Event Security

 

 

https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Security-101--What-to-Expect-at-the-U.S.-Presidential-Inauguration.aspxSecurity 101: What to Expect at the U.S. Presidential InaugurationGP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652017-01-18T05:00:00Zhttps://adminsm.asisonline.org/pages/megan-gates.aspx, Megan Gates<p>​Almost 1 million people are estimated to descend on Washington, D.C., on Friday for the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Many of those individuals are part of 63 groups planning demonstrations at the inauguration, presenting a unique security challenge for the U.S. federal government, D.C. officials, and other stakeholders.</p><p>“Anytime you have coming together such large numbers of people, such large numbers of groups that intend to demonstrate and exercise their First Amendment rights, you’ve got to be vigilant; you’ve got to plan; you’ve got to prepare,” said U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson in a press conference. <br></p><p>This is why the inauguration was designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE), allowing federal officials to begin crafting a security plan for the event 180 days before it was to take place. <br></p><p></p><div class="ms-rtestate-read ms-rte-wpbox"><div class="ms-rtestate-notify ms-rtestate-read af4e0b24-c744-4f11-a407-cfd54f64d3ec" id="div_af4e0b24-c744-4f11-a407-cfd54f64d3ec"></div><div id="vid_af4e0b24-c744-4f11-a407-cfd54f64d3ec" style="display:none;"></div></div><p>​The U.S. Secret Service led the planning, working with other federal partners, such as the U.S. Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and local partners such as the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)—Washington, D.C.’s local police force.</p><p>Given the unique scope of a U.S. presidential inauguration where heads of state and numerous U.S. leaders will be in attendance, along with between 700,000 to 900,000 civilians, there will be an enormous security presence in the nation’s capital. <br></p><p>Johnson said that approximately 35,800 security personnel will be involved over the course of inauguration weekend—10,000 DHS personnel, 12,000 other federal personnel, 7,800 National Guard personnel, and 6,000 police officers from MPD and other local police departments.<br></p><p><strong>Security Measures for the Inauguration </strong><br></p><p>On Wednesday at 5 p.m., U.S. Capitol Police will begin <a href="https://www.uscp.gov/media-center/press-releases/2017-presidential-inaugural-capitol-complex-street-closures-parking" target="_blank">closing street access</a> to the Capitol complex and continue closing streets on Thursday at 11 p.m. local time. Streets access is expected to resume at 5 p.m. on Friday, and in the meantime the police are encouraging people to walk or take public transportation.<br></p><p>"Inaugural events attendees are encouraged to use public transportation, as many streets in and around the Capitol Grounds and the National Mall will be closed to private automobiles for much of the day," Capitol Police said in a statement. </p><p>Security personnel will establish two different types of perimeters for the event: soft vehicle perimeters where those who live or work inside the perimeter will be given access, and hard vehicle perimeters where only official vehicles will be allowed to pass through. The hard vehicle perimeter will also be heavily fortified by trucks and dumpsters, “given the current threat environment,” Johnson added.<br></p><p>The <a href="https://www.wmata.com/rider-guide/events/inauguration/index.cfm#MoreInfo" target="_blank">Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority​</a> (WMATA) will open at 4 a.m. on Friday and run through midnight. It plans to run at peak service from 4 a.m. until 9 p.m. that evening to service riders, but the Navy Archives, Federal Triangle, Mount Vernon Plaza, Pentagon, and Smithsonian stations will be closed.<br></p><p>Security personnel will have bag checks and 300 magnetometers set up to screen individuals planning on attending the inauguration festivities.<br></p><p>Washington, D.C., is also a <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/releases/GPA-01-17-Inauguration-No-Drone-Zone.pdf" target="_blank">no fly zone​</a> for unmanned aircraft (drones), and Johnson said security measures have been taken to ensure that no drones are able to fly within the District during the inauguration weekend. <br></p><p>“Christmas was just a few weeks ago,” Johnson added. “I suspect a lot of people got drones for Christmas…this is something we’ve thought about, we have planned for, and we have technology to deal with it.”<br></p><p>Officials have also issued permits to 99 groups planning to demonstrate on inauguration weekend—63 of which plan to demonstrate on Friday. These permits were issued to help security plan for how it will handle these protesters—such as where protestors will be allowed to demonstrate to ensure that they are not crossing paths with groups that might hold opposing views. <br></p><p>This helps security personnel ensure that opposing groups do not disrupt the festivities and it helps prevent demonstrations from escalating. Security personnel will also monitor these groups for disruption and to make sure they remain separated, Johnson explained.