RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

A PROGRESSIVE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

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FOREWORD

Since 1996, the U.S. Congress has required that every four years the Department of Defense conduct a major defense policy review to examine U.S. defense strategy and submit a report on its findings. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as this process is known, is intended to generate a forward-looking strategy based on the current and foreseeable threat environment. It must outline a national defense strategy that is consistent with the U.S. national security strategy and define the military force structure, modernization plans, and resource requirements necessary to implement the strategy. The Department of Defense is expected to submit the results of its latest review to Congress in early 2006.

The devastating impact on the military of the war in Iraq is only one of many developments that demand the Pentagon adopt a new direction over the next four years. Despite its repeated vows to protect the military, the Bush administration has left the world’s greatest fighting force on the brink of disaster. The all-volunteer army is reaching the breaking point, with U.S. ground forces stretched as never before and widespread equipment shortages. In essence, the Bush administration has made a mockery of Vice President Cheney’s pledge at the 2000 Republican National Convention: “Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return….And I can promise them now, help is on the way.”

United States weapons systems are not tailored to existing and projected threats, and the Pentagon has more programs on the drawing board than it can afford given the Bush administration’s record-setting budget deficits. The U.S. nuclear force posture is outdated, and the administration’s interest in new nuclear weapons that do not strengthen the posture has needlessly undermined U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. DoD continues to reject integration with other agencies responsible for intelligence and post-conflict reconstruction and has not yet defined an appropriate role in homeland defense.

This QDR outlines a fiscally realistic strategy that will ensure that the American armed forces have the right number of high quality people in both the active and reserve components and that these men and women are properly trained, motivated and equipped to deal with the threats of the 21st century.

Despite its repeated vows to protect the military, the Bush administration has left the world’s greatest fighting force on the brink of disaster.
Over the next four years, this strategy will produce a military that, above all, makes personnel the top priority and invests heavily in the men and women of America’s armed forces. This strategy will lead to a stronger, faster, and more flexible military that is better able to deal with both asymmetric and traditional threats. This strategy redefines the military’s role in post-conflict situations, including waging counterinsurgency campaigns and providing the Pentagon with the forces and guidance it needs to work in concert with other agencies. The strategy, which we refer to as “1-1-2-3,” calls for a military that gives first priority to protecting the homeland, can fight and win one major regional conflict, can engage in two simultaneous substantial peacekeeping and stabilization missions and can deter conflicts in three regions. As compared to the Bush administration’s “1-4-2-1” defense strategy, our strategy gives more emphasis to developing peacekeeping and stabilization capabilities and somewhat less emphasis to deterring regional contingencies.

This strategy will lead to the development of essential war-fighting technologies while cutting DoD’s losses on weapons systems that are either outdated or not cost effective. This strategy offers a realistic, updated assessment of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military doctrine. It lays out a comprehensive threat and capabilities strategy and will better integrate the military in critical areas of intelligence and homeland defense.

In both its recommendations and its coverage, this QDR reflects two primary lessons learned specifically from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as more generally from the years that have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. First, the strategy takes into account budget realities in an era of unprecedented defense spending and in the wake of a $500 billion annual deficit created in large part by the war in Iraq and the administration’s fiscal policies. The strategy is based on the assumption that defense budgets cannot rise appreciably in the next four years and offers overall cuts and cost savings that provide sufficient funds to cover new necessary expenditures and compensate for recommended changes in current policies and posture.

Second, while this QDR would help build a military that is better able to act when armed force is required, the strategy recognizes that the United States must not rely on the military alone if it wishes to maximize its power to protect people and influence events. While by its very nature a QDR focuses almost exclusively on the Department of Defense, the recommendations herein reinforce and reflect the
national security strategy outlined in *Integrated Power*, by Lawrence Korb and Robert Boorstin of the Center for American Progress.\(^1\) Integrated power requires the United States to discard traditional concepts of “hard” and “soft” power and views them as essential partners, not alternatives or competitors. Integrated power means abolishing the artificial policy and budget divides between defense, homeland security, diplomatic, and development assistance policies in U.S. foreign policy.

This QDR focuses only on the most critical threats and challenges that mandate change in U.S. defense strategy and force posture. This strategy does not attempt to cover all aspects of defense policy, leaving aside such important issues as reform of procurement procedures, logistics management, and the Pentagon’s civilian and military bureaucracy. Nor does this strategy claim originality throughout. It draws heavily on previous work of the Center and other organizations, and provides references to studies and concepts that have been advanced elsewhere.

Since its inception, the Center for American Progress has focused on providing progressives with new perspectives on national security and presenting realistic, concrete policies that can make a difference. This QDR offers a blueprint for action over the next four years that can help build the powerful, properly equipped, well-trained and highly motivated armed forces that can best protect the American people and advance U.S. national interests. It is intended to provoke the kind of debate and reexamination of priorities that is vital to the health of a strong, democratic country.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States enters the 21st century with unmatched military power and unprecedented challenges. In order to meet these challenges, the Department of Defense over the next four years must begin a fundamental shift in military doctrine and priorities so that this country is better positioned to respond to the threats of a post-Cold War and post-9/11 world and to project power whenever and wherever necessary.

This Quadrennial Defense Review outlines a strategy that gives top priority to protecting the homeland, investing in military personnel, and preventing conflicts. It gives the military the manpower and technology it needs to best combat asymmetric threats from non-state actors such as terrorist groups, to deter and contain traditional enemies, and to fulfill its responsibilities in post-conflict situations. It aims to produce a more powerful, flexible, and agile military force that can best protect the American people and advance U.S. national interests. Implemented over time, it will rebalance forces and weaponry in order to allow the United States to protect the homeland, fight one major regional conflict, engage simultaneously in two substantial post-conflict missions, and contain conflict in three regions.

This strategy is based on the twin principles of realism and integration. Realism to best respond to the threats the U.S. faces, to allocate limited financial resources available for defense in a cost-effective manner, and to redefine the military’s capabilities and responsibilities after the fighting ends. Integration to best unite the efforts of the different armed services and non-military government agencies, to get the most from alliances across the globe, and to rebalance spending to allow the United States to go beyond the military and exercise all the instruments of power.

Threats

The United States military must have the capacity to confront a diverse array of threats. In the short term, these include dealing with violent extremists and terrorists with a global reach, weak and failing states, and extreme regimes. Over the long term, the United States will have to deal with the rise of China, new challenges from Russia and across the so-called “arc of crisis” in Central Asia, combustible regions around the globe, competition over scarce resources, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, and the declining reputation of the United States in the world.

As threats evolve, U.S. forces must be able to adapt in order to confront conventional and non-conventional threats alike. The United States’ unmatched military technological superiority is no longer enough to guarantee that Americans
will be safe and that U.S. forces will prevail in battle and in securing the peace. Nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on the ability to develop and deploy nuclear and biological weapons. In Iraq, suicide bombings and crude explosive devices are claiming more lives of U.S. troops than tanks or enemy troops. New capabilities are required.

