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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Book-Review-Lone-Wolf-Terrorism.aspxBook Review: Lone Wolf TerrorismGP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a43444652019-04-01T04:00:00ZMark S. Hamm and Ramón Spaaij; Reviewed by Bill Scott, CPP<p>​Columbia University Press; <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/">cup.columbia.edu</a>; 336 pages; $35.​</p><p>Well written and exhaustively researched, <em><a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-age-of-lone-wolf-terrorism/9780231181747">The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism</a></em> is an encyclopedia of information on the history, characteristics, methodology, and evolution of the lone wolf threat. Historical data is broken into pre-9/11 and post-9/11 groupings for analysis. The book presents holistic information succinctly and in a readable fashion. Reviewing this comprehensive list of attacks condensed in summary form with the ability to compare and contrast each event provides an outstanding reference for those in security.  </p><p>Professionals tasked with identifying and stopping lone wolf actors will find that this resource provides information not found in previous material. The authors take up the challenge to classify these attacks and help to form a critical look at potential patterns and instigating events.</p><p>The book provides information and lessons learned from past attacks while acknowledging the difficulty in proactively identifying the lone wolves. For example, Chapter 11 examines two terrorists who each committed lone wolf attacks. Each had broadcasted for some time their radical beliefs through social media. One attacker, Carlos Bledsoe, was even on the FBI’s Terrorism Watch List prior to his attack. Yet, neither man presented enough of a threat to warrant arrest, questioning, or even surveillance by law enforcement.  </p><p>The book proposes sting operations as a preventive measure but warns of such challenges as racial profiling accusations and potential defamation of character lawsuits. </p><p>The radicalization process is also worth the attention of security professionals. Some lone wolf actors are indoctrinated by terrorist groups and others by their local environments, such as those bullied in school or at work. This book presents a compelling look at how lone wolf terrorists are made over time, not born.</p><p>For security professionals trying to understand the lone wolf threat, this book provides an excellent reference. It will engage both experienced professionals and those who are new to the topic.  </p><p><em>Reviewer: Bill Scott, CPP, PMP (Project Management Professional), is a senior director with ABS Group focused on security and emergency response operations planning. He is former chair of the ASIS Global Terrorism, Political Instability, and International Crime Council and a member of the committee writing the ASIS workplace violence standard.</em></p>

 

 

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https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/On-Duty-and-Vulnerable.aspxOn Duty and Vulnerable<p>Awareness of police misconduct and calls for reform in the United States have increased over the last decade. In some cases, officers were investigated and prosecuted at the state level for their actions. Other incidents investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice resulted in criminal prosecution of a police officer for violating a person’s constitutionally protected rights.</p><p>For example, from 2009 to 2012 the U.S. Department of Justice charged 254 police officers throughout the United States with violating the individual rights of Americans. </p><p>The private security industry remains historically insulated from claims of civil rights-related violations and the resulting criminal sanctions that can be imposed against security personnel. The private security industry in the United States is much larger than the public sector police force; the industry outnumbers public police by a ratio of at least three to one. This growing number of security personnel could lead to increased civil rights violations. </p><p>The security industry is also less regulated, meaning that security personnel have varying amounts of training while public sector police counterparts have mandated training programs. This discrepancy in training can also become a problem because many private security personnel have direct contact with the public, often performing quasi-judicial police-related activities. ​</p><h4>Criminal Sanctions</h4><p>One federal statute that has been used to prosecute police officers for civil rights violations is Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 242. It makes it a crime for anyone acting “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom” to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the U.S. Constitution or state and local laws. </p><p>The statute also applies to public officials violating a person’s civil rights, including elected officials, public facilities’ care providers, correctional officers, court staff, and security officers.</p><p>For example, if a police officer assaults a citizen, the officer can be prosecuted for assault and battery and be charged at the federal level for violating the citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights under Section 242.</p><p>A conviction under the statute re­quires three elements. First, the act must violate a protected right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. If defendants reasonably understand that their actions are constitutionally impermissible, they can be held accountable for their actions. </p><p>Second, the accused must be acting under “color of law,” meaning an officer authorized under state or federal law and acting in his or her official capacity.</p><p>Lastly, there must be intent to “deprive a person of a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them,” according to <em>Screws v. United States</em> (U.S. Supreme Court, 1945). </p><p>This case clarified that a defendant violated Section 242 when engaged in activities to deprive an individual of his or her rights and was also “aware that what he does is precisely that which the statute forbids,” according to the Court’s opinion. </p><h4>​Prosecutions</h4><p>Few federal Section 242 prosecutions have involved security personnel. Of those cases, however, private security personnel were prosecuted when they conferred with police powers, were working off duty or moonlighting, or when they were employed as security guards under government contracts.