Event Security

 

 

https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Houston’s-Game-Day-Solutions.aspxHouston’s Game Day SolutionsGP0|#cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8;L0|#0cd529cb2-129a-4422-a2d3-73680b0014d8|Physical Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652017-07-01T04:00:00Zhttps://adminsm.asisonline.org/pages/lilly-chapa.aspx, Lilly Chapa<p>​The city of Houston, Texas, was in a football frenzy during the days leading up to the 2017 Super Bowl showdown between the New England Patriots and Atlanta Falcons at Houston’s NRG Stadium. A nine-day fan festival, pop-up clubs hosting acts such as Bruno Mars and Taylor Swift, National Football League (NFL) and ESPN activities, and other events were scattered throughout the sprawling metropolis, home to 2.2 million people. </p><p>Just four months before a million visitors converged on Houston for the festivities, Jack Hanagriff, the infrastructure protection coordinator for Houston’s Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security, was tasked with expanding the city’s surveillance program and implementing a solution that would support emergency communications while overcoming the expected strain on the mobile network. </p><p>“Although our system is robust and can handle things normally, when you get a national event coming in, our cell service gets interfered with and then our cameras get hindered by blockages,” Hanagriff explains. Especially tricky was Super Bowl LIVE, the nine-day fan festival held in Discovery Green, a 12-acre urban park, and in five surrounding parking lots. The area is also home to the George R. Brown Convention Center and several hotels, high-rise condominiums, and businesses—all of which contribute to high usage of wireless and mobile networks, even when no events are taking place. </p><p>Hanagriff had to figure out how to deploy additional cameras to Discovery Green and other high-traffic areas such as team hotels, pop-up clubs, and the Galleria shopping center, while addressing the network strain that was sure to hinder communication and video feeds during the events. </p><p>“In public safety, we’re using other sources of technology beyond the actual emergency radio communications—such as cell phones and field reporting devices and cameras—and it works fine,” Hanagriff explains. “But when you start coming in with a mass of people and commercial carriers putting in their infrastructure and tents, the ecosystem of the venue changes so that our existing permanent solution is not adequate because it may get blocked.”</p><p>Hanagriff pulled together a robust team for the task, including vendors, wireless providers, and federal, state, and local players. Axis Communications donated 40 cameras to the cause, Vidsys provided information management middleware, and Siklu’s radios were used to transmit some of the video surveillance. Wireless carrier Verizon had already been working for months to beef up its network capacity in the city, and Hanagriff said it agreed to allow the city to connect its cameras to the fiber network it was laying.​</p><h4>The Buildout</h4><p>While NRG Stadium and the Galleria already had robust camera networks established, the city had to prepare Discovery Green and its surrounding parking lots for Super Bowl LIVE, where more than 150,000 people were expected to attend each day.</p><p>“We were confident we would get some coverage, but when I saw the footprint of the event…Discovery Green is one thing, but those five additional parking lots? That’s a lot of coverage,” Hanagriff says. “We knew we needed some really big players.”</p><p>In the weeks leading up to the kickoff of Super Bowl LIVE, workers spent 480 hours deploying the solution. Several cameras were installed on permanent structures surrounding Discovery Green, but most of the installation occurred in sync with the construction of the Super Bowl LIVE infrastructure. </p><p>“As they built the gates and kiosks and stages, we attached the cameras to those structures,” Hanagriff explains. “But even while they were building, they kept moving things, so we kept having to move the cameras. We had to put flyover cables where they didn’t exist—we were literally dropping 3,000-pound flagpoles to attach cables to and run them across the street.”</p><p>Fixed cameras were installed at all entry and exit areas, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras were used at every gate to observe the outer perimeter of the festival’s footprint. VIP and high-density areas were also a high priority—Discovery Green’s main stage was expected to draw at least 20,000 people for its major events, such as nightly light shows and a concert by Solange Knowles. Hanagriff said the city worked with intelligence officials to set up cameras in areas where potential threats could be carried out. Cameras were also outfitted with audio sensors that could detect and triangulate gunshots, as well as a sensor that detects an elevated anger response in human speech that often occurs before an argument.</p><p>The 40 Axis cameras, as well as 26 of the city’s existing cameras, were brought together under one dashboard through Vidsys middleware and were connected with fiber because of Verizon’s infrastructure buildout. Additionally, the 40 new cameras streamed to the Verizon cloud, allowing for mobile access and redundancy. “If we lost our main system, we could still run the temporary system off the cloud,” Hanagriff explains. “The cloud gave us versatility to bring in mobile applications and partners that did not have access to our existing system.”</p><p>Hanagriff wanted to deploy a camera on top of a hotel a block from the Super Bowl LIVE footprint for an all-encompassing view of the festival, but ran into connectivity problems. The fiber did not extend to the hotel, and radio frequencies completely saturated the area, making a wireless network solution impossible. The city ended up working with Siklu to install a millimeter wave radio that used narrow beam technology to transmit the video feed on an unoccupied spectrum. </p><p>“There was so much radio frequency you could walk on air,” Hanagriff says. “The Siklu radio beamed right through all of it.” </p><p>Security officials set up an emergency operations center in the convention center next to Discovery Green, where the camera feeds—including setups at NRG Stadium and the Galleria—were consolidated. Although many of the existing cameras were part of a closed network, the temporary cameras could be accessed via mobile devices from the cloud, which was crucial in integrating new partners into security operations. Hanagriff described the operations center as a huge room with dozens of partners: event coordinators, Houston officials and first responders, the Harris County Sheriff’s Department, the Texas Public Safety and Transportation Departments, the FBI, and other federal agency representatives. </p><p>Whether they were at the center itself or out in the city, officials could access the camera feeds via mobile devices. The Harris County Sheriff’s Department set up a mobile command post at the Galleria, where more activities and protests were taking place. It was able to use the mobile application to review the Galleria’s camera feeds and correspond with the main command post, Hanagriff says. And during the Super Bowl game itself, several groups were able to access the city’s cameras at NRG Stadium, including NFL security directors and another mobile command post closer to the event.  ​</p><h4>Emergency Operations</h4><p>While Hanagriff’s role was coordinating the technology infrastructure ahead of the festivities, Patrick Hagan, technical specialist and engineer operator for the Houston Fire Department, saw firsthand how the camera setup helped emergency operations in such an unpredictable environment.</p><p>During Super Bowl LIVE, members of Houston’s police and fire departments were dispatched via portable devices that operate on Band 14, a broadband spectrum reserved for first responders. The devices can run active GPS for an entire 16-hour shift, serve as trackers for the officers, and share information, location, and images from the field to command center or vice versa. </p><p>“Because of the nature of the footprint, Super Bowl LIVE was closed off with a hard barrier, so we had to have teams inside that didn’t have vehicle apparatus,” Hagan explains. “Because of that they were on foot or on bike, so we dispatched them via GPS, which was new to us.” </p><p>A few weeks before the Super Bowl events, first responders tested out the devices to communicate via Band 14 during the Houston Marathon. “We gave the GPS a run for its money—we tried to max out the system, wanted to see what it would do under a lot of traffic, and never got any failure points,” Hagan says. But that wasn’t the case for Super Bowl LIVE.</p><p>Due to the massive amount of radio frequency traffic in Discovery Green, which Hagan agreed was the most he had ever experienced, the officers’ GPS signals experienced reflectivity and weren’t totally precise.</p><p>“Our GPS wasn’t quite true,” Hagan says. “It was off in some cases by 150 yards, which when you’re in a sea of people, is a few thousand people. We had to work around that.”</p><p>Hagan and others in the emergency operations center were able to coordinate with officers in the field by using the video feeds and verbal commands to guide them to called-in emergencies.</p><p>“We’d leverage those video systems to give our bike teams a better location,” Hagan explains. “We could see the officer’s blue dot with the tracking system and I’d compare it to the map of where I knew the patient was by looking at a video feed. Then I could verbally walk them there via radio and cellular communication. I can’t just say that the patient is over by the food truck when there are 80 food trucks.”</p><p>Using GPS and video feeds for dispatching was a first for the Houston Fire Department. “We don’t show up when things work. We show up when things break,” Hagan notes. “It’s a very fine line that we walk between using cutting-edge technology versus tried and true methods that are much lower tech. We have to utilize the technology to our advantage when we can, but when it fails we need to have contingency for that, and still be practiced in that contingency.”</p><p>Hagan made sure that contingency plans were in place during the Super Bowl, explaining that officials were prepared to resort to voice and radio dispatching if the GPS or video feeds failed. The dual capability of the video feeds allowed even the giant command post to be completely mobile, he notes. </p><p>“Everything in the command post was done on a laptop and broadcast on these giant screens, so at a moment’s notice we could drop and run and take all that with us and still have all our capabilities,” Hagan says. “We could still share data…still communicate—that’s the point of the redundancy. We had the hard connection but we wanted to be able to see all of our video streams and everything on mobile if we had to.”​</p><h4>Technology Forward</h4><p>After nine days of fans, football, and a Patriots win in overtime, Hanagriff and Hagan agree that the technology-forward security approach was a success. And while the pop-up clubs have been deconstructed and Discovery Green has reverted back to an urban oasis, the technology used remains in the city. Verizon’s citywide enhancements will continue to benefit Houstonians, city businesses and public officials will continue to strengthen their partnerships, and ​the 40 cameras Axis provided will be part of what Hanagriff calls a technology playground.</p><p>The cameras will be redeployed in high-traffic areas such as Discovery Green and the Galleria, and businesses, first responders, and industry partners will test ways to further integrate security technology into Houston. Hanagriff plans on forming a partnership with everyone invested in the project to determine the direction and scope of the testing.</p><p>“We all get exposure to all these different technologies, and there are benefits for everybody, and it’s all done by in-kind services,” Hanagriff says. “Everybody gets a big bang with no buck.” </p><p>Public safety officials will be able to learn more about video analytics and other cutting-edge technology without disrupting their current camera system, industry partners who provide the equipment and software will be able to conduct research and development and receive direct feedback from subject matter experts, and private businesses that allow the city to put equipment on their buildings will have access to systems that are normally out of reach. </p><p>“Most business partners are usually on the inside looking out, and this system gives them the ability to be on the outside looking in on their property,” Hanagriff notes. </p><p>Hagan says that in the past the fire department has only had access to the city’s camera feeds and has been unable to manipulate them. Being able to take full advantage of the cameras’ capabilities during the Super Bowl events showed how helpful they could be during dispatch, and he hopes the fire department can continue to access the city’s camera infrastructure more fully. </p><p>“We have a lot of the same goals and a lot of people doing the same exact job,” Hagan notes. “If we as a city can get three or four people who can perform that function and share that information with each department in real time, that would make sense. If someone calls into this joint operation and says, ‘I need eyes here, do you see anything?’ those people can give immediate feedback to any department. That’s the plan.”   ​</p>

Event Security

 

 