<br></p><p>There is no specific threat to the inauguration, Johnson said, but security personnel will remain vigilant as the global terrorist environment is very different in 2017 than it was in 2013—the last time an inauguration was held in the United States. <br></p><div class="ms-rtestate-read ms-rte-wpbox"><div class="ms-rtestate-notify ms-rtestate-read 9c55b8b2-304d-46c0-8e24-aa44e28ebc64" id="div_9c55b8b2-304d-46c0-8e24-aa44e28ebc64"></div><div id="vid_9c55b8b2-304d-46c0-8e24-aa44e28ebc64" style="display:none;"></div></div><p>​Officials have to be concerned about homegrown violent extremism and lone wolves, Johnson explained, along with the “larger picture of general security and general public safety when you have a large public gathering with estimates of 700,000 to 900,000 people in close proximity of each other.”</p><p><strong>Securing Local Businesses</strong><br></p><p>While U.S. federal and local officials will be handling the security of public spaces in and around the inauguration, business owners will be responsible for securing their own facilities throughout the festivities. <br></p><p>One precaution these individuals should take is to map concealment areas in their facilities and regularly conduct routine sweeps of them—particularly the exterior—for weapons of convenience or cached weapons, says Ross Bulla, CPP, PSP, founder and president of The Treadstone Group, Inc., which advises clients on security solutions and best practices for protecting people, property, and information.<br></p><p>This is because a group who might be planning a violent demonstration may try to leave supplies at a local business on a parade route or nearby the National Mall to access them later. If facility owners find these kind of items, Bulla says they should contact law enforcement immediately and post security—if possible—in the area that the items were stowed in.<br></p><p>Bulla also recommends businesses in the immediate vicinity of the inauguration and its parade route assess their physical security, their food and safety handling, water supplies, electrical systems, and shelter in place procedures. This is especially critical for hotels, which might require hundreds of people—both guests and staff—to shelter in place should an emergency occur.<br></p><p>“You also may need to determine a way to re-credential people,” Bulla explains. “Guests who’ve left the facility and need to get back inside, you need to be able to quickly identify them as a guest and get them inside, while not allowing non-guests in.”<br></p><p>And for high-rise facilities, Bulla says it’s critical to limit or prevent rooftop access. <br></p><p>“Check door locks and secure windows that face the inauguration and parade route because on of the main or favored activities of protest groups is to get on a roof and unfurl banners or throw objects,” he explains. “Your roofs’ become focal points. Newspapers see them, and they’re a great place to throw rocks at law enforcement.”<br></p><p><strong>Securing your Person</strong><br></p><p>Individuals planning to attend the inauguration should <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/releases/JIC-01_PressRelease_TransportationPlan-Final_USCP-1-6-17.pdf" target="_blank">review the reference materials</a> provided by officials on prohibited items, which include animals other than service or guide animals, oversized backpacks and bags (18” by 13” by 7”), coolers, mace, selfie sticks, bicycles, and more.<br></p><p>While small bags and purses will be allowed in secure areas, Bulla recommends individuals planning to attend the inauguration try not to carry a bag at all as it will slow them down going through security screenings. <br></p><p>“If you go to an officially sanctioned event or any unsanctioned or related event, there will be security screening in place,” Bulla says. “Don’t carry an oversized camera, don’t carry an oversized purse—or even carry one…just pack lightly, or nothing more than your wallet if possible.”<br></p><p>Those traveling to Washington, D.C., for inauguration festivities can also sign up for free emergency text alerts and notifications by texting the word “INAUG” to 888777, according to the Secret Service.<br></p><p>Bulla also suggests creating a muster point plan if you’re attending the event with several people should an emergency occur and you need to evacuate quickly.<br></p><p>“It’s one thing to evacuate quickly and protect yourself if there is an incident,” Bulla ​says. “It’s entirely different to be one of 100,000 people running. You’re not going to be able to stay with your husband, your wife, your children.”<br></p><p>Instead of attempting to stay with your party, Bulla says you should plan to run with the crowd and exit the area as quickly as possible. Then, when you’re away from danger, head to the muster point you agreed on beforehand, such as a hotel lobby.<br></p><p>“One of the primary reasons that people are injured or killed is because they panic and don’t have an escape route,” he adds. “Just always know and be aware of your surroundings, and where you’d go if something happened.”<br></p><p>For more on inauguration security, listen to a special edition of the <em></em><a href="https://soundcloud.com/security-management/special-edition-us-presidential-inauguration-security"><em>Security Management </em>podcast</a> with a former U.S. Secret Service agent.<br></p><p><br></p>

Event Security

 

 