</p><p><strong>Police powers. </strong>Some security personnel were prosecuted under Section 242 when they were granted state-related powers and considered “state actors.” In the events leading to <em>Williams v. United States</em> (U.S. Supreme Court, 1951). Williams was a private detective with a special police officer’s card issued by the City of Miami. He had also taken an oath. Lindsey Lumber Company hired Williams to investigate a series of thefts, and during the investigation Williams used “brutal methods,” displayed his badge, and included the presence of a policeman to “lend authority” to the interrogations of four suspects who were “unmercifully punished for several hours,” according to court documents.</p><p>A jury convicted Williams of violating Section 242. He appealed the ruling, ultimately appearing before the U.S. Supreme Court to answer the question of whether private persons could be prosecuted under the statute.</p><p>In its opinion, the Court reasoned that Williams was acting under color of law and was not a private person. The Court concluded Williams’ actions were an “investigation conducted under the aegis of the state” because a regular police officer attended the interrogation and Williams was “asserting the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private person.”</p><p>The Court upheld his conviction and noted that Williams was “no mere interloper but had the semblance of a policeman’s power from Florida” and his conduct violated the due process right to be free “from the use of force and violence to obtain a confession.”</p><p>Another case where private security personnel were convicted under Section 242 was <em>United States v. Hoffman </em>(U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 1974). In the case, two members of the Penn Central Transportation Company’s police force were convicted for physically assaulting trespassers on or near company property.</p><p>The officers admitted that they attacked trespassers but argued that they were not acting under Illinois law. Instead, they said they were acting in a purely private capacity and as private persons at the time they committed the crimes.</p><p>Ultimately, the appellate court determined the officers were acting under color of law because Illinois state statute had given the railroad company’s police force “police powers as those conferred upon the police of cities,” according to court documents.</p><p><strong>Moonlighting.</strong> Off-duty police officers granted government powers in a private security capacity have also been prosecuted and convicted of civil rights violations, such as in 2003 when a federal court ruled that a security guard in a strip club was acting under the color of law when he assaulted a dancer.</p><p>The off-duty police officer, moonlighting as a private guard, was wearing his badge and gun during the assault, identified himself as a police officer, and prevented the victim from calling the police. He also filed an arrest report against the victim for allegedly assaulting him.</p><p>The officer was found guilty under Section 242 and received a 27-month sentence as well as three years of supervised release. The officer appealed the decision, and the federal circuit court upheld the original ruling <em>(United States v. White, </em>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2003). A federal judge found that “displaying signs of state authority” by wearing his gun and badge, declaring himself to be a police officer while off-duty, and filing a police report “underscores his imposition of state authority,” according to court documents.</p><p><strong>Government contract.</strong> The third identified theme is that security personnel can be prosecuted under Section 242 when operating under a contractual relationship with the state. In cases where security personnel employed as contractors for the state were prosecuted under Section 242, private security personnel had positions within a state agency, making the parties liable for their actions under the statute. Private security personnel working in correctional settings have also been prosecuted under similar circumstances.</p><p>Some of these cases are based on violations of a person’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In <em>United States v. Mendez </em>(U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, 2009), the defendant, an employee of a privately-owned prison transport company, received six months imprisonment and one year of supervised release for assaulting an inmate in her care and custody.</p><p>In another case, <em>United States v. Fuller</em> (U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, 2009), four defendants who worked for the Wackenhut Corporation, a contractor for a New Mexico county correctional facility.</p><p>Employed as correctional officers, two of the defendants physically assaulted an inmate, kicking him in the head multiple times. Prosecutors charged another defendant with failing to prevent the attack and indicted the fourth defendant with conspiracy for fabricating evidence, lying to, and providing false statements to police investigators. A jury convicted three of the defendants—the two defendants directly involved in the assault and the employee that lied to investigators—for violating Section 242.</p><p>Fifth Amendment violations involving contract security also exist. In <em>United States v. Loya</em> (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2009), Loya was employed as a contract guard at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facility. </p><p>While working in the facility’s infirmary, Loya sexually assaulted female inmates—a violation of the detainees’ Fifth Amendment right, to “life and liberty, including the right to bodily integrity.” Loya pleaded guilty to Section 242 violations and served a 36-month sentence.</p><h4>Lessons</h4><p>These cases show that private security personnel can be prosecuted under Section 242, but also raise questions as to why so few cases have been brought. This may be because people fail to report violations, prosecutorial discretion, or the use of other federal statues to prosecute security personnel for civil rights-related violations.