In addition, the years since the Cold War and 9/11 have shown the need to better define, and develop capacity to support, the military’s role in counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian interventions, and stabilization operations. Budgetary and personnel constraints demand that the U.S. support the growth of regional forces and help allies’ militaries share in the burdens of international security. The U.S. military must always retain the capacity to address threats alone, but the recent historical record demonstrates the need to cooperate with others, particularly in addressing transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, and infectious diseases.

Goals

The strategy presented in this QDR recognizes that the Department of Defense must consistently pursue core missions, despite a fluid security environment. Acting in concert with other agencies and military forces, the Pentagon’s primary goals include the responsibilities to:

- Protect the American people from harm by safeguarding the homeland and projecting power around the globe.
- Deter and defeat aggression against the United States, its peoples and its interests.
- Prevent conflict around the world, especially in weak and failing states, which have the potential to become terrorist havens and sources of regional insecurity.
- Forge strategic and tactical alliances with other U.S. agencies, foreign states, and international organizations to build capacity in these other entities in order to leverage their strengths and enable them to shoulder greater responsibilities.
- Assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.
- Shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries.
- Ensure access to energy supplies, and the flow of trade and communications.
Strategy

There are nine core elements to the strategy presented in this QDR.

First, while the military’s first priority should be to protect the homeland, this administration has never given homeland defense the priority it deserves in doctrine or resources. This strategy will counter the threats of the 21st century by promoting a process of developing forces and equipment that will enable the military to defend the homeland; fight one major regional conflict; engage concurrently in two substantial post-conflict peacekeeping and stabilization missions, including counterinsurgency campaigns; and deter or contain conflicts in three countries or regions. This doctrine is referred to as “1-1-2-3.”

Second, the United States must commit the necessary personnel, both military and civilian, to ensure quick and decisive military victories and a stable peace that enables U.S. military forces to be redeployed. The United States should remain committed to the Powell doctrine, making sure that – regardless of whether it acts unilaterally or with its allies – it employs overwhelming force to win on the battlefield. The United States must also clearly define its military and political objectives and have a concrete post-conflict strategy so that the Congress and the American people are aware of the potential costs before risking lives and treasure. Our country’s experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan dictate that we should hope for the best but plan for the worst and take steps to maintain domestic support from the moment American troops are dispatched to the day they come home.

Third, this strategy recognizes that unilateral military action is sometimes necessary to deal with imminent threats. Protecting the American people requires that the United States strike to stop imminent threats. Any country that has intelligence that it is about to be attacked has the right under the international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to strike first.

Fourth, the recruitment, training, development, and retention of quality military personnel must be the Pentagon’s top priority. The war in Iraq has placed excessive burdens on U.S. forces, and the all-volunteer military is seriously strained. In particular, ground forces must be increased by at least 86,000 active-duty troops and receive greater attention in the allocation of scarce defense funds. The military must also devote more resources to, and redefine the role of, the National Guard and Reserve, increasing their responsibilities in homeland defense and avoiding situations like Iraq that have kept them on active duty far longer than the norm.
Fifth, the Department of Defense must direct its resources to areas likely to reap the largest security gains. The administration’s current so-called “capabilities approach,” which “focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur,” fails to assign levels of risk and importance to the various threats this nation faces.¹ The Pentagon must reintroduce elements of a “threat-based” model that guided its thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period. Weapons procurement policies must also change dramatically, so that they are attuned to actual needs rather than political interests. The administration and Congress should eliminate outdated weapons, cut losses on systems that do not work but are kept alive because of political interests, and increase funding for systems that reflect changing threats to U.S. national security. Only through the assignment of risks and priorities can the Pentagon produce programs and budgets that are affordable and cost effective.

Sixth, the administration must structure U.S. nuclear forces to deter and defeat catastrophic attacks on the United States and its allies, assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, and actively shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. Our nuclear strategy is based on two fundamental principles: only military targets are legitimate targets, and the collateral damage associated with a nuclear strike must not exceed the military value of a nuclear strike. Applying these principles to the current and foreseeable security environment, a nuclear force posture of 600 deployed warheads and 400 warheads in “reserve” offers a more than credible deterrent against catastrophic threats. Our strategy advocates the development of technology capable of generating new strategic capabilities in response to new threats. It places a greater reliance on conventional weapons and places a much stronger emphasis on nonproliferation.

Seventh, the Department of Defense must balance the necessity of maintaining the readiness and capabilities of the existing force with the need to modernize and transform, as it did during the 1990s. The administration’s excessive focus on the so-called “revolution in military affairs” to transform the armed forces rapidly has threatened the readiness and capabilities of U.S. ground forces. Funds for equipping ground troops have instead been diverted to bring these new transforming technologies into the force much more rapidly than prudent or necessary.
Eighth, the Department of Defense should enhance its role in homeland defense. As the Gulf Coast hurricanes demonstrated, national emergencies at times demand significant involvement by the U.S. military. The administration must establish clear guidelines for the U.S. military in homeland security, including chains of command, roles and responsibilities and timelines for engagement, and ensure that the Department of Defense gives adequate attention and resources to this area.

Finally, the military must work to maintain stability and prevent serious international crises before they erupt into armed conflict. This requires renewed and stronger ties with U.S. allies, including increased funding to help train and equip allied armed forces, as well as with international and civilian agencies, including the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). On the regional level, the United States must increasingly rely on and support peacekeeping units like those of the African Union in resolving regional conflicts, thus reducing the need to deploy U.S. forces.

**Increased Integration**

This QDR requires the Department of Defense to adopt new commitments to responsible, realistic policies and pursue greater integration both within the Pentagon and with other government agencies. The strategy will require the Pentagon and Congress to adopt institutional changes that will allow the government to achieve its missions in a more cost-effective manner.

First, this strategy promotes a unified national security budget, in which the budgets of DoD, State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other agencies with responsibility for national security and international policy are consolidated and rebalanced. The current budgeting system gives overwhelming power to the Pentagon in determining both the direction and tactics of U.S. foreign policy.

Second, the DoD must increasingly coordinate the activities of its component intelligence agencies with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI should have actual authority to determine the allocation of the Pentagon’s intelligence budget, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of the country’s overall intelligence spending.
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Recommendations

Military Personnel and Readiness

In order to support, strengthen and protect U.S. armed forces, the following steps must be undertaken:

- **Increase the size of the total Army by at least 86,000 active-duty troops.** The Pentagon should add two division-sized peacekeeping or stabilization units, double the size of the active-duty Special Forces, and add 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel to the active-duty force.

- **Maintain the end strength of the Marine Corps at 185,000 active troops and 40,000 elected reserve.**

- **Reduce the number of Carrier Battle Groups in the U.S. Navy from 11 to ten and the number of Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings from 19 to 18.**

- **Amend “back door draft” policies.** DoD should reduce the duration of the military service obligation, change stop-loss policy implementation, and issue a new executive order on selected reserve recall.

- **Address quality-of-life issues to improve personnel readiness.** DoD should maintain troop pay and benefits; compensate federal civilian employees in the National Guard and Reserve for lost pay when their units are summoned to active-duty; and enable selected reservists and their families to enroll in TRICARE, the military’s healthcare system.

- **Repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.** This will widen the pool from which the military can recruit and help retain people with critical skills that are already in short supply.

- **Eliminate the ban on women in combat.** The armed services should establish standards for every military occupational specialty and allow those who meet the standards to qualify regardless of gender.