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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/A-Threat-in-the-Crowd.aspxFour Indicators Security Professionals Should Look for when Identifying Suicide Bombers<p>​<span style="line-height:1.5em;">Though there is no textbook profile of a suicide bomber, there are trademark actions and behaviors. The warning signs of an attack, known as “telltale indicators,” manifest themselves when a person is being deceptive.​</span></p><h4>Body language</h4><p>Something didn’t feel right. A young man was skulking around the entrance of Mike’s Place, an American-themed Tel Aviv seaside bar and restaurant, as if he were trying to avoid the line of vision of security officer Avi Tabib, who was posted at the door. The man’s roundabout movements were odd enough that Tabib, knowing that Mike’s Place would be an attractive terrorist target as a hangout for diplomats from the U.S. embassy next door, broke off his conversation with a waitress to study the man more closely. The man eventually approached the door. </p><p>“Something about his body language…his eyes…bothered me and I didn’t like it,” the guard later recalled. “Something about his stubbornness and defensive aggression really ticked me off. His eyes signaled trouble.”</p><p>The signs of trouble were enough for Tabib to turn the man away. But the man circled back and tried to rush past Tabib into the bar. Tabib, a martial arts aficionado, tackled him at the hip, and an explosive belt detonated, killing the attacker, the waitress, and two other men, but, miraculously, not Tabib.​</p><h4>Clothing</h4><p>Something didn’t feel right. Although he had been in Israel for only several months, Mikhail Sarkisov intuited that this was no typical patron looking to enter the seaside coffee shop. On a steamy Friday Tel Aviv evening, he was wearing a bulky jacket up top and shorts on the bottom, exposing his spindly legs. When Sarkisov, a former Russian policeman and soldier, wanded him, the man went off like a church bell. </p><p>“I asked him, ‘What’s that?’ And he said, ‘It’s mine,’” Sarkisov told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.</p><p>“I said, ‘I didn't ask whose it was, I said, what is it?’” Sarkisov recalled. </p><p>“He put his hand in his pocket. I know what a bomb is. I was an officer in the Russian army.” </p><p>Sarkisov grabbed for the attacker’s hand, and the man took off toward the U.S. Embassy. Sarkisov chased after him, yelling “terrorist!” Officers working at the embassy combined with Sarkisov to subdue the attacker and prevent him from detonating his bomb, which was packed with six pounds of nuts and bolts to maximize carnage.​</p><h4>Behavior</h4><p>Something didn’t feel right. An 18-year-old man, in a baseball cap and wearing a backpack on his chest, was wheeling a piece of luggage through the lobby of the luxurious JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta toward a lounge where a group of regional CEOs were gathering for breakfast. He seemed to have tunnel vision—oblivious to activity around him, focused on his destination. Suspicious, guards stopped him from entering the lounge. </p><p>“I want to see my boss,” the young man told the officers, according to an indictment issued against a conspirator in the attack. </p><p>“Which one is your boss? What’s his name?” one of the officers asked. ​</p><p>Eventually, a hotel clerk who had come over to see what was going on relented to the man’s pleas. Moments later, a blast ripped through the hotel, killing six and wounded dozens. Another bomb ripped through the Ritz Carlton hotel across the street shortly thereafter as part of a coordinated strike.</p><p><br></p><p>Three cases in which “something didn’t feel right.” Two in which security personnel trusted their training and senses and prevented larger tragedies. One in which nonsecurity staff disregarded warning signs identified by security officers.</p><p>These “somethings,” explains David Harel, weren’t just abstract, ethereal hunches. Harel, managing director and vice president of ASERO Worldwide, a global consultancy specializing in security and risk management with a special focus on Israel, says that the sense of foreboding was triggered by specific acts and behaviors that were difficult to completely articulate at the moment—a movement, a look, a tone, a gesture. “The indicators were there,” says Harel, who previously held high-level positions at the Israeli Security Agency (ISA). “They just might not have been sure what they were at the time.”</p><p>While suicide terrorism is a relatively infrequent modus operandi—the 2014 Global Terrorism Index indicates that less than 5 percent of all terrorist incidents worldwide since 2000 have been suicide attacks—it is a quickly growing phenomenon. From 1982 through May 2015, there were 4,568 suicide attacks worldwide, according to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), a research institute based at the University of Chicago. And 2014 represented a high-water mark of attacks with 545. Unsurprisingly, they are particularly lethal. According to CPOST, the average attack killed 10 people and wounded 26 others. Data compiled by ASERO show that although a mere 0.6 percent of terrorist attacks in Israel between late 2000 and 2008 were suicide bombings, this tiny fraction accounted for half of all terrorism fatalities in that country. </p><p>What’s more, suicide attacks are spreading beyond the typical theatres of Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria. “In Europe, in general, we are about to see more suicide terrorism,” predicts Zori Kor, an ASERO vice president. “You can simply walk to wherever there are a lot of people. It is more efficient than a bag left at an airport or on a corner.” Many other analysts agree, pointing to the likely return to Europe of hundreds of jihadist fighters who will be bringing home tactics from Syria.</p><p>Moreover, suicide attacks are becoming more sophisticated, as terrorists share techniques and technology on the Internet. For example, in March of this year, four suicide bombers killed 142 and wounded 351 worshipers when they detonated bombs at two mosques in Sana’a, Yemen. The attacks were so deadly partly because secondary devices targeted the fleeing masses.</p><p>Because of the violence engendered by the religious, political, economic, and historic strife in the country and the surrounding region, Israel’s approach to security is extraordinary—security doesn’t need to show a bottom line, deliver a return on investment, or take on ancillary areas such as customer service or maintenance. Every threat is considered existential, and security always has a seat at the table—often at the head of the table. In addition, Israel’s small dimensions—it is frequently compared to New Jersey in size—allow it to impose much stricter measures and cultivate in its population a much stronger awareness of threats than larger nations can achieve. </p><p>Still, many of the approaches and techniques used in that country—in this case with regard to suicide bombings—offer lessons to businesses, governments, and other institutions around the world. That’s especially so because today’s terrorists, and their causes and techniques, routinely cross borders, notes Kor.