</p><p>For example, federal prosecutors can recommend a case for diversion instead of prosecuting suspects under Section 242 when the accused agree to probation and dismissal of the charges upon completion of probation. </p><p>Additionally, proving all requirements to secure a Section 242 conviction can be a barrier. “Color of law” and the “willfulness” standards can be difficult to establish, subsequently insulating security officers from prosecution.</p><p>Despite these factors that may limit prosecutions of private security personnel, the security industry should be aware of these liabilities, which could become greater as public-private partnerships expand to fight crime. Security managers should train their officers to protect the constitutional rights of the people they serve.  </p><p><em>Brian Johnson, Ph.D., is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Grand Valley State University. He is the author of four books, including Principles of Security Management. HE specializes in private security, criminology, and law enforcement. Naoki Kanaboshi, S.J.D., is an associate professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Grand Valley State University. He writes on constitutional law, civil rights, and legal issues for criminal justice practitioners.</em></p><p></p>GP0|#21788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f;L0|#021788f65-8908-49e8-9957-45375db8bd4f|National Security;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Guidance-on-Threat-Assessment-Teams.aspxGuidance on Threat Assessment Teams<p>​Recent guidance from the U.S. Secret Service, <em><a href="https://www.dhs.gov/publication/enhancing-school-safety-using-threat-assessment-model">Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence,</a></em> offers baseline information for developing a threat assessment team (TAT) to mitigate potentially violent or devastating events at K-12 schools in the United States. </p><p>The Secret Service advocates for a five-step process to establish a TAT with a multidisciplinary approach to information sharing. For each step, the author will provide guidance that extends beyond the scope of the Secret Service report with additional threat prevention measures.</p><p><strong>1. Establish a multidisciplinary team.</strong> The TAT is designed to direct, manage, and document threat assessment processes. Assemble a team from a variety of disciplines, which may include teachers, school guidance counselors, coaches, school resource officers, mental health professionals, and school administrators. Have a designated leader with the authority to act immediately in cases where time is of the essence. Meet on a regular basis and when needed if there is an emergent concern. These meetings should include dealing with potential threat indicators, training and role-playing focused on building confidence and capability, and building rapport and confidence in other team members.</p><p><strong>Additional guidanc</strong><strong>​e:</strong> Threat assessment is an intelligence-led activity and requires a certain skill set to synthesize information. Schools could partner with an agency or consider employing an employee with an intelligence background. The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) also offers valuable trend information on physical and cyber threats that could be useful for the TAT. </p><p><strong>2. D</strong><strong>efine prohibited and concerning behavior</strong><strong>.</strong> Concerning behavior progresses through a continuum, and policies must consider warning signs, which include “a marked decline in performance; increased absenteeism; withdrawal or i<strong></strong>solation; sudden or dramatic changes in behavior or appearance; drug or alcohol use; and erratic, depressive, and other emotional or mental health symptoms,” according to the report. Policies and procedures should be set in place to monitor and direct action to collect additional information to consider if these are indeed a concern.</p><p><strong>Additional guidance:</strong> The Secret Service does allude to a continuum, but there is no specific guidance on how to categorize threats. A more in-depth understanding of transient and substantive threats is needed. It may be advisable to develop a tailored process map for each TAT, which describes each step and indicates responsibility in each phase to avoid anything falling through the cracks. </p><p><strong>3. Create a central reporting system.</strong> Establishing a central reporting system is crucial to all other threat assessment activities. Schools should establish multiple streams of information that could include online reporting, email, phone, and face-to-face communication. No reporting should be dissuaded but educating the school community on what to report will increase the validity of information. Document thoroughly when responding to each report, categorizing threats, and determining whether to act. Anonymous reporting should be an option for those who are uncomfortable coming forward in a formal or public way. It is important to handle each case with professionalism, considering privacy and confidentiality concerns.</p><p><strong>Additional guidance: </strong>Consider partnering with an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), which is a nonprofit organization that provides an avenue for two-way sharing between the public and private sectors. Though ISACs have traditionally dealt with cyber and physical security, the model could be used to develop information sharing practices related to threat assessment. ​</p><p><strong>4. Determining the threshold for law enforcement intervention.</strong> Law enforcement intervention may be needed in some cases, though it may not be involved in all threat assessment efforts. Create policies and procedures to indicate when law enforcement should be involved—for example, in cases that deal with weapons, threats of violence, and physical violence. Law enforcement should be involved when elements of a crime are present.</p><p><strong>Additional guidance: </strong>Certain privacy laws set limitations on law enforcement activity when it comes to minors. School administrators and the TAT should familiarize themselves with state law before developing policies and procedures around law enforcement response.</p><p><strong>5. Establish assessment procedures.