- **Continue to invest substantial resources to reset, recapitalize, and modernize the force.** Congress and DoD must ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to reset the force even after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. They must increase the Army’s share of the baseline budget from 24 to 28 percent in order to pay for the additional troops, as well as resetting the force.
Conventional Weapons Systems

The Department of Defense should seek funding for flexible, efficient weapons systems that help combat 21st century threats, while stopping development and production of weapon systems that unwisely use scarce resources and/or do not meet performance standards.

- **DoD should seek funding for the following weapons systems:**
  - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to provide cost-effective next-generation air technology to the three branches of the armed services and to U.S. allies.
  - Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to carry out strike missions and provide real-time battlefield imagery and other functions without risking personnel or incurring the costs of manned aircraft.
  - B-2 heavy bomber to increase the military’s ability to deliver large payloads over long distances with minimal risk and decrease reliance on other countries to provide the U.S. with airbases.
  - Future Combat Systems (FCS) to enhance the Army’s ability to deploy units and increase their firepower and effectiveness.
  - Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) to provide a relatively light and easily deployable combat vehicle to bridge the gap between today’s heavy forces and future FCS systems.
  - CVN-21 aircraft carrier to provide increased power protection while lowering operational costs.
  - Littoral Combat Ship to support a cost-effective multi-use system that can protect forces on shore and launch unmanned aircraft and watercraft.

- **DoD should stop development and production of the following weapons systems:**
  - F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet, which is an unnecessary and costly supplement to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
  - SSN-774 Virginia class submarine, which offers few technological advantages yet substantially higher costs in comparison with existing submarines.
DD(X) Destroyer, which suffers from innumerable technological difficulties and ballooning costs without offering any true advantage over the Littoral Combat Ship.

V-22 Osprey, which has caused numerous training deaths and excessive cost overruns and which suffers from unresolved development issues while offering only marginal advantages over existing helicopters.

C-130J transport aircraft, which provides no additional capabilities over existing transport aircraft and suffers from severe technological flaws.

Offensive space-based weapons, which can be easily disrupted, are of no use in low-tech asymmetric conflict, and are far more expensive than existing technologies while offering few additional strike capabilities.

Further deployment of the National Missile Defense System, which offers unproven technology at exceptionally high costs to defend against a highly unlikely nuclear missile strike against the United States.

Nuclear Forces

In order to structure U.S. nuclear forces more effectively in order to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, the United States must:

- **Field a deployed arsenal of 600 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs, Trident SSBNs, and B-2 and B-52H strategic bombers, with 400 weapons held in reserve.** A generous estimate of the number of military targets in China and Russia that would be essential to either country’s war fighting abilities and that only nuclear weapons could effectively hold at risk is several hundred each. A “600+400” arsenal would enable the United States to hold these targets, as well as the very limited number of such targets in extreme regimes, vulnerable with a high degree of certainty.

- **Maintain nuclear forces and prepare “surge capacity.”** DoD and the Energy Department should retain the ability to sustain the technological readiness of the current force and supplement it with additional forces should there be a dramatic shift in the international security environment.
Pursue the utility and cost-effectiveness of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Any RRW should lead to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by guaranteeing the end of U.S. nuclear testing; result in significant long-term cost savings; enable the permanent, irreversible dismantlement of several existing warheads for every new RRW; and should not create new missions for nuclear weapons.

Revitalize arms control with Russia. The United States should negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia that codifies further reductions, mandates the permanent dismantlement of excess warheads and creates new verification mechanisms, extends existing transparency and verification measures (which are based on START I, a 1991 U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreement) beyond their 2009 expiration, and includes tactical nuclear weapons in arms reduction.

Cease research and development of an advanced, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon (the “Bunker Buster”). This gratuitous, destabilizing, and expensive weapons system not only lacks any practical use, but also sends precisely the wrong message to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.

Homeland Defense

In order to enhance the Department of Defense’s role in homeland defense, the following steps must be taken:

Maintain Homeland Defense Capacity. First responders should be added to the list of people with critical jobs who are prohibited from joining or remaining in the Selected Reserve. A Homeland Security Corps should be established in each state, and the Army National Guard should be transformed from being a backup to the active force to being the primary protector of the homeland.

The Department of Defense must work more closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to share information and create essential synergies across various levels of government. DoD’s budget should be integrated with that of all the other agencies involved in homeland security.

The Pentagon should budget at least $20 billion for homeland defense, double the current amount. The Department of Defense should increase its capabilities to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and helping in the recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological,
or high-yield explosive attacks on the United States and provide the Army National Guard with the equipment it needs to perform its proper role in dealing with natural or man-made disasters.

- The Army National Guard should take on increased duties to be a protector of the homeland in the case of a large-scale natural or man-made disaster. This means emphasizing light infantry, military police, and combat support functions in Guard units as opposed to such major combat functions as armor and artillery.

- The command structure of the National Guard needs to be strengthened to reflect its expanding real-time responsibilities. At least two regional commands should be established between existing state headquarters and the National Guard Bureau to enhance homeland defense/disaster response planning and improve coordination with the U.S. Northern Command.

- The U.S. Northern Command must improve its abilities to assist in recovery from catastrophic disasters when directed to do so by the president. Active-duty response times must be reduced, and at least two active-duty Army divisions and a headquarters unit should be trained in domestic consequence management missions so they can support or relieve the Army National Guard in a national emergency. However, the military should not routinely be given lead responsibility for disaster planning and execution and should support civilian authorities wherever possible.

Intelligence

In order to develop more robust intelligence capabilities, the following steps must be taken:

- Integrate DoD’s intelligence into the Office of the Director Of National Intelligence. This restructuring will help integrate the DoD’s intelligence activities with those of other agencies and eliminate duplication.

- Give final budgetary authority to the DNI. The DoD should ensure that the Director of National Intelligence has final budget sign-off on its intelligence programs as provided in the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
- Maximize performance of intelligence personnel. The DoD should ensure that the right people are recruited and trained for their jobs by developing a Human Capital Plan for DoD intelligence personnel.

- Coordinate DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations with other Intelligence Community HUMINT operations. DoD’s intelligence operations should form a complementary rather than a competitive or duplicative structure.

- DoD clandestine operations, both domestic and international, must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law and regulations. All databases and intelligence collection activities must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law.
CONTEXT AND STRATEGY

The terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated that America’s greatest enemies operate without regard for borders and aim to surprise the United States with deadly attacks. The attacks forced the United States to recognize that national security means more than traditional state-on-state warfare. It has required a reconsideration of the sources of conflict, and recognition that conflict can take forms other than traditional major combat operations.

September 11 did not change everything, however, as some like to claim. It should not be seen as an excuse to shift all focus to terrorism or to cast aside tried and true doctrines. States remain the leading actors on the geopolitical stage and crave security, wealth, and power, just as they did before September 11. Alliances are alive, though ailing. Nuclear weapons remain attractive to both state and non-state actors seeking to assert hegemony or cause mass destruction.