</p><p>Israel frequently thwarts suicide attacks, but it hasn’t always been so proficient. The Jewish nation “failed early” when faced with new terrorism techniques, says Doron Bergerbest-Eilon, founder, president, and CEO of ASERO. “We learned from our failures and came in with practical solutions,” he continues. Bergerbest-Eilon developed those years of experience as the head of the protection and security division and the senior ranking security official at the ISA. “Because we started early, we are in many ways more advanced than the rest of the world,” he says. </p><p>For example, during the Second Intifada, from 2000-2005, Israel was struck more than 140 times by suicide bombers. The numbers have plummeted since then—replaced by incidents of shootings, stabbings, and car rampages—because of Israel’s effective response to the threat. That response has included detailed human and technical intelligence, a border fence at the West Bank, widespread surveillance, public education, and close collaboration between public and private security forces, among other factors.</p><p>But what happens when an attacker slips by this web of defense and is bearing down on a target? Though there is no textbook profile of a suicide bomber, there are trademark actions and behaviors that Bergerbest-Eilon and his ASERO colleagues have documented. ASERO calls the warning signs of an attack “telltale indicators,” or TTIs. Harel explains that TTIs manifest themselves, or “leak,” when a person is being deceptive. Cognitive and emotional dissonance, he says, result in increased brain activity, which can be seen in thermal images.</p><p><br></p><h4>Model of Deception</h4><p>Absent access to brain scans, security screeners can apply a four-part model. Harel uses an ABCD categorization for TTIs: appearance, behavior and belongings, context, and documentation.</p><p><strong>Appearance.</strong> Consider shoebomber Richard Reid. One of his subduers, a man named Kwame James, was asked by a CNN interviewer why he had noticed Reid on the plane prior to the attack. James said: “Just his long, scraggly hair, just his appearance in general. I mean, usually Paris is a very fashion-conscious city, and usually when you’re flying on those longer flights from Paris to Miami or to New York, whatever, everybody is pretty well-dressed, and he definitely wasn’t.”</p><p>A rough-hewn appearance among smartly attired people is a certain TTI. Others could be irregular bunching under clothes, excessive or oversized clothing, inappropriate dress for time or season, and style of dress in contradiction to a stated profession or position. Also, clothing may seem to be holding excessive weight. </p><p><strong>Behavior and belongings.</strong> Before two women blew themselves up at an entrance to a rock concert at the Tushino Airfield outside Moscow in 2003, their agitation was visible. On Christmas Day in 2009, Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab checked in to his flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, a flight he would attempt to blow up. He failed to check a bag, even though his itinerary indicated that he would be staying in wintry Michigan for two weeks. Before Yigal Amir assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, Amir’s carriage and behavior while lying in wait—including repeatedly sitting and standing, sidling, and walking backwards—caught the attention of a videographer who was capturing the prime minister’s appearance from a nearby roof. Asked why the video keeps coming back to the assassin in the crowded scene, the videographer said, “I said to myself, suppose there is somebody here who is going to commit a murder.... He looked like that kind of person.”</p><p>Israeli police, security, and the public are trained to look for irregular behavior in relation to time, place, and circumstance. This might include nervousness or anxiety, heavy sweating, rigid or unnatural movements, a detached air or blank stare, furtive glances, acute focus (as in the previously mentioned Jakarta hotel attack), and avoidance of eye contact with security personnel. </p><p>For example, security and pedestrians shortcircuited a potentially far more dangerous attack when they noticed a man holding a bag and walking with a stiff gait toward the main entrance of the the Sharon Mall in the Israeli coastal town of Netanya in December 2005. According to an account in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, a witness saw a man walking “like a robot” to the mall. A woman shouted to the guards at the entrance to the shopping center, “Suicide bomber! Suicide bomber!” A guard grabbed the man and pulled him away from the entrance, while police rushed over to assist. The attacker detonated the explosives in the bag, killing the guard and four others, and wounding more than 50. Authorities said the toll would have been much higher had the terrorist entered the mall.</p><p><strong>Context. </strong>Why would a financially struggling, pregnant Irish chambermaid make a last-minute ticket purchase to fly from London to Tel Aviv alone? Ann Marie Murphy told El Al authorities that her Jordanian fiancé wanted the lovers to marry in Israel and had sent her ahead, and that she was staying at the Hilton, one of the most expensive hotels in the country. She claimed to have been given a free room because of her occupation—though it was highly unlikely that a deluxe hotel would extend a free room to housekeeping staff. Nor could she verify her hotel reservations or identify any friends or relatives she would be seeing in Israel. </p><p>Turns out her “fiancé,” Nezar Hindawi, had planted more than 3 pounds of Semtex in her bag with the intent of taking down the flight—and getting rid of an unwanted girlfriend and unborn child.</p><p>The Murphy case is a classic example of an unlikely context serving as the key to exposing a suicide bombing plot.</p><p><strong>Documentation.</strong> Another indicator of an attack might be poor, questionable, or counterfeit documentation such as passports, driver’s licenses, or work permits. Harel points to a 2012 suicide attack by a bomber on a passenger bus carrying Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria. There were sufficient anomalies, he says—waiting in the arrival hall for a charter flight, carrying a heavy backpack even though it had wheels—for authorities to investigate. Had they asked for ID, they would have seen that he was carrying a Michigan driver’s license that had a Baton Rouge, Louisiana, address. It also listed the man, who video stills suggest stood about six feet tall, as five foot two. Ironically, days before, the man had been turned down when trying to rent a car because his identification looked suspicious. </p><p>It’s been reported that poor documentation contributed to the capture of the Millennium Bomber, who tried to cross from Canada to the United States to attack the Los Angeles International Airport. After being pulled from his car by a Customs agent, the bomber handed over two Quebec driver’s licenses with the same birthdates but in different names.</p><p>Up-to-date intelligence, prompt information sharing, and public awareness are key to thwarting suicide attacks, as the Israeli model shows. 