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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/How-Stadiums-Sport-Security.aspxHow Stadiums Sport Security<p>​</p><p>WHEN FANS fill a sports stadium, they aren’t thinking about where the nearest exit is or what major threats are facing the venue at that moment. But these venues do have many security threats—everything from terrorism risks to evacuation challenges.</p><p>The National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security (or NCS4) at the University of Southern Mississippi (USM) has a new initiative aimed at helping sports stadiums assess what security technology and practices may give them the most bang for the buck. The project involves establishing a security lab to test out various security solutions and technologies.</p><p>NCS4 has set up a physical lab at USM that will serve as a command post, and some assessments will be conducted there. But evaluation will also come from field tests of equipment and procedures. Jerry Surak, chief scientist at Science Applications International Corporation, which is consulting on the lab, says the group is currently completing its report on the lab’s “pilot” assessment of high-definition video surveillance, which involved a look at how two major camera companies performed in various scenarios at a November college football game.</p><p>Bill Squires, an NCS4 advisory board member who is the immediate past president of the Stadium Managers Association (SMA), says that having NCS4 vet equipment may help stadiums cut through the noise and assess whether a product performs as claimed.</p><p>NCS4 began as the Center for Spectator Sports Security Management in 2006 through a grant from the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency.</p><p>The lab evaluations will be a two-tiered process. In the first tier, NCS4 researchers and others will conduct an industry trade study on the technology or the procedure, says Surak. This will include input from the NCS4 advisory board members to help pinpoint what qualities are most important to professionals.</p><p>After the study, the researchers will drill down to essential requirements for the technology or protocols to be benchmarked against. Researchers will also interview stadium managers and arena operators to find out their operational needs. Surak says the program was influenced by the Department of Homeland Security’s SAVER program for emergency response equipment evaluation.</p><p>The second tier involves the actual field tests and assessments of the tools. Surak adds that the lab will not be comparing technologies with each other, but rather it will be assessing whether they fulfill the claims their manufacturers make. In addition to assessing capability, the lab will also rate usability, maintainability, and deployability, as well as affordability compared with the industry baselines, which will be the only comparison area. All of the categories will be assigned a point value and the final report will allow users to apply their own point values to each category to further personalize it to their priorities.</p><p>After the evaluations, the results will be written up into reports that Surak says will be available to NCS4 members and will also be provided to DHS. Vendors will have a period of time when they can dispute any findings before the final report is released. The actual evaluations of the process or technology will be conducted by a team of subject-matter experts, such as engineers and end users, who are not part of the lab or NCS4 but who have been invited to conduct the evaluations.</p><p>The pilot test was a smaller version of what the full evaluations will be. It did not involve an industry review but rather was a field evaluation of high-definition cameras from two volunteering vendors, Pixel Velocity and Avigilon.</p><p>Surak says that due to the costs of acquiring equipment, for now the lab depends on vendor participation, though “we’re trying to be vendor agnostic here,” says Surak. As mentioned, subject-matter experts conduct the assessments, rather than NCS4 directly. Surak adds, “We believe that most vendors will see value from two perspectives…. They get feedback from an important community of interest that will help them guide their product roadmaps in the end, and they’ll get firsthand exposure to the professional operators that provide them immediate feedback on what works and what doesn’t.”</p><p>There are also threshold requirements for evaluation. For example, in the pilot, the equipment had to already be installed in stadiums.</p><p>Some of the other things NCS4 would like to evaluate, according to Surak, are devices that are scanning for contraband at entry points, technology that supports evacuation and crowd management, and radiation detection devices. The priority right now is on deterrence, detection, and prevention.</p><p>The final report for the pilot evaluation is expected early this year, and NCS4 Director Louis Marciani says that although the lab is not officially up and running yet, he expects it to have completed some official vetting by the end of this year. Marciani says that NCS4 is in the process of seeking government funding.