Rather, September 11 changed our perception of strategic reality. We now realize that the greatest danger to the American people is not a single great power or a group of rising powers. The greatest threats are the forces of fragmentation – forces that create and sustain terrorist organizations, dictatorships, and poverty, threatening security around the globe. Countering these forces, and the threats they produce, should define the United States’ security agenda for the foreseeable future.

To counter the forces of fragmentation, the United States must adopt a strategy of integrated power. The United States must use all the tools in its arsenal, from diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic policy to coercive means such as military power to counter these forces and the threats they create and sustain.

The United States military has a vital role to play in a strategy of integrated power, though its role has not been adequately defined and therefore its full potential remains untapped. To ensure that the United States is positioned to address immediate threats, prepare for emerging threats, and make appropriate adjustments in the future, it is vital to focus on the threats facing the United States in both the immediate and the long term.

The greatest threats are the forces of fragmentation – forces that create and sustain terrorist organizations, dictatorships, and poverty, threatening security around the globe.

Immediate Threats

While the security landscape will continuously evolve in the next decade, the primary threats to U.S. national security will come from the three forces of fragmentation: violent extremists and terrorists with a global reach, extreme regimes, and weak and failing states.

Each of these entities presents a unique policy challenge, and unlike the great or rising powers that threatened the United States throughout the twentieth century, they will not be fought using the traditional rules of warfare. With an increased risk for the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, porous national boundaries, and world opinion that grows increasingly hostile towards the United States, it remains imperative that we understand and vigorously combat these emerging threats by military force, if necessary.

Violent Extremists/Terrorists. These actors with a global reach, are exemplified by, but not exclusive to, the al Qaeda network that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. Although these violent extremists operate largely under the banner of Islam, their values and tactics remain wholly at odds with the overwhelming majority of Muslims around the globe. The motivations for members of terrorist groups vary, from concerns about encroaching Western culture to anger over United States support for Israel and autocratic regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, scant economic opportunity and the hateful propaganda of some religious schools and leaders continue to encourage young people to take up the extremists’ cause. These radicals seek to kill a vast number of U.S. citizens, fundamentally alter the international order, and disrupt the American economy.

Extreme Regimes. These regimes threaten to destabilize critical regions and the global community by pursuing nuclear weapons, harboring terrorist networks, and engaging in other unpredictable behavior. The most dangerous examples of these regimes, North Korea and Iran, continue to develop nuclear weapons capabilities and threaten long-time allies of the United States in critical regions of the world.

Weak and Failing States. These states are not new to the international system. September 11 only illustrated that their instability can now be brought right to America’s doorstep to unleash devastating violence on the American people. The United States must assist fragile countries that face overwhelming challenges, including civil wars, declining resources, a youth bulge with few employment opportunities, and economic migration from rural to urban areas. If neglected, these states can serve as safe havens for terrorist networks, as well as places where infectious disease and trafficking in humans, arms, and drugs can flourish.
Long-Term Challenges

The United States must be prepared to meet six fundamental long-term challenges, including: the growing power of China, new challenges from Russia and Central Asia, the potential eruption of other combustible regions, competition over scarce resources, the declining reputation of the United States in the world, and the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, materials, and expertise.

China. The United States must meet the geopolitical challenges posed by the rise of China. U.S. relations with China will pose one of the most fundamental issues for national security policymakers in the decades ahead. The United States will be able to exert some influence over China’s strategic development, particularly through economic cooperation and partnerships over shared geopolitical concerns (such as instability in the Middle East or the Korean peninsula). But even this limited influence will diminish if the United States continues to be dependent on China to fund its increasingly growing budget and trade deficits. Ultimately, China will pursue its own strategic interests with or without U.S. support, and the United States will need to be prepared for conflict with China if necessary.

Broadly speaking, China faces two alternative paths in the coming decades. One path, integration, would see China become a productive regional leader committed to peace, stability, and economic growth. The other path would find China as a force of fragmentation committed to using its growing military power to achieve its security and economic development objectives. A China that followed this path will have concluded that the core international security and economic institutions that the United States and its allies created after World War II, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, no longer advance China’s interests.

It is likely that China will choose a middle ground. But the path China chooses will largely depend on how well China – and in particular, the Chinese Communist Party – can resolve the myriad internal governance issues that currently plague the country, from rampant official corruption to a lack of central control over local provinces to human rights abuses. The United States has little influence over these internal matters, but must use wisely whatever influence it has.

China’s military modernization is aimed at deterring a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan by building the capacity to forcibly annex the island if necessary. Any military build-up is worrisome, and the United States must
carefully monitor these developments in order to minimize the chances of misperception or escalation by either party. Nevertheless, the United States needs to recognize that much of China’s modernization has long been planned and is consistent with a nation of China’s rising economic and diplomatic stature.

**Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Basin.** The United States will need to pay increasing attention to the countries that comprise the Central Asia region and Caspian Sea basin, extending from the edges of Ukraine in the west to Kazakhstan in the east. The region is rich in natural resources, but it lacks a history of democratic governance and is host to fledgling democracies and established dictatorships. Since the region sits at a strategic crossroads between China, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, instability here can affect U.S. interests in neighboring areas. The United States has strong interests in maintaining international access to the region’s energy resources, preventing regional conflict, and stifling the arms and drug trades. However, increasing Chinese and Russian militarization and influence potentially threaten these interests.

A diversity of energy supplies is an essential U.S. interest. The United States must embrace energy policies that reduce dependence on oil. Nonetheless, Russia and the Caspian Sea basin are vital to current energy needs: by 2010, the United States will be importing up to 13 percent of its oil imports from Russia while the Caspian Sea basin contains a significant quantity of untapped reserves. Moreover, many of these countries provide important energy transit routes to both eastern and western markets.

Russia’s uneven transition from authoritarian rule to democracy also remains a source of grave concern for the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has clamped down on political freedoms, repressed political opposition, and backtracked on free-market reforms. High oil prices have buoyed Russia’s economy, enabling it to devote more resources to the military and skirt difficult economic reforms. Russia faces a host of strategic problems in its neighborhood, including a long-standing violent uprising in the Russian province of Chechnya that has resulted in possibly hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Furthermore, the democratic transition of the former Soviet countries that occupy Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin remains uncertain. Though countries like Georgia and Ukraine are working to consolidate recent democratic breakthroughs, others, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are struggling with political instability. Russia’s uneven transition from authoritarian rule to democracy also remains a source of grave concern for the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has clamped down on political freedoms and backtracked on free-market reforms. Strong independence movements in Chechnya and in China’s western Muslim province of Xinjiang increase regional volatility.
The increasing militarization of the region poses threats to both stability and access to natural resources for the United States and the international community. The solidification of the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 has increased not only diplomatic dialogue, but military ties between the member states. Furthermore, while Russia already maintains bases in neighboring states, China has reportedly also attempted to gain access to bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin, in part used to conduct ongoing operations in Afghanistan, has raised the ire of the SCO, which has called on the United States to remove them. The unstable nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan on the border of Central Asia and the tenuous historical relationship between India and China also threaten regional peace. Strategic interests and military alliances will increasingly matter in the region as NATO pushes eastward and Central Asia houses U.S., Russian, and potentially Chinese military bases.