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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/In-Search-of-Security-Metrics.aspxIn Search of Security Metrics<p>At a major insurance company headquartered in the Midwestern United States, the assistant vice president for corporate security has used an environmental risk metric for the past 12 years to help the company decide where to place office facilities around the country. The company owns or leases hundreds of facilities across the United States. Corporate security regularly collects a suite of data, assigns weights to various factors, and develops a numeric score that places each facility into a low, medium, or high category of risk. For each risk category, written policy specifies a cluster of security measures that should be in place at the site. Exceptions can be granted, but the systematic approach results in uniformity and in efficiency in decision-making and security systems contracting. 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The term is sometimes used interchangeably with measurements, analytics, and performance measures. With metrics, security managers can speak to senior leaders in familiar business language, offering measurable results that correlate with investment. Without compelling metrics, security managers and their budgets rely largely on the intuition of company leadership. </p><p>Two years ago, the ASIS Foundation implemented a new structure for assessing and overseeing security research. The first test of that structure was a proposal for research on security metrics, says Linda F. Florence, Ph.D, CPP, president, ASIS Foundation Board of Trustees. "The ASIS International Defense and Intelligence Council had a special interest in the topic, having made several presentations on metrics at the ASIS Annual Seminar and Exhibits. The council formed a vision of what the security field needed, found researchers who could perform the work, and helped the researchers develop a proposal for ASIS Foundation funding."</p><p>The Foundation Research Council approved the proposal, and the Foundation sought and received funding from the ASIS Board of Directors. The result was the ASIS Foundation Metrics Research Project. The Foundation awarded a grant to Global Skills X-Change (GSX) and Ohlhausen Research to undertake the project. GSX specializes in applying validation, measurement, and standards development techniques to produce business tools. Ohlhausen Research, Inc., conducts research in security, criminal justice, and technology.</p><h4>Depth Perception<br><br></h4><p>The project's research team consisted of the author as principal investigator; subject matter expert and former Director of Information Protection for the U.S. Air Force Daniel McGarvey; Senior Analyst Megan Poore; and Technical Advisor Lance Anderson, Ph.D.</p><p>Throughout the research, which be­gan in 2013, the ASIS Defense and Intelligence Council ensured that the security practitioner's point of view was represented by serving on the project's advisory board and expert panel.</p><p>The researchers gained insights into security metrics through a systematic review of the literature, an online sur­vey of ASIS members, and lengthy fol­low- up interviews by phone. In addition, the research team was guided by an advisory board and an expert panel composed of security professionals with experience in the use of metrics. The project was completed in the spring of 2014.</p><p>The research found many books, articles, and reports discussing reasons to use metrics, characteristics of existing metrics, and methods for communicating metrics. Among the most valuable resources on security metrics were George Campbell's <em>Measures and Metrics in Corporate Security: Communicating Business Value</em> and Mary Lynn Garcia's <em>The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems</em>, as well as numerous articles in both <em>Harvard Business Review</em> and <em>MIT Sloan Management Review</em>—the latter on business metrics generally.</p><p>This noted, most sources that examine security metrics operate at a conceptual level only. The literature has few specific strategies for developing or evaluating security metrics. Likewise, descriptions of empirically sound security metrics with statistical justification and evidence are scarce. </p><p>To uncover specific uses of security metrics and to gain an understanding of the different ways in which security professionals may be using metrics, the research team invited more than 3,000 ASIS members to participate in an online survey. The survey's 20 questions asked about metrics collection, comparison to external benchmarks, return on investment, sharing and presentation of metrics, and alignment with organizational risks and objectives. The survey also examined the particulars of metrics usage among respondents.</p><p>The 297 respondents demonstrated a high degree of interest in metrics. Of the respondents who said they are not using security metrics, 78 percent said they would use metrics if they knew more about how to create and use them effectively. More than half of all respondents asked for more information from ASIS regarding metrics.</p><p>Respondents provided the research team with a detailed view of the many ways that security professionals are using metrics today, including focusing on topics, reporting data, sharing with the C-suite, aligning with organizational risk, and using a dashboard tool.</p><p><strong>Metrics topics.</strong> Respondents were asked which aspects of the security program they measure. The top five categories were security incidents, criminal incidents and investigations, cost against budget, security training and education, and guarding performance, which includes turnover and inspections. </p><p><strong>Reporting.</strong> Eighty percent of respondents who use metrics provide their metric findings to persons outside the security department. Recipi­ents of the information include senior management (79 percent of those who share metrics outside the security department), managers of other departments (59 percent), supervisors (51 percent), and people who report to the security department (47 percent). Those who share metrics provide the information quarterly (43 percent), monthly (40 percent), or annually (17 percent).</p><p><strong>Sharing.</strong> Respondents who share metrics with C-suite personnel were asked which elements they share. The top choices were security incidents (80 percent), cost against budget (62 percent), criminal incidents and investigations (57 percent), regulatory compliance (44 percent), and risk analysis process (40 percent).</p><p><strong>Alignment.</strong> Eighty percent of respondents who use metrics said that their metrics are tied to, aligned with, or part of the larger organizational risk process or organiza­tional objectives. For example, some metrics protect the company's most important product line; other metrics may support business continuity, compliance, risk management, or client satisfaction. One respondent explained that top management sets broad goals and writes plans while se­cu­rity metrics demonstrate how effective those plans are.</p><p><strong>Dashboard tool.</strong> Forty-four percent of respondents who use metrics perform their data collection, review, or sharing via a security management dashboard tool.