Terrorism

 

 

https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/The-Evolution-of-Airport-Attacks.aspxThe Evolution of Airport AttacksGP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652017-04-01T04:00:00Z<p>​The bustling Brussels Airport in Zaventem, Belgium, handles more than 500 flights a day, bringing more than 27,000 passengers into the facility with approximately the same number departing. Mornings are particularly busy at the airport, and amid the flurry of activity, it is little wonder that on March 22, 2016, three men emerging from a taxi outside of the departures hall passed through unnoticed. </p><p>The trio loaded their heavy suitcases onto baggage carts and entered the flow of people heading through the doors toward the ticket desks. Shortly after they entered the departures hall, the three split up to take their places in separate ticket lines.</p><p>Three minutes later, one of the men detonated his suitcase bomb, which had been packed with nails, as he stood in one of the check-in lanes. Approximately nine seconds after that, the second man detonated his suitcase bomb in another lane. The third suitcase bomb did not detonate immediately; surveillance camera footage showed that after being thrown to the ground by the second blast, the third man, Mohamed Abrini, simply got up and walked away from the airport toward the city center. </p><p>It is unknown whether he left because he got cold feet or because his device failed to detonate, but he was later arrested and charged with participation in the attack. Police bomb technicians destroyed Abrini’s bomb-filled suitcase, which they report may have been the largest of the three, in a controlled explosion. </p><p>The attack at Zaventem resulted in 17 deaths. Another 14 victims were killed when a fourth suicide bomb was detonated an hour later in a subway train at the Maalbeek metro station in Brussels. The coordinated attack was the deadliest in Belgian history. It was also a lethal reminder of the continuing threat to the soft parts of airports outside security checkpoints. ​</p><h4>Evolving Tactics<img src="/ASIS%20SM%20Callout%20Images/0417%20Feeature%204%20Infographic.jpg" class="ms-rtePosition-2" alt="" style="margin:5px;width:466px;" /></h4><p>The air transit system has been considered a prime target since the beginning of the modern era of terrorism. From a terrorist’s perspective, hundreds of people trapped inside a pressurized metal tube at 30,000 feet are ideal targets not only because the victims are so vulnerable, but because of the heavy media coverage such attacks generate. </p><p>For example, the photos of TWA 847 pilot John Testrake in the plane’s cockpit window being held at gunpoint by a Hezbollah hijacker became some of the most iconic images of 1980s terrorism.</p><p>Terrorist threats to aircraft spurred a series of security improvements, which were in turn answered by changes in terrorist weapons and tactics. The evolutionary—and deadly—game of cat-and-mouse between terrorist planners and aviation security officials has been occurring since the 1960s.</p><p>Initially there was very little security provided to the air transportation system, but a sharp increase in commercial airline hijackings in the 1960s and early 1970s led to enhanced airline security in the United States and Europe. High-profile hijackings led to greater and more widespread improvements to aviation security worldwide. </p><p>As hijackings became more difficult to conduct, terrorists began to direct their attention to aircraft bombings. Palestinian bombmakers created plastic explosives to look like everyday items in increasingly elaborate efforts to bring them onto aircraft undetected. The result was a number of airline bombing plots in the 1980s using concealed devices. </p><p>In 1987, North Korean agents destroyed a plane using a device hidden inside a radio to set off liquid explosives hidden in a liquor bottle. In another incident in 1986, explosives and the detonating device were hidden in a suitcase under a false bottom and a pocket calculator. Security detected the device before it could be taken aboard the plane. </p><p>Perhaps the most famous of these bombings was Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, a bombing that killed 243 passengers, including two of my colleagues, U.S. Diplomatic Security Service Special Agents Dan O’Connor and Ron Lariviere. </p><p>Despite security improvements, terrorists continued to focus on attacking aircraft. In 1994, an attacker assembled a bomb in the aircraft lavatory and left it on board when he deplaned at an intermediate stop on the flight’s course. The bombing was a dry run for a more complex strike against multiple airlines. </p><p>When security measures were improved in the 1990s to defend against this style of attack, terrorists adapted once again. While planning the 9/11 attack, hijackers used permissible carry-on items—like box cutters—to hijack planes and turn them into human-guided cruise missiles. </p><p>In response to post-2001 security crackdowns to protect against that type of attack, jihadists again shifted their tactics toward onboard suicide attacks with hidden bombs. The first of these was the failed December 2001 shoe bomb attack. When security officers began screening shoes routinely, aspiring airline bombers then shifted to a plot to fill camouflaged toiletry containers in carry-on baggage with liquid explosives.