**Regional Instability.** While numerous countries and regions do not directly threaten the United States now, over the long term the seeds of instability may grow into conflict. From the re-emergence of economic populism in South America to corrupt governments in Africa to bitter popular discontent with globalization among people in the Middle East to nuclear arms races in South Asia, there are numerous countries – and indeed entire regions – in various states of political transition. A toxic mix of anti-American ideology, high unemployment, acquisition of nuclear and biological weapons, and erratic leaders could have serious implications for U.S. national security.

As the only country able to project power anywhere in the world, the U.S. military is likely to be drawn into a variety of contingencies, whether they are peacekeeping or combat operations. For example, if fundamentalists in the Pakistan military were to overthrow President Pervez Musharraf and make their nuclear weapons available to a network like al Qaeda, the United States would be compelled to act. Likewise, if Israel and the Palestinians move forward in a two-state settlement, the United States may have to assist in the transition.
RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

Resource Scarcity. A scarcity of critical resources can also breed instability by forcing states into direct conflict or prompting destabilizing population migration both internally and across borders. Significant changes in the environment – such as those brought on by climate change – will have a profound impact on the availability of two of the most crucial of these resources: cropland and freshwater. Resource scarcity has already become a major flashpoint in the Middle East, and many countries – including China and Japan – have unresolved disputes over territories that have oil and natural gas. As demand for these scarce resources grows in the global marketplace, particularly from rising powers like China and India, so does the potential for military conflict. Such a conflict might eventually involve U.S. military forces.

The continued spread of nuclear and biological weapons, materials, and expertise could give rogue states and even individuals the means to threaten the United States and its interests with catastrophe.

Declining Reputation. The United States is facing a precipitous decline in its reputation around the world. This limits the country’s ability to persuade other states and international organizations to join with it to address global security threats, thereby placing undue financial and military burdens on the United States to handle these issues alone. Where the United States has enjoyed comity with other countries, as in Afghanistan, other countries have provided financial and military assistance. In Iraq, however, the United States has had to bear the military and financial burdens largely alone. Beyond financial assistance, other countries provide skills and expertise that the United States lacks, most notably in peacekeeping and stabilization operations, language and cultural skills.

Proliferation of Nuclear and Biological Weapons. The continued spread of nuclear and biological weapons, materials, and expertise could give rogue states and even individuals the means to threaten the United States and its interests with catastrophe. Global efforts to secure and/or eliminate stockpiles of weaponsusable plutonium and highly-enriched uranium—the “gunpowder” responsible for a nuclear explosion—have not picked up appreciably since 9/11.iii Renewed global interest in nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels could result in the further proliferation of the materials, technology, and expertise needed to fabricate nuclear weapons. Finally, the same biotechnological advances that have improved

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iii For more information, please see Brian Finlay & Andrew Grotto, The Race to Secure Russia’s Loose Nukes: Progress Since 9/11, September 2005, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7D/NUKES.PDF

iv For more information, please see Andrew Grotto & Jonathan Tucker, Achieving Biosecurity: A Progressive Action Plan (forthcoming Spring 2006)
our health care and fueled our economy can also be used to engineer and spread new deadly diseases.iv

Defense Strategy

In this current era, the threats posed by the forces of fragmentation are constantly evolving. The United States’ unmatched technological military superiority is not enough to guarantee that U.S. forces prevail in battle and in securing the peace. Enemies will confront the United States in ways that play to their strengths, which are likely to include such asymmetric tactics as improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and even nuclear and biological weapons.

The U.S. military must be able to combat enemies that employ everything from small arms to sophisticated weapons. The military must be flexible, agile, and mobile, with the ability to fight traditional conventional battles, as well as to engage in non-conventional counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, and stabilization operations.

The United States is the only nation that has the potential to project substantial military power anywhere in the world. U.S. forces will be called upon frequently to assist in combustible areas around the world. While the United States needs to build capacity in regional forces and in its allies’ militaries to share in the burdens of international security, it must also ensure that the U.S. military has the capacity to address these threats by itself, if necessary.

Mission of Defense Strategy

Defense strategy should advance the national security strategy identified in 
Integrated Power, released by the Center for American Progress in 2005.4
Accordingly, the most important priorities for a U.S. defense strategy are to:

- Protect the American people from harm by safeguarding the homeland and projecting power around the globe.
- Deter and defeat aggression against the United States, its peoples and its interests.
- Prevent conflict around the world, especially in weak and failing states, which have the potential to become terrorist havens and sources of regional insecurity.
Forge strategic and tactical alliances with other U.S. agencies, foreign states, and international organizations to build capacity in these other entities and to leverage their strengths and enable them to shoulder greater responsibilities.

Assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.

Shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries.

Project power to ensure access to energy supplies, and the flow of trade and communications.

A New Strategy

The United States needs to reorient its current defense strategy based on current threats, fiscal constraints and fundamental American principles. An altered U.S. defense strategy recognizes that unilateral military action is sometimes necessary to deal with imminent threats and it sees war as an undesirable but essential step, but not the first or only resort. It remains committed to the central idea behind the Powell doctrine that when military action is used, it should be overwhelming. The neglect of this fundamental military doctrine has led the United States to wage war on the cheap, which not only has failed to save U.S. resources, but has allowed insecurity to flourish in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The reoriented strategy presented here integrates a threat-based and capabilities-based approach as opposed to the current practice of focusing excessively on capabilities without assessing risk. It reflects an understanding of the need for transformation while maintaining current military readiness and capabilities as opposed to the current practice of making transformation an end in itself. It moves beyond the administration’s “1-4-2-1” paradigm, which gives too much emphasis to warfighting, and not enough to peacekeeping and stabilization. The new defense strategy includes these elements:

1-1-2-3. The military’s first priority must be, as always, to protect the homeland. But strategy must change to reflect the threats of the 21st century. An analysis of current and likely future threats is vital to ensuring that the United States directs resources to where they are likely to reap the largest security gains. This strategy begins a process of developing forces and equipment that will enable the military to defend the homeland, fight one major regional conflict, engage in two substantial post-conflict missions aimed at peacekeeping and stabilization, and deter or contain conflict in three countries or regions (“1-1-2-3”). This alters the current strategy (“1-4-2-1”) of placing an excessive emphasis on fighting regional contingencies and removing regimes, and not enough emphasis on creating those forces necessary to stabilize and reconstruct an area after the removal of a regime.
Bush Administration Defense Strategy

The Bush administration’s first QDR, released on September 30, 2001, laid out a defense strategy that has largely defined the United States’ force posture over the last five years. It had three main components. First, the 2001 QDR established a strategy of “1-4-2-1,” which called for maintaining forces capable of defending the homeland first (1), operating effectively in four critical theaters (4), with the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time (2) while preserving the option for one major offensive to occupy an aggressor’s capital and if necessary, to replace the government (1).

Second, to confront a world marked by surprise and substantial uncertainty, the Department of Defense shifted its planning from the “threat-based” model that had guided much Pentagon thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period to a “capabilities-based” model. According to the Pentagon, while the United States has little sense of who will attack, or when or how they might attack, the country does have a sense of capabilities that can be built to provide advantages against a diverse set of enemies.