</p><p>This research makes it possible to clearly define security's role and contribution to the organization at the tactical, organizational, and strategic levels. The report provides a working metrics tool that can help practitioners use metrics in the most effective manner. </p><h4>In the Tool Belt<br><br></h4><p>GSX and Ohlhausen Research studied the current uses of security metrics and created several resources for practition­ers. The Security Metrics Evaluation Tool (Security MET) helps security pro­fessionals develop, evaluate, and improve security metrics. A library of metric descriptions, each evaluated according to the Security MET criteria, provides valuable resources. Guidelines for using metrics can help security professionals inform and persuade senior management.</p><p>The tools, especially the Security MET, are designed to help security managers assess and refine metrics that they are using or considering, based on an intimate knowledge of conditions at their organization, in a manner guided by scientific assessment methods. </p><p><strong>Security MET.</strong> The Security MET is meant to aid and empower the security manager, not to dictate any particular security decision. By providing a standard for scientific measurement, it offers guidance for improving the inputs that go into the security professional's own decision-making process.</p><p>The Security MET is a written instrument that security managers can use to assess the quality of specific security metrics. Users can determine whether an existing or proposed metric possesses scientific validity, organizational rele­vance (such as clear alignment with corporate risks or goals), return on investment, and practicality.</p><p>The tool was developed through a comprehensive, iterative process that involved synthesizing scientific literature, reviewing security industry standards, and obtaining input from metrics experts on the project's advisory board and expert panel. Many of the criteria come from the field of psychometrics, which is concerned with the measurement of mental traits, abilities, and processes. The psychometric literature addresses the measurement of complex human behaviors, including sources of error inherent in social and organizational situations. In addition, through its connection with legal guidelines and case law, psychometric theory provides ways to address complicated legal issues related to fairness and human error.</p><p>The tool presents nine criteria for evaluating a security metric. The criteria fall into three groups: technical, operational, and strategic.</p><p><em>Technical.</em> The technical criteria include reliability, validity, and generaliz­ability. Reliability means the degree to which the metric yields consistent scores that are unaffected by sources of measurement error. Validity refers to the degree to which evidence based on theory or quantitative research supports drawing conclusions from the metric. Generalizability means the degree to which conclusions drawn from the metric are consistent and applicable across different settings, organizations, timeframes, or circumstances.</p><p><em>Operational.</em> Operational criteria include the monetary and nonmonetary costs associated with metric development and administration, as well as timeliness and the extent to which metric data can be manipulated, coached, guessed, or faked by staff.</p><p><em>Strategic.</em> Strategic criteria include return on investment, organizational relevance, and communication. Return on investment is the extent to which a metric can be used to demonstrate cost savings or loss prevention in relation to relevant security spending. Organizational relevance is the extent to which the metric is linked to organizational risk management or a strategic mission, objective, goal, asset, threat, or vulnerability relevant to the organization—in other words, linked to the factors that matter the most to senior management. Communication refers to the extent to which the metric, metric results, and metric value can be communicated easily, succinctly, and quickly to key stakeholders, especially senior management.</p><p>A score sheet is presented at the end of the Security MET. The instrument is easy to score and imposes little to no time burden on staff. Lower scores on particular criteria show where a metric has room for improvement. </p><p>Here's an example of how the Security MET can be used to evaluate a real-life metric. At a major financial services firm, employees were being robbed of their mobile phones on the sidewalks all around the office as they came to work, when they went outside for lunch, or when they left to go home. The firm identified hot spots and times for phone theft and applied extra security measures. After reaching a maximum of 40 thefts in a two-month period, the number soon declined to zero.</p><p>Evaluating the metric with the Security MET provides some valuable insights. The metric—the number of mobile phone thefts—is highly reliable, as it is based on incident reports from employee victims, police reports, and video surveillance. Its validity appears to be confirmed by the outcome—that problem was eliminated. Collecting the data has little marginal cost, as the company already tracks and trends security incidents. Its organizational relevance is high, as it aligns with the firm's goal of attracting workers to the central business district. As for communication, it is a straightforward metric that is easy to explain. In terms of return on investment, it is hard to quantify the value of keeping employees safe and continuing to attract new employees.</p><p>Thus, while the metric appears to present a reasonable return on investment, the Security MET helps the user see that developing clear proof of ROI would be one way to strengthen this particular metric. The addition of a short survey asking employees if they feel more se­cure and would recommend the company to others would provide validation for both the solution and the metric.</p><p><strong>Metrics library.</strong> The researchers de­veloped 16 summaries of metrics currently in use in the security field. The summaries were developed primarily through telephone interviews with on­line survey respondents. The summaries may serve as examples for security pro­fessionals who are considering ways to use metrics. (See box on page 58 for a complete list of topics.)</p><p>The library presents a three- to four-page summary of each metric. In addition, each metric is evaluated by several metrics experts, using the Security MET. The metrics library is presented in the full project report.</p><p>These real-world metrics come from a variety of industries including defense/aerospace, energy/oil, finance, government, insurance, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, real estate management, retail, security services, shipping/logistics, and telecommunications.</p><p>Some of the metrics are more sophisticated and detailed than others, providing a range of examples for potential users to consider. The metrics are not presented as models of perfection. Rather, they are authentic examples that security professionals can follow, refine, or otherwise adapt when developing their own metrics.