<br></p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/The-Power-of-Physical-Security.aspxThe Power of Physical Security<p>​<span style="line-height:1.5em;">A</span><span style="line-height:1.5em;">ny utilities security expert can effortlessly recite the details. In April 2013, someone snuck into an underground vault near a freeway in San Jose, California, and cut several telephone cables. Then, 30 minutes later, snipers shot at an electrical substation in Metcalf, California, for almost 20 minutes, knocking out 17 transformers that funnel power to Silicon Valley, before fleeing the scene and evading capture. </span></p><p>A major blackout was prevented by rerouting power around the downed station, but the attack caused more than $15 million in damage and brought physical threats to the electric grid to the forefront of discussions about the security of the United States’ critical infrastructure. It quickly became clear that cyberattacks were not the only threat to the U.S. power supply. </p><p>Two years have passed since the incident, and, while the snipers remain at large, the utility industry is taking steps to deter any future attacks.</p><p>“Because the grid is so critical to all aspects of our society and economy, protecting its reliability and resilience is a core responsibility of everyone who works in the electric industry,” said acting Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) chairman Cheryl LaFleur in a statement in March 2014. (LaFleur was named permanent chairman in July 2014.) Following LaFleur’s statement, FERC directed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop new standards requiring owners and operators of the bulk-power system to address risks due to physical security threats and vulnerabilities.</p><p>The FERC order asked NERC to create a standard to identify and protect transmission stations, substations, and associated primary control centers that could cause widespread outages if compromised. </p><p>From those instructions, a 10-person drafting committee created the CIP-014 standard that focuses on transmission assessments and physical security. The standard requires transmission station and substation owners to perform a risk assessment of their systems to identify facilities that could have a critical impact on the power grid.</p><p>The order also requires owners and operators to develop and implement a security plan to address potential threats and vulnerabilities.​</p><h4>Participants</h4><p>The electric system is made up of three components: generators—coal fired, biomass, solar, and wind—that produce electricity; transmission—taking the electricity from the power source and moving it somewhere, such as a substation; and distribution—power moving from a facility to the meter in a home, business, or other building.</p><p>When electricity moves from a generation station, such as a wind farm, it goes to a substation that normally has transformers that decrease the voltage, often from 500 to 230 kilovolts (kV). From there, the substation transmits the power to another substation, which usually lowers the voltage even further to 115 kV so it can be used in residential and commercial facilities. </p><p>CIP-014 applies to transmission substations in the electric system, not the generators or the distribution stations. However, it doesn’t apply to all 55,000 transmission substations in the country, explains Allan Wick, CPP, PCI, PSP, a member of the standard drafting committee. </p><p>Instead, the standard relies on categories that determine which facilities must comply with the standard. The standard takes effect if a system that is “rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading with an interconnection,” Wick explains. </p><p>Because of these criteria, CIP-014 applies to transmission facilities that operate at 500 kV or higher, or single facilities that operate between 200 kV and 499 kV where the substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltage to three or more other transmission stations that have an “aggregate weighted value” higher than 3,000 kV. </p><p>This means that few transmission substations will have to comply with standards. “By the time you use those criteria against what’s in the standard, [CIP-014] will only apply to 200 or fewer substations in the United States,” Wick says. The standard also applies to the control centers that operate those 200 substations—which are owned by roughly 30 different companies. </p><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre;"> </span></div><h4>Preparation</h4><p>FERC approved CIP-014 in November 2014, officially kickstarting the compliance process that owners need to complete by the first implementation date in October 2015. Their first responsibility is to perform an initial risk assessment (Requirement 1) to identify the transmission stations and substations the standard may apply to. Owners then have to identify the primary control centers that operationally control each transmission station or substation identified in the risk assessment.</p><p>Once these steps have been completed, owners will have 90 days to have an unaffiliated third party verify their assessments (R2). This third party can be a registered planning coordinator, transmission planner, reliability coordinator, or an entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. </p><p>If the third party adds or removes a transmission station or substation from the original assessment, owners then have an additional 60 days to modify their risk assessments or document the basis for not making the appropriate changes.</p><p>Additionally, if the primary control centers identified are owned by a company other than the transmission station, that owner needs to be notified (R3) within seven days following the third-party verification that it has operational control of the primary control center.