Third, this capabilities-based approach placed greater emphasis on accelerating the ongoing transformation of the U.S. forces. Transformation, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said, “is about an awful lot more than bombs and bullets and dollars and cents; it’s about new approaches, it’s about culture, it’s about mindset and ways of thinking of things.”

Despite this rhetoric, however, there was little change in the Pentagon’s weapons system acquisition programs and its conventional and nuclear force posture compared to the first QDR which was completed in 1997.

Use of Force Doctrine. The United States must commit the necessary personnel, both military and civilian, to ensure quick and decisive military victories and a stable peace. The United States should remain committed to the doctrine that it will employ overwhelming force to win on the battlefield, regardless of whether acting unilaterally or with allies. It must clearly define its military and political objectives and a concrete post-conflict strategy so that the Congress and the American people are aware of the potential costs before risking lives and treasure. Our country’s experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan dictate that we should hope for the best but plan for the worst and take steps to maintain domestic support from the moment American troops are dispatched to the day they come home.

Unilateral Action. Protecting the American people will at times require that the U.S. take unilateral military action. The United States must strike to stop imminent threats. Any country that has intelligence that it is about to be attacked has the right under the international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to strike first or launch a preemptive attack. However, preemption must not be confused with the preventive war doctrine embraced by the administration.
RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

**Importance of Personnel.** The recruitment, training, development, and retention of quality military personnel must be the Pentagon’s top priority. It cannot take a backseat to transformation. The war in Iraq has placed excessive burdens on overextended forces, and the all-volunteer military is seriously strained. In particular, ground forces must be increased by at least 86,000 active-duty troops and receive greater attention in the allocation of scarce defense funds. The military must also redefine the role of the National Guard and Reserve, increasing their role in homeland defense and providing them with the resources to do that job.

**Flexibility and Transformation.** The Department of Defense must balance the need to maintain the readiness and capabilities of the existing force with the need to modernize and transform as it did during the 1990s. The excessive focus by this administration on exploiting the so-called “revolution in military affairs” to transform the armed forces rapidly has threatened the readiness and capabilities of American ground forces. Funds that are needed to provide the necessary number of properly equipped ground troops have been diverted to bring new transforming technologies into the force much more rapidly than is prudent. Since military weapon systems last so long and since the nature of the international system is dynamic, the United States must continue to invest in and exploit new technologies to ensure that its forces remain on the cutting edge. However, reshaping or transforming the military to take advantage of these new technologies must be done in an evolutionary way to avoid diminishing the current capabilities and readiness of our troops. The adoption of new technologies has been done this way since the end of the Cold War.

**Capabilities and Threats-Based Approach.** The Department of Defense must direct its resources to areas likely to reap the largest security gains. The current so-called “capabilities approach” fails to assign levels of risk and importance to the various threats this nation faces. The Pentagon must reintroduce elements of a “threat-based” model that guided its thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period. Only through the assignment of risks and priorities can the Pentagon produce programs and budgets that are both affordable and effective, unlike the current approach, which makes National Missile Defense the single largest program in the defense budget even though it deals with the least likely threat.
**Nuclear Posture.** The strategy calls for the adoption of a new posture for U.S. nuclear strategic forces. This posture should deter and, if necessary, defeat a range of catastrophic attacks on the United States and its allies; assure allies of the U.S.’ commitment to their security; and actively shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. This strategy is based on two fundamental principles: first, only military targets are legitimate targets; and second, the collateral damage associated with a nuclear strike must not exceed the military value of a nuclear strike. Based on these principles and the current and foreseeable security environment, a nuclear force posture of 600 deployed warheads and 400 warheads in “reserve” offers more than a credible deterrent against catastrophic threats. This approach runs counter to the current administration’s Cold War mindset that insists on keeping several thousand nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert, maintaining several hundred in Europe, and continuously seeking to develop new nuclear weapons, an approach that undermines nonproliferation.

**Conflict Prevention.** The military must play its proper role in maintaining global stability and prevent serious international crises before they erupt into armed conflict. This requires that the Pentagon have much stronger ties with other governmental agencies and U.S. allies in order to combat the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons and to help train and equip allied armed forces. On the regional level, there must also be increased reliance on peacekeeping units like those of the African Union in order to solve regional conflicts, thus reducing the need to deploy U.S. forces.

**Addressing Specific Threats**

To implement the national security strategy laid out in *Integrated Power*, U.S. military forces must be structured first to deal with the threats posed by violent extremists, extreme regimes, and weak and failing states. If the United States does not have sufficient forces properly equipped to deal with these immediate existential threats to the nation, national security will be jeopardized.

**Violent Extremists/Terrorists.** Combating violent extremists will require the United States to protect the homeland against future attacks as well as to maintain the capability to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear and biological weapons and to hunt them down and destroy them wherever they might be. Deterrence and containment will not work as they do with established states. There must
be policies in place to discipline states that aid and support violent extremists, including removing regimes in extreme cases such as Afghanistan.

Therefore, the highest priority in the U.S. force structure must be given to funding those military capabilities that protect the homeland and manage the aftermath of another attack; that can destroy these violent extremists wherever they may be; and if other options like diplomatic, military and economic actions do not succeed, can bring about regime change in states that support these radicals. This involves not only removing the regime, but also ensuring that the United States assist in bringing peace and stability to the area after the regime is toppled. Just as combat operations require advance planning and a significant commitment of money and manpower, so does the post-combat or stabilization and reconstruction phase.

The military will need to establish genuine partnerships with the intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify terrorists, disrupt operations, and prevent extremists from getting their hands on a weapon of mass destruction. In order to be successful, the military will need to make a series of changes in its priorities and structure. These will include expanding special operations forces that have language, cultural and other specialized skills, as well as providing conventional ground forces with similar skills; increasing the military’s ability to deploy rapidly; developing the capability to wage counterinsurgency campaigns; and expanding programs to train foreign forces in order to bolster capacity in other countries. The recently announced National Security Language Initiative – which will provide “crash courses” in basic language skills to deploying troops, as well as establish a civilian reserve corps of critical language experts – represents a small step in the right direction.5

**Extreme Regimes.** These countries, such as North Korea and Iran, threaten to destabilize critical regions and the global community by pursuing nuclear weapons, harboring terrorist networks, and engaging in other dangerous and unpredictable behaviors. However, unlike terrorists and violent extremists, extreme regimes can normally be contained and deterred because their rulers, even the most despicable ones, want to stay in power. Therefore, the United States must have sufficient conventional and nuclear forces both to deter these countries from acquiring nuclear and biological weapons or to respond to these countries with military force when they clearly threaten U.S. national security interests.

**Weak and Failing States.** These states can create instability in the world by breeding violence, enabling the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, increasing drug trafficking, supporting international crime and/or becoming havens for violent extremists. Unlike extreme regimes, governments in these countries are either weak or non-existent; they cannot provide basic services to their citizens,
such as protection from internal and external threats, healthcare, or education. The United Nations and regional organizations will not be able to restore order in all of these states. Therefore, the United States must have the capability to deploy military forces by itself or with its allies, to stabilize weak and failing states and prevent them from becoming havens for terrorists with a global reach. This will require developing and sustaining an early warning system that is available to all relevant government agencies, and is linked to an interagency response capability. The military must also create a “surge capacity” that allows it to intervene rapidly in at least two weak or failing states simultaneously.