</p><p><strong>Guidelines.</strong> A key task in this research was to develop guidelines for effectively using security metrics to persuade senior management. What would make those presentations more compelling? Several recommendations emerged.</p><p>Present metrics that are aligned with the organization's objectives or risks or that measure the specific issues in which management is most interested. One of the most important measures is return on investment (ROI).</p><p>Present metrics that meet measurement standards. A metric may be more persuasive to senior management if it has been properly designed from a scientific point of view and has been evaluated against a testing tool, such as the Security MET, or established measurement and statistical criteria.</p><p>Tell a story. If the metric is prevention-focused, a security professional can make the metric compelling by naming the business resources threatened, stat­ing the value of those resources, and describing the consequences if the event occurs. Another part of a compelling story is the unfolding of events over time. Metrics can show progress toward a specific strategic goal. </p><p>Use graphics and keep presentations short. Senior managers may be interested in only a few key measures. While security professionals may choose to monitor many metrics via a dashboard interface, they should create a simpler dashboard for senior management. Some security professionals said they limit their presentations to five minutes.</p><p>Present metric data regularly. As data ages it becomes more historical, less actionable, and thus potentially less valuable. The research does not suggest an optimal interval for sharing security metrics with senior management, but the survey shows that 83 percent of security professionals who share metrics outside the department do so at least quarterly. </p><p>Future steps for helping security professionals improve their use of metrics include a webinar sponsored by the ASIS Defense and Intelligence Council and the further development of the metrics library. Other ideas under consideration include metrics training for security practitioners, the development of a tool for creating a metric from scratch and implementing it in an organization, and the creation of a library of audited— not merely self-reported—metrics. </p><p>The best security practice is evi­dence-based; without research, practitioners must rely on anecdotal information to make decisions. The ASIS Foundation continues to seek ideas for research projects that would increase security knowledge and help security professionals perform their work more effectively. </p><p>The complete project report, <em>Persuading Senior Management with Effective, Evaluated Security Metrics</em>, is available as a free download. The 196-page report contains the full text of the Security MET, the library of metric summaries (with evaluations), guidelines for presenting metrics to senior management, the project's literature review, and detailed results of the online survey.</p><p>Florence says, "We are proud to brand this quality research with the ASIS Foundation logo and share the findings with our members and the security profession as a whole. This research will help propel security from an industry to a profession, where we belong."  <br></p><p>Peter E. Ohlhausen is president of Ohlhausen Research, Inc., and served as principal investigator for the ASIS Foundation Metrics Research Project. He is a member of ASIS.</p>GP0|#28ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997;L0|#028ae3eb9-d865-484b-ac9f-3dfacb4ce997|Strategic Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Security-101--What-to-Expect-at-the-U.S.-Presidential-Inauguration.aspxSecurity 101: What to Expect at the U.S. Presidential Inauguration<p>​Almost 1 million people are estimated to descend on Washington, D.C., on Friday for the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Many of those individuals are part of 63 groups planning demonstrations at the inauguration, presenting a unique security challenge for the U.S. federal government, D.C. officials, and other stakeholders.</p><p>“Anytime you have coming together such large numbers of people, such large numbers of groups that intend to demonstrate and exercise their First Amendment rights, you’ve got to be vigilant; you’ve got to plan; you’ve got to prepare,” said U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson in a press conference. <br></p><p>This is why the inauguration was designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE), allowing federal officials to begin crafting a security plan for the event 180 days before it was to take place. <br></p><p></p><div class="ms-rtestate-read ms-rte-wpbox"><div class="ms-rtestate-notify ms-rtestate-read af4e0b24-c744-4f11-a407-cfd54f64d3ec" id="div_af4e0b24-c744-4f11-a407-cfd54f64d3ec"></div><div id="vid_af4e0b24-c744-4f11-a407-cfd54f64d3ec" style="display:none;"></div></div><p>​The U.S. Secret Service led the planning, working with other federal partners, such as the U.S. Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and local partners such as the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)—Washington, D.C.’s local police force.</p><p>Given the unique scope of a U.S. presidential inauguration where heads of state and numerous U.S. leaders will be in attendance, along with between 700,000 to 900,000 civilians, there will be an enormous security presence in the nation’s capital. <br></p><p>Johnson said that approximately 35,800 security personnel will be involved over the course of inauguration weekend—10,000 DHS personnel, 12,000 other federal personnel, 7,800 National Guard personnel, and 6,000 police officers from MPD and other local police departments.<br></p><p><strong>Security Measures for the Inauguration </strong><br></p><p>On Wednesday at 5 p.m., U.S. Capitol Police will begin <a href="https://www.uscp.gov/media-center/press-releases/2017-presidential-inaugural-capitol-complex-street-closures-parking" target="_blank">closing street access</a> to the Capitol complex and continue closing streets on Thursday at 11 p.m. local time. Streets access is expected to resume at 5 p.m. on Friday, and in the meantime the police are encouraging people to walk or take public transportation.<br></p><p>"Inaugural events attendees are encouraged to use public transportation, as many streets in and around the Capitol Grounds and the National Mall will be closed to private automobiles for much of the day," Capitol Police said in a statement. </p><p>Security personnel will establish two different types of perimeters for the event: soft vehicle perimeters where those who live or work inside the perimeter will be given access, and hard vehicle perimeters where only official vehicles will be allowed to pass through. The hard vehicle perimeter will also be heavily fortified by trucks and dumpsters, “given the current threat environment,” Johnson added.