</p><p>After the initial risk assessment has been completed, transmission owners that are covered by the standard will perform subsequent assessments at least once every 30 months. Transmission owners that are not covered by the standard are also required by law to perform assessments, but only once every 60 months.​</p><h4>Physical Security</h4><p>Once the transmission analysis and identification have been completed, owners are required to conduct evaluations of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack (R4) to each of their respective transmission stations, substations, and primary control centers.</p><p>These evaluations should include unique characteristics of the identified and verified transmission stations, substations, and control centers. For example, characteristics could include whether the substation is rural or urban, if it’s near a major highway, or if it’s in a valley. </p><p>For instance, the substation could be “set down in a small valley, so there are areas around it [from which] a shooter could either shoot the transformers or even use a rocket-propelled grenade to shoot something into it,” Wick explains.</p><p>Owners also need to detail any history of attacks on similar facilities, taking into account the “frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events,” according to the standard. CIP-014 asks owners to include intelligence or threat warnings they’ve received from law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization, the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and government agencies from either the United States or Canada.</p><p>Once these evaluations have been completed, and no more than 120 days after R2 is completed, owners are required to develop and implement a documented security plan and timeline that covers their respective transmission stations, substations, and primary control centers (R5). </p><p>Within the security plan, owners should include law enforcement contact and coordination information, provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats and their corresponding security measures, and resiliency or security measures designed “collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified” during R4.</p><p>The drafting committee chose this language specifically, Wick says, because “you can’t just do one of those—you need to put them together as a group to ‘deter, detect, delay,’ because those are the primary components…in a layered security program.”</p><p>The committee was also purposely less prescriptive about methods owners can use as part of their security measures. “We tried to build in maximum flexibility to arrive at the same end state for everybody,” Wick says. For instance, to delay someone “you can do that several different ways. You could have a 20-foot -high wall with razor tape, or you could do it with a chain link fence; there are so many options that you could use to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities that are identified in R4.”</p><p>This nonprescriptive method has faced some criticism, but many others think it’s beneficial. The regulators “are not really telling you to go out and spend all sorts of money on increased cameras, spending a lot of money on fences,” says Rich Hyatt, PCI, manager of security services for Tucson Electric Power. “They’re kind of promoting that you should harden up your site, like vegetation removal, signage…it’s not like the government’s coming in and telling you to spend $5 million per substation.”</p><p>The committee is also allowing owners to take a twofold approach by giving them the opportunity to build in resiliency on the operational side and protect their assets with security measures.</p><p>For example, Tucson Electric Power is increasing its resiliency by hardening its substations, says Hyatt, who’s also a member of the ASIS International Utilities Council. This is important because sometimes transformers malfunction. “There’s always the likelihood of sabotage, but we also have a threat of malfunction or weather-related issues, or manmade stuff that could go into a transformer being taken out,” he explains.</p><p>Hyatt is also working with substation employees to improve emergency communication, another issue addressed in the standard. “We’re also engaging our…substation folks to beef up their emergency response and have additional spare parts in their inventory so they can respond if a transformer got shot out—we could get it back online quicker,” he explains.</p><p>However, Jake Parker—director of government relations for the Security Industry Association (SIA)—says physically protecting assets is the better way to go for utilities security. “We think that physical security measures are much more cost effective because the cost of hardening the structure can also be extremely steep,” he explains. </p><p>Once owners have drafted and implemented their physical security plans, they then need to be verified again by a third party reviewer (R6) within 90 days. This reviewer can be an entity or organization with physical security experience in the electric industry and whose review staff: has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification; is approved by the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO); is a government agency with physical security expertise; or is an entity or organization with law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.