**Traditional Threats.** The tragic events of September 11 did not mark a complete change in the international system. The possibility of traditional conventional warfare between nation-states still exists. Therefore, the U.S. military must maintain sufficient heavy ground forces and the capability to project sufficient air and naval power to deal with traditional forms of warfare that could erupt in places like the Korean peninsula or the Taiwan Strait. These forces must be sufficient to ensure a favorable outcome if North Korea should attack South Korea. The U.S. military must also be able to respond in the Taiwan Strait if China takes military action against Taiwan, or in the Persian Gulf if Iran should strike out at its neighbors in response to the international community’s actions against its nuclear program. These forces must be sufficient to ensure a favorable outcome should deterrence fail. The numerous hotspots around the world require a flexible and agile military that can assist in combating war and securing peace.
CURRENT CHALLENGES & RECOMMENDATIONS

America’s men and women in uniform continue to make us proud. They have fought bravely around the world and have made great sacrifices. Nevertheless, the U.S. military—and the all-volunteer army in particular—is in danger of being broken as a result of poor planning and weak leadership by the Bush administration, pork-barrel decision making in the Congress, and little congressional oversight. That it has held together this long is a tribute to the personal sacrifice of the active duty and reserve personnel.

The following sections assess the current challenges to implementing the appropriate U.S. defense strategy and makes recommendations for each category. It includes the following: a budget crisis, the straining of the all-volunteer army, equipment shortages, mismatch of weapons systems with threats, a flawed nuclear force posture, and insufficient attention to homeland security and intelligence.

The U.S. military—and the all-volunteer army in particular—is in danger of being broken as a result of poor planning and weak leadership by the Bush administration. pork-barrel decision making in the Congress, and little congressional oversight.
THE BUDGETARY SITUATION

Under the five-year plan submitted to the Congress in early 2005, regular defense spending for the FY 2006-2011 period was reduced by $30 billion. Indications are that the Pentagon will be asked to trim another $15-$32 billion from its next $2.8 trillion five-year plan. Thus, while the defense budget increased by 41 percent over the period of the last QDR, the upcoming four-year period will see a decline in the budget. Ryan Henry, the Pentagon’s principal deputy undersecretary for policy, noted in late 2005 that the Pentagon spending binge of the last several years cannot be sustained. James Albaugh, chief executive of Boeing’s $30 billion military division, was even more blunt: “[It] has been a great ride for the last five years, but it’s over. There will be a flattening of the defense budget.”

It is clear that the regular defense program budget will need to decrease. Even counting the Social Security surplus, the federal government is running annual deficits of over $500 billion. The fiscal situation is so precarious that the head of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) admitted to being “terrified” about the budget deficit. The war in Iraq continues to cost $6 billion per month. Repairing the damage caused by hurricanes Rita and Katrina could cost $100 billion. Moreover, while the defense budget consumes only 20 percent of the total federal budget, it represents more than half of federal discretionary spending.

Even if the Pentagon were to receive all of the funds allocated in the plan presented to Congress in January 2005, it still would not be able to fund all planned weapons systems. The military’s 26 largest acquisition programs are on average 40 percent above planned costs and 20 percent behind schedule. As a result, the procurement account could be short by as much as $35 billion in FY 2011 alone. In addition, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to push the costs of personnel, operations, and maintenance beyond projected levels. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis estimates that the administration’s defense budget projections may understate the cost of the current defense plan by $800 billion over the next decade.

Therefore, this QDR report will begin by discussing the manpower and recapitalization situation and then take a hard look at existing weapons programs to see how they can be tailored to counter existing threats. It will then make recommendations regarding homeland defense and intelligence.
**RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER**

Recommendations

- The United States needs to operate under a fiscally unified national security budget. Under a unified budget, the president and the Congress will finally be able to make cost-effective trade-offs across agency lines, determining whether to put a marginal dollar into deploying national missile defense interceptors or building Coast Guard cutters. Since missile defense is funded in the Pentagon budget and the Coast Guard in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget, this type of trade-off cannot currently be made.

- Congress should revamp its committee structure to allow it to monitor the entire national security budget as a whole. This would allow Congress to determine the appropriate balance in offensive, defensive, and preventive components of this nation’s security expenditures.

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† Four-year estimate. ‡ Derived from halved ten-year estimate.
The ability of the United States military to perform its missions depends on smart people more than on smart bombs. As the Marine Corps manual on war fighting states, “Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.” As Melvin Laird, Richard Nixon’s secretary of defense and the architect of the all-volunteer Army, put it, “People, not hardware, must be our highest priority.”

However, the priority given to the men and women of America’s armed forces today – especially those in the Army – appears, lamentably, to have diminished. Overextension and overuse of the Army by the Bush administration, as well as inattention to quality-of-life issues, has severely strained the troops on the ground. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed deeply troubling cracks in the organization and structure of the million-strong total volunteer Army. These problems have been exacerbated both by the current challenges of the international security environment and the way in which the Bush administration has used the active-duty and reserve components since September 11. As a result, the all-volunteer Army is closer to being broken today than at any time in its 33-year history.

In essence, the Bush administration has made a mockery of Vice President Cheney’s pledge at the 2000 Republican National Convention when he said, “Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return…. I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership…. And I can promise them now, help is on the way. Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander-in-chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale.”

Since September 11, the all-volunteer Army has been called to assume greater responsibilities than ever before without being given the tools it needs. U.S. troops – both active duty and reserve – are being asked to battle terrorism around the globe, protect the American homeland, and engage in peacekeeping, stabilization, and nation-building operations. Few imagined that the total volunteer Army would be used in such a manner when it was designed 30 years ago, and the Bush administration has failed to make the appropriate structural changes necessary for
success in these new missions. Today, the active-duty Army is not large enough, nor does it have the right mix of skills necessary to meet current needs. Moreover, the reserve component is being used at unsustainable levels. This threatens not only the quality and readiness of the total volunteer Army, but also its ability to recruit and retain troops with the right skills and aptitude.

**Ability to Respond to Other Threats is Reduced.** The overstretching of the U.S. Army in Iraq means that the United States has few forces remaining to respond to other crises around the world. In fact, the Army is not even currently able to deploy enough ground troops to Afghanistan. Failure to adequately stabilize Afghanistan soon may well result in Afghanistan reverting to its pre-9/11 weakness, which allowed it to become a breeding ground for terrorists. Indeed, shortly before retiring in September 2005, Gen. Richard B. Myers – former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – warned Congress that the concentration of U.S. troops and weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq had limited the Defense Department’s capacity to prepare for other conflicts.15

**Domestic Protection Capability Diminished.** Many of the reservists who have been called up without appropriate notice and kept on duty too long are police officers, firefighters, and paramedics in their civilian lives – that is, first responders who are vital to the safety of their local communities.16