<br></p><p>The <a href="https://www.wmata.com/rider-guide/events/inauguration/index.cfm#MoreInfo" target="_blank">Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority​</a> (WMATA) will open at 4 a.m. on Friday and run through midnight. It plans to run at peak service from 4 a.m. until 9 p.m. that evening to service riders, but the Navy Archives, Federal Triangle, Mount Vernon Plaza, Pentagon, and Smithsonian stations will be closed.<br></p><p>Security personnel will have bag checks and 300 magnetometers set up to screen individuals planning on attending the inauguration festivities.<br></p><p>Washington, D.C., is also a <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/releases/GPA-01-17-Inauguration-No-Drone-Zone.pdf" target="_blank">no fly zone​</a> for unmanned aircraft (drones), and Johnson said security measures have been taken to ensure that no drones are able to fly within the District during the inauguration weekend. <br></p><p>“Christmas was just a few weeks ago,” Johnson added. “I suspect a lot of people got drones for Christmas…this is something we’ve thought about, we have planned for, and we have technology to deal with it.”<br></p><p>Officials have also issued permits to 99 groups planning to demonstrate on inauguration weekend—63 of which plan to demonstrate on Friday. These permits were issued to help security plan for how it will handle these protesters—such as where protestors will be allowed to demonstrate to ensure that they are not crossing paths with groups that might hold opposing views. <br></p><p>This helps security personnel ensure that opposing groups do not disrupt the festivities and it helps prevent demonstrations from escalating. Security personnel will also monitor these groups for disruption and to make sure they remain separated, Johnson explained.<br></p><p>There is no specific threat to the inauguration, Johnson said, but security personnel will remain vigilant as the global terrorist environment is very different in 2017 than it was in 2013—the last time an inauguration was held in the United States. <br></p><div class="ms-rtestate-read ms-rte-wpbox"><div class="ms-rtestate-notify ms-rtestate-read 9c55b8b2-304d-46c0-8e24-aa44e28ebc64" id="div_9c55b8b2-304d-46c0-8e24-aa44e28ebc64"></div><div id="vid_9c55b8b2-304d-46c0-8e24-aa44e28ebc64" style="display:none;"></div></div><p>​Officials have to be concerned about homegrown violent extremism and lone wolves, Johnson explained, along with the “larger picture of general security and general public safety when you have a large public gathering with estimates of 700,000 to 900,000 people in close proximity of each other.”</p><p><strong>Securing Local Businesses</strong><br></p><p>While U.S. federal and local officials will be handling the security of public spaces in and around the inauguration, business owners will be responsible for securing their own facilities throughout the festivities. <br></p><p>One precaution these individuals should take is to map concealment areas in their facilities and regularly conduct routine sweeps of them—particularly the exterior—for weapons of convenience or cached weapons, says Ross Bulla, CPP, PSP, founder and president of The Treadstone Group, Inc., which advises clients on security solutions and best practices for protecting people, property, and information.<br></p><p>This is because a group who might be planning a violent demonstration may try to leave supplies at a local business on a parade route or nearby the National Mall to access them later. If facility owners find these kind of items, Bulla says they should contact law enforcement immediately and post security—if possible—in the area that the items were stowed in.<br></p><p>Bulla also recommends businesses in the immediate vicinity of the inauguration and its parade route assess their physical security, their food and safety handling, water supplies, electrical systems, and shelter in place procedures. This is especially critical for hotels, which might require hundreds of people—both guests and staff—to shelter in place should an emergency occur.<br></p><p>“You also may need to determine a way to re-credential people,” Bulla explains. “Guests who’ve left the facility and need to get back inside, you need to be able to quickly identify them as a guest and get them inside, while not allowing non-guests in.”<br></p><p>And for high-rise facilities, Bulla says it’s critical to limit or prevent rooftop access. <br></p><p>“Check door locks and secure windows that face the inauguration and parade route because on of the main or favored activities of protest groups is to get on a roof and unfurl banners or throw objects,” he explains. “Your roofs’ become focal points. Newspapers see them, and they’re a great place to throw rocks at law enforcement.”<br></p><p><strong>Securing your Person</strong><br></p><p>Individuals planning to attend the inauguration should <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/releases/JIC-01_PressRelease_TransportationPlan-Final_USCP-1-6-17.pdf" target="_blank">review the reference materials</a> provided by officials on prohibited items, which include animals other than service or guide animals, oversized backpacks and bags (18” by 13” by 7”), coolers, mace, selfie sticks, bicycles, and more.<br></p><p>While small bags and purses will be allowed in secure areas, Bulla recommends individuals planning to attend the inauguration try not to carry a bag at all as it will slow them down going through security screenings. <br></p><p>“If you go to an officially sanctioned event or any unsanctioned or related event, there will be security screening in place,” Bulla says. “Don’t carry an oversized camera, don’t carry an oversized purse—or even carry one…just pack lightly, or nothing more than your wallet if possible.”<br></p><p>Those traveling to Washington, D.C., for inauguration festivities can also sign up for free emergency text alerts and notifications by texting the word “INAUG” to 888777, according to the Secret Service.<br></p><p>Bulla also suggests creating a muster point plan if you’re attending the event with several people should an emergency occur and you need to evacuate quickly.<br></p><p>“It’s one thing to evacuate quickly and protect yourself if there is an incident,” Bulla ​says. “It’s entirely different to be one of 100,000 people running. You’re not going to be able to stay with your husband, your wife, your children.”<br></p><p>Instead of attempting to stay with your party, Bulla says you should plan to run with the crowd and exit the area as quickly as possible. Then, when you’re away from danger, head to the muster point you agreed on beforehand, such as a hotel lobby.<br></p><p>“One of the primary reasons that people are injured or killed is because they panic and don’t have an escape route,” he adds. “Just always know and be aware of your surroundings, and where you’d go if something happened.”<br></p><p>For more on inauguration security, listen to a special edition of the <em></em><a href="https://soundcloud.com/security-management/special-edition-us-presidential-inauguration-security"><em>Security Management </em>podcast</a> with a former U.S. Secret Service agent.<br></p><p><br></p>GP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465