</p><p>The ASIS certifications requirement was included after a review of existing applicable certifications. “By holding one of those two certifications, it shows that you know what you’re talking about on physical security,” Wick explains. “We did reviews of any certification that had physical security requirements, and these were the only two that were suitable.”</p><p>If the reviewer recommends changes to the R4 evaluation or the security plan, owners then have 60 days to comply with those recommendations or document why they are not modifying their plans.</p><h4>Penalties</h4><p>CIP-014 has an aggressive implementation timetable; Parker says he expects most utilities to have their physical security plans in place by spring 2016. There are no penalties for owners who do not comply with the new standard, although owners who do comply are required to keep documentation as evidence to show compliance for three years. NERC is responsible for enforcement.</p><p>Despite the lack of penalties and the limited number of transmission stations and substations covered by the standard, many companies say the standard has inspired them. CIP-014 has given companies guidance on increasing their physical security, according to Parker.</p><p>“We’re seeing, given the current environment and response to what happened at Metcalf…that utilities are finding it easier to justify security improvements across the board via rate increases,” he explains.</p><p>The rate increases are the funding mechanism utilities can use to pay for physical security improvements. They can do this by bringing proposals to their boards and justifying small rate increases “to cover the cost of the security upgrades because of the standard, but also because of the need to improve physical security of the electric grid overall,” Parker adds. </p><p>Hyatt agrees, saying that the industry is doing a “really good job” on being proactive in “policing up” and increasing the use of best security practices. The incident at Metcalf, he adds, has “actually increased security’s perception among executives where we work that physical security is just as important as cybersecurity.” ​</p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/The-Role-of-School-Resource-Officers.aspxThe Role of School Resource Officers<p>​Mo Canady, executive director of the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO), discusses the security implications of an SRO’s role in today’s educational environment.</p><p class="p1"><i>Q. What are school resource officers (SROs) and what are some of their job functions?  </i></p><p class="p1"><b>A. </b>SROs are sworn law enforcement officers assigned by their employing law enforcement agency to work with schools. They go into the classroom with a diverse curriculum in legal education. They aid in teaching students about the legal system and helping to promote an awareness of rules, authority, and justice. Outside of the classroom, SROs are mentoring students and engaging with them in a variety of positive ways.</p><p class="p1"><i>Q. What are some of the standards and best practices your organization teaches? </i></p><p class="p1"><b>A. T</b>here are three important things that need to happen for an SRO program to be successful. Number one, the officers must be properly selected. Number two, they have to be properly trained. And thirdly, it has to be a collaborative effort between the law enforcement agency and the school district. This can’t just be a haphazard approach of, “We have a drug problem; let’s put some police officers in there and try to combat it.” It needs to be a community-based policing approach.</p><p class="p1"><i>Q. Some SROs have come under fire for being too aggressive in the classroom. What’s your take?</i></p><p class="p1"><b>A. </b>There have been a handful of incidents that have played out in the media. But, it is up to the investigating agency to determine right and wrong. I’ve been very happy with the fact that the majority of those officers involved in these incidents have not been trained by us.</p><p class="p1"><i>Q. How does NASRO train officers to deal with potential threats? </i></p><p class="p1"><b>A. </b>In our training, we certainly talk about lockdown procedures and possible responses to active shooter situations, but we don’t get too detailed. It’s really up to each agency to make those kinds of decisions. In the case of an active shooter, I don’t believe most SROs are going to wait for additional backup to get there. Most of them are so bought into their schools and their relationships with their students, that if they hear gunfire, they’re going to go try to stop whatever is happening. </p><p class="p1"><i>Q. Do SROs consider themselves security officers? </i></p><p class="p1"><b>A. </b>We’re engaged in security and it’s a big part of what we do—but it’s just one piece of what we do. Sometimes when people think about physical security, the idea of relationship building doesn’t necessarily come in there, and yet it’s the lead thing for us. We know that through those relationships, if we’re building them the right way, we may get extremely valuable information from students, parents, faculty, and staff. It’s what leads to SROs in many cases being able to head off bad situations before they happen.</p>GP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465