</p><p>The U.S. Transportation Security Administration subsequently intro­duced restrictions on the quantity of liquids that passengers could bring aboard an aircraft, and, in turn, a jihadist attempted an attack with a device that was sewn into a suicide operative’s underwear. </p><p>Once security measures were amend­ed to address the threat of underwear bombs, attackers turned to cargo aircraft, hiding improvised explosive devices in printer cartridges bound for the United States. </p><p>And the deadly escalation continues today. In November 2015, a bomb concealed in a soda can was smuggled onto an airliner in Egypt, killing 217. Three months later, another bomb, this one disguised in a laptop, was smuggled aboard a flight in Somalia. Fortunately, that bomb only killed the suicide operative when it detonated and the aircraft was able to return to the airport for an emergency landing.</p><p>However, not all attacks on aviation involve hijacking or smuggling bombs aboard aircraft. Just as terrorists adjusted for heightened security at embassies by targeting traveling diplomats, attackers have found ways to attack airline passengers even as it has become more difficult to attack aircraft. </p><p>Back in the mid-1980s, terrorists attacked crowds of airline passengers beyond the confines of airport security at ticket counters in Rome and Vienna. In November 2002, al Qaeda operatives attempted to attack an Israeli airliner in Kenya with a surface-to-air missile. A 2011 attack at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport took advantage of the facility’s soft areas, as did the Brussels attack. </p><p>In the wake of the Rome and Vienna attacks, perimeter security at airports in Europe was temporarily increased, but due to the cost and effort involved, soon reverted to business as usual. </p><p>Similar short-term increases in security posture at airports across the globe were seen in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and to a lesser extent following Domodedovo.  </p><p>The targeting of the soft side of airports is especially attractive to grassroots groups and individuals who lack the ability to construct bombs sophisticated enough to be smuggled through security. </p><p>The July 4, 2002, armed assault against a ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport and the June 2007 attack against the Glasgow Airport using a poorly constructed vehicle bomb are examples of attacks against the soft side of airports by poorly trained grassroots jihadists.​</p><h4>Expanding Danger</h4><p>In response to recent attacks in Brussels and Istanbul against the soft side of airports, security has again been increased. However, in many places this increased security is not much more than a show of force intended to reassure the traveling public and to perhaps deter poorly trained would-be terrorists. Without names or bag checks, it is difficult to keep a professional terrorist—especially one who has a ticket—away from the facility. </p><p>In some places, more thorough checkpoints have been established away from the airport to conduct initial screening. This tactic can be quite effective at smaller airports, but cumbersome at larger, busier airports where the heavy volume of travelers causes a backlog at the inspection point, thus effectively pushing the target away from the building to the crowd of people awaiting screening.   </p><p>It is important to remember that the objective of terrorist planners is to create a high body count and a large amount of publicity. This means that an attack against the soft side of an airport can be almost as good as an attack against an aircraft, and a successful attack against an airport is better than a failed or thwarted attack against a harder target. </p><p>As the security at airports is pushed outward in response to attacks against the soft sides of airports, and checkpoints are established away from the building, this merely moves the real target—the vulnerable group of people awaiting screening from inside the building—to an area outside of it.   </p><p>This principle was demonstrated during the June 28, 2016, attack against Istanbul’s Ataturk International Airport. In that attack, three operatives armed with AK-47s and suicide vests launched an attack on the soft side of the airport. Coming in the wake of the Brussels attack, and due to the overall high terrorist threat inside of Turkey, security was increased at Turkish airports, and armed security checkpoints were established at the entrances to the departure hall to prevent terrorists from entering the hall like they did in Brussels. </p><p>Shortly after the three attackers exited their cab outside the departure hall, they were confronted by police and a firefight erupted between the police and the attackers. The first operative was able to approach the security checkpoint and detonate his device amid the crowd. This device shattered a large window that permitted the second attacker to enter the building and begin searching for a crowd of people to target with his suicide bomb. </p><p>Fortunately, the second attacker was shot and immobilized before he could do so. The third attacker was pursued by the authorities and detonated his device in a parking lot, causing minimal damage like the second bomber. Between the gunfire and the first bomb, however, 45 victims were killed—nearly three times more than in Brussels. The bulk of the victims were outside the security checkpoint at the door to the departure hall. ​</p><h4>Staying Ahead of the Game</h4><p>Moving the security checkpoint outward from the airport simply moves the chokepoint outward, and the crowd of people waiting to get through that checkpoint remains vulnerable. This principle applies to many circumstances and locations beyond airports as well, posing a significant challenge to security professionals. While not an easy problem to address, some methods exist to mitigate the threat.</p><p>First, static security checkpoints themselves are not enough. It is necessary to establish outward-looking protective surveillance that extends beyond the property line. This surveillance also needs to focus on preoperational surveillance rather than just attack recognition. Once the attackers start shooting or detonating bombs, it can be helpful to quickly counter them and limit their access to additional victims, but it is far better to catch them at an earlier phase of the terrorist attack cycle. </p><p>Many large international airports are using surveillance technology that identifies suspicious behavior and alerts operators. The information collected by these programs can be shared with nearby airports, allowing them to keep an eye out for similar activity on their premises. </p><p>Terrorists often follow an attack planning cycle and are vulnerable to detection as they conduct the surveillance they require to carry out an attack. Terrorist operatives generally possess poor surveillance tradecraft and are not difficult to spot if people are looking for them. </p><p>But cops or soldiers manning a checkpoint at a door are not normally well positioned to spot such activity. This, ideally, needs to be accomplished by specialized units that have been trained in the craft of detecting surveillance and who are not tasked with manning checkpoints. Teams such as these will patrol parking areas and other spaces further away from the airport to identify potential threats.</p><p>This type of technology and information sharing between airports is imperative because attackers may scope out multiple facilities in a region. It is important for security teams at different airports to foster information sharing by alerting their counterparts to anomalous behavior.</p><p>Surveillance must also go beyond the use of cameras and should use a combination of human agents and cameras integrated with analytic software that can be used to help expand and direct the efforts of the humans. Cameras with nobody watching them are little better than no cameras at all. They may be useful for investigating an attack after the fact, but will be of little help in preventing an attack.  </p><p>Even in a case where the preoperational surveillance is missed and an attack is underway, personnel located beyond checkpoints can help to see problems as they are developing rather than allowing attackers to gain tactical surprise by permitting them to have free rein in areas where they can assemble and coordinate their attack.  </p><p>Furthermore, undercover operators can enjoy tactical surprise themselves and are in a great position to turn the tables on the attackers. Action is always faster than reaction, and if the attackers are permitted to draw and shoot first, it gives them a significant advantage over security forces. </p><p>A failed attack against a soft target venue in Garland, Texas, in May 2015, showed that security personnel manning the door of a facility can gain a life-or-death advantage in a firefight if they have advanced warning and a description of a potential threat. </p><p>In the Garland case, the FBI alerted local authorities of a potential threat to the event and provided the suspect’s vehicle description. This passing of critical intelligence prepared local officers for an impending attack. It also highlights the importance of intelligence sharing both horizontally and vertically within the law enforcement and security communities as they seek to secure airports and other soft targets.  </p><p><em><strong>Scott Stewart </strong>is vice president of tactical analysis at Stratfor.com and lead analyst for Stratfor Threat Lens. ​</em></p>

Terrorism

 

 

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