program components towards the goal of protecting the companyメs brand integrity is the main objective. <br>In my experience as Director of Worldwide AP Investigations at a large technology company, a multi-faceted strategy was very effective and reduced piracy by at least 10-15 percent over a four-five year period.  It was a highly integrated approach and involved law enforcement referrals and prosecutions, aggressive civil litigation, asset seizures, and cease and desist notices.  Web site takedowns, and robust consumer education and PR campaigns were also part of the strategy. In one case in California in November 2001, then U.S. Customs (now U.S. Customs and Border Protection) made the largest software seizure in history of a container load of counterfeit software and cigarettes worth more than $60 million.  <br> <br>Cases such as these are the result of extensive law enforcement liaison and training programs that not only assist officers in identifying the companyメs products but also help build those all-important relationships that facilitate cooperation.  Through this approach, we were successful in getting a broad range of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI; ICE; and many state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute our cases.  <br>In addition to traditional enforcement measures, other program elements, such as legislation, are critical to support the effort.  My company successfully supported a legislative initiative to close a loophole that allowed counterfeiters to break open software packages and sell the genuine components used to authenticate counterfeits. Internally we worked with product and packaging teams to adopt the latest security features and counterfeiting counter-measures and leveraged public relations opportunities and the company Web site to reach consumers.  By employing all of these strategies in an integrated manner, over a five-year period the company saw a dramatic drop in the availability of counterfeit products and a shift towards the sale of genuine products. There were indications that counterfeiters were moving towards the counterfeiting of competitorsメ products. Anecdotal information filtered back to us that the sellers and distributors were reluctant to sell counterfeits of our products due to our strong enforcement posture.<br> <br>Measures of Success<br> <br>Measuring effectiveness and success can be the most challenging aspect of an antipiracy program. As in law enforcement, it is often difficult to know if your efforts are truly having an impact. Can success be measured in seizure and arrest statistics? A qualified yes, if they are strategically targeted. <br>However, random seizures of counterfeit products have little impact.  Does an increase in the seizure of counterfeits indicate that the strategy is working or does it suggest a greater availability of illegal product on the market? Focusing enforcement efforts on certain products, organizations, and markets can result in an increase in legitimate sales and should be measured in individual markets.  Information campaigns surrounding enforcement actions can also be very effective as a deterrent and lets consumers know that the company is protecting brand integrity and consumer interests. <br>Consumer comment and feedback can also be a useful measure of effectiveness especially with regard to anti-piracy technologies.  However, one must be careful about too much negative publicity that can result in a lack of brand confidence and rapid migration to a competitorメs brand. This may be particularly true in the pharmaceutical industry where there are often similar choices. <br>For example, Viagra is one of the most common counterfeit pharmaceutical products offered by illegal online pharmacies. Overexposure of this issue may lead consumers to think that they automatically reduce their risk by purchasing another erectile dysfunction drug. Changes in consumer behavior and buying trends can be another measure of success. <br>Target qualification and identification, case prioritization, and enforcement outcomes can be hard to establish and even harder to measure. Referrals to law enforcement agencies do not always yield immediate results and require patient liaison efforts. While federal agencies have broader jurisdiction and authority than state and local agencies, they invariably take longer to conclude the investigation. I know of numerous cases that were very successful in dismantling counterfeiting organizations but took in excess of one year to complete. In the meantime, counterfeits continue to flood the market and company executives are looking for results.  <br>In addition, enforcement agencies often have other priorities and want to avoid being seen as working for one company as opposed to an entire industryラfor these reasons, good  law enforcement liaison is critical for success. When I managed a worldwide anti-piracy program our active law enforcement liaison and training program paid great dividends in terms of cooperation and our law enforcement colleagues knew that we were 100 percent committed to supporting them. <br>A good antipiracy program must also balance customer satisfaction and public image with strong security and enforcement measures. For example, while encryption and product activation keys are effective software antipiracy measures, they often create user frustration and inconvenience.  Another consideration is how will strong enforcement affect the companyメs image and brand reputation?  Will it be seen as モheavy handedヤ in going after infringers? In recent years the recording Industry understandably took a very strong stand against unpaid digital downloading of music, but in the process it created a public relations problem by alienating its own customer base--- young music enthusiasts. Targeting large-scale counterfeiters and distributors helps to avoid that perception and reinforces the point that strategic enforcement protects consumersメ interests. <br>Good data management and retrieval is critical to the conduct and the analysis of investigations as well as to the ability to measure success. One pharmaceutical company with which I am familiar had a very robust Internet antipiracy program; however, during the program evaluation by an independent management consultant, the success was difficult to quantify due to the inconsistency and unreliability of the data that was collected. In addition, the cost of モcleaningヤ the data so that consistency could be achieved was high.  If data isnメt accurate and reliable the entire process and results are distorted and program effectiveness will be difficult to determine.<br> <br>Globalization has impacted both legitimate and illegitimate commerce. Criminals operate across national borders, thus to be truly effective, investigations and strategies must be coordinated on an international basis and targeted on the source of the problem. Admittedly there are challenges in transnational cooperation and enforcement, not the least of which is a disparity in IP laws. Success, however, can be measured in terms of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of major violators, closures of illegal plants, civil lawsuits, and forfeited assets. The money recovered through restitution and asset seizure can help finance antipiracy operations and cause a decrease in availability of the most frequently pirated products and an increase in your companyメs bottom line.<br> <br>Rich LaMagna, CPP, is the former director of Worldwide Anti-piracy Investigations for Microsoft and is the president of LaMagna and Associates, LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm.<br> <br> </p>GP0|#28ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997;L0|#028ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997|Strategic Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465