</strong> Establishing threat assessment procedures will help paint an accurate picture of the student’s thinking and behavior, formalize a reporting structure, and identify appropriate interventions. Documentation is once again stressed, with creation of forms and templates to capture necessary information. The report recommends a community-wide approach and encourages a brainstorming exercise on sources of potentially helpful information. This exercise can be repeated once an individual of concern is identified for information more specific to that person. Additionally, social media should be examined to gain information, interviews should be conducted, and the student’s locker should be searched. </p><p><strong>Additional guidance: </strong>The Secret Service guidance seems to only consider internal threats—mainly students—but narrowing the focus is a risk in and of itself. A threat could be anyone: a teacher, contractor, administrator, or someone not associated with the school. </p><p>Threat assessment is a necessary part of threat prevention at every K-12 school. Threat assessment programs and teams will be more successful if they are a function of an overarching enterprise risk management process, fueled by both internal and external sources of information.</p><p><em>Cody Mulla, CPP, has 20 years of experience in security and crisis management. He has worked supporting both the private and public sectors and is a member of the ASIS International School Safety and Security Council and the Utilities Security Council.​</em></p>GP0|#3795b40d-c591-4b06-959c-9e277b38585e;L0|#03795b40d-c591-4b06-959c-9e277b38585e|Security by Industry;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Building the Control Room of Tomorrow.aspxBuilding the Control Room of Tomorrow<p>​At the center of an enterprise organization’s security op­eration stands its nucleus, arguably one of the most important pieces for overall functionality and efficiency: a command center or security operations center (SOC). A place where a variety of systems and solutions come together, the command center exists to provide a common operational picture, mitigate threats, and promote enhanced communication during an incident.</p><p>The goal of any command center is to monitor, assess, and respond to a variety of threats and incidents. As technologies advance and trends develop, so too do the strategies in place to meet this goal. There are several considerations that must be made when designing the control room of the future. </p><p><strong>Space</strong>. For many companies, a control room may be allotted space in a basement or small windowless room chosen as an afterthought. While some companies are limited by space, many decide the SOC’s location is unimportant. This can be a big mistake when designing a control room that will serve the company now and into the future. It’s critical for this space to be large enough to house important equipment that allows operators to view the relevant incoming data and make informed decisions, but it’s also necessary for the space to be scalable as needs change, technology evolves and coverage increases, and a company grows.</p><p><strong>Operator comfort</strong>. Space isn’t the only consideration when designing an SOC or control room. Central to the success of any organization is the ability for security operators to quickly and efficiently take information coming into an SOC and act on that information to identify risks and mitigate threats. Operator comfort, as a result, should be central to the design of a control room, taking lighting, console comfort, ergonomics, ambient noise, and temperature into careful consideration. If operators are uncomfortable or distracted, in pain with a sore neck due to bad viewing angles, or too warm in a room without proper ventilation, they can miss out on critical events or emergencies. Addressing these before they become problematic is crucial in the design stage of an SOC.</p><p><strong>Technology. </strong>When it comes to building a mission-critical SOC, there's a reason why large-scale video walls that showcase a number of incoming data points are dominant. Uniform and integrated visual elements are imperative to the success of an SOC or control room, because operators and first responders require the most up-to-date and complete information regarding incoming security-related events. Additionally, the technology needed to bring multiple data streams together in a single-pane-of-glass view is an important consideration to make, and hiring a control room integrator that specializes in this technology can streamline the process and result in better situational awareness across the board.</p><p><strong>Data convergence</strong>. Command centers today combine a number of security components, but as end users demand an emphasis on the full umbrella of security rather than small silos, facilities are focused on including additional pieces, such as risk and threat assessment, employee travel, and social media monitoring. Data incorporation is also a critical element, and command centers must be able to collect any number of data points for effective data aggregation. Dashboards that can make sense of a large amount of information can streamline decision-making and response.</p><p><strong>Innovation</strong>. While words like artificial intelligence and machine learning are often whispers around the industry, for innovative companies, these terms are becoming more commonplace as they enter a new frontier in how data is collected and analyzed to deliver information to security operators. The control room of the future brings innovative software and systems to the forefront, taking existing sensors that are providing a wealth of information and layering an additional method by which to understand what is happening and make decisions about the organization’s health. </p><p>Enterprise organizations rely on their SOC for business operations. In times of an emergency, and as risks become more severe, a complete situational picture is necessary. Taking into consideration the space, operator comfort, technology, data convergence, and future innovation can set security managers up for success in protecting their enterprises.  </p><p>Dan Gundry is director of national control room sales at Vistacom.</p><p><br></p>GP0|#69b4a912-eafa-43d2-b6a4-8aed47f69245;L0|#069b4a912-eafa-43d2-b6a4-8aed47f69245|Security Technology;GTSet|#8accba12-4830-47cd-9299-2b34a4344465