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In addition, the massive deployment of National Guard units overseas has undermined the ability of states to deal with natural disasters or potential terrorist attacks. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the deployment of National Guard units to Iraq proved detrimental to immediate recovery efforts, as state officials in Louisiana and Mississippi struggled to overcome the absence of some 8,000 National Guard members from their states.17 An even bigger problem during the Katrina recovery efforts was equipment shortages: an October 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that, on average, non-deployed National Guard units in the United States have only 34 percent of their essential equipment in stock, down from 74 percent in 2001. These units are running particularly low on trucks, generators, and radios, because much of that equipment has been sent to Iraq.18 It will cost anywhere from $7 to $20 billion to re-acquire the equipment required to fully prepare the National Guard for responding to domestic disasters and terrorist attacks in the future.19
At a July 2005 meeting of the National Governors Association, several state governors expressed concern that the extended deployment of Guardsmen to Iraq has depleted resources at home.²⁰ Governors of western states were particularly worried because National Guard equipment and personnel have traditionally been used to combat wildfires.²¹ Although the National Guard Bureau has promised to keep at least half of each state’s guard troops at home and available for domestic missions, Governor Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho noted at the meeting that more than half of his state’s Guard has been called up to active-duty by the Pentagon.²²

**Army Overstretched.** As of October 2005, the Army has 251,000 soldiers serving in some 120 countries around the globe.²³ The bulk of these troops are in Iraq, Afghanistan, South Korea, and the Balkans, with 19 brigades (12 active and 7 Guard) currently forward deployed in these locations.²⁴ Every available combat brigade from the active Army has already been to Afghanistan or Iraq at least once for a 12-month tour, and many are now in their second and even third tours of duty after barely a year at home.

According to a Defense Science Board study commissioned by the DoD and presented to Secretary Rumsfeld in August 2004, the military does not have sufficient ground forces for the nation’s current war and peacekeeping demands.²⁷ A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report stated that the United States could sustain 123,000 troops in Iraq, far below current levels, only if it increased deployments and decreased time at home, as well as reduced U.S. troops from Bosnia and East Asia.²⁸ Yet, CBO recognized that these changes were probably not sustainable in the long run.

Furthermore, as National Guard and Army reservists conclude their tours in Iraq and return home, combat commanders in Iraq have begun running “perilously low” on soldiers who can fill critical support jobs like military police, civil affairs officers, and truck drivers – positions that have historically been assigned to the reserve component. The Army has begun “reaching the bottom of the barrel,” admitted retired Army General Barry McCaffrey after visiting Iraq in the summer of 2005.²⁹

Indeed, the percentage of military functions allocated to the reserves is substantially the same as it was in 1973 – an arrangement that better represents the challenges of that era than of the present one. Before restructuring began in 2004, the reserves accounted for 97 percent of the Army’s civil affairs units, 70 percent of its engineering units, 66 percent of its military police, and 50 percent of its combat forces.³⁰ As the number of Army National Guard and Reserve brigades in Iraq is reduced from seven to two later this year (2006), the strain on the active component can be expected to increase.³¹
This overstretching leaves the United States potentially vulnerable in places like South Korea as well as at home, where members of the Army National Guard support first responders during man-made and natural disasters. In fact, one of the two Army brigades stationed in South Korea has already been sent to Iraq.

Although the active Army exceeded its overall targets for troop retention and reenlistment in fiscal year 2005, it is experiencing shortages in some of the most vital combat positions and in first-term reenlistments. Meeting these aggregate reenlistment goals has been costly. In 2005, spending on selective reenlistment bonuses in the active-duty Army was $505 million, triple the amount spent in 2004 and almost five times the 2003 level.\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover, the military’s experience over the last 30 years has demonstrated that aggregate retention rates will sharply decline if the Army continues to keep soldiers away from home for more than one year out of three, especially among mid-career personnel like Army captains, senior non-commissioned officers, and seasoned warrant officers, most of whom have not made a lifetime commitment to the Army.\textsuperscript{33} This overextension is what broke the career Army in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{34} As one indication of potential difficulties, the active-duty Army missed its retention goals by about 7 percent or 1,000 soldiers in the first two months of FY 2006.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{National Guard and Reserve Misused.} Since September 11, over 400,000 reservists have been called to active duty, including the largest activation of the National Guard for overseas missions since World War II.\textsuperscript{36} The Bush administration has used the National Guard and Reserve not as a backup as it was originally conceived, but as an extension of the active component. Currently, around 112,300 members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are mobilized in support of the global war on terror.\textsuperscript{37} Although this reflects a decline from the peak of 220,000 Reserve and National Guard troops on domestic and overseas missions in the spring of 2003, several National Guard and Reserve units have been kept on active duty for longer than anticipated, sent overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan without effective training, and mobilized without reasonable notice.\textsuperscript{38} This last practice not only undermines the readiness of the reserve soldiers to carry out their tasks, but it also puts an unfair burden on reservists’ families and employers by leaving them with very little time to prepare for the soldiers’ absence. Members of the Michigan National Guard, for example, were sent to Iraq with only 48 hours notice.\textsuperscript{39}
Short-notice deployments have occurred despite the fact that Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, the commander of the Army Reserve, stated in 2003 that a reserve soldier should be given at least a 30-day notice before being mobilized.\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, despite Lt. Gen. Helmly’s statement that reserve soldiers would not be kept on duty for more than nine to 12 months in a five-year period, the Maryland National Guard’s 115\textsuperscript{th} Military Police Battalion has been deployed three times since September 11, and some of these soldiers served on active-duty for more than two years.\textsuperscript{41} More and more of these “citizen-soldiers” are becoming full-time warriors against their wishes and contrary to the reserve’s intended purpose. In early 2005, Lt. Gen Helmly publicly acknowledged that the Army Reserve is “rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force” with “hamstrung” management.\textsuperscript{42}

Another major strain on the reserve component has resulted from the Army’s use of the individual ready reserve (IRR) to fill personnel shortages in Iraq. The IRR comprises 118,000 men and women who have completed their active-duty service and have not joined a Guard or Reserve unit, but who still have time left on their eight-year military service obligation.\textsuperscript{43} These former soldiers can be mobilized to fill vacancies for a legal maximum of two years. Since the war in Iraq began in 2002, the Army has called more than 5,700 such reservists back to active duty.\textsuperscript{44} But only 3,950 reported to duty, and the Army was forced to suspend the program in November 2005.

\textbf{Operational and Personnel Readiness Levels in Decline.} The current system has led to a decline in the overall readiness of the active Army – that is, its ability to carry out missions effectively. According to the GAO, operational readiness rates for selected equipment have been declining since 1999 across all of the services and the slide has occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.\textsuperscript{45} This decline has hit the Army the hardest as it has borne the brunt of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although 75 percent of the Army’s active-duty soldiers today have combat experience, making the Army more experienced than it was a few years ago, readiness is arguably still declining because of such things as equipment shortages and low morale.\textsuperscript{46} A 2005 report by the Army Surgeon General’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT-II) revealed that, although morale had improved from the previous year, more than half of soldiers still reported that their unit morale was low or very low.\textsuperscript{47} At least 10 percent of soldiers demonstrated symptoms of acute or post-traumatic stress disorders.\textsuperscript{48}
Major Difficulties with Recruiting. Recruiting new qualified enlistees has also become more and more difficult. The Army currently aims to sign up 165,000 new soldiers each year – 80,000 for the active duty Army and 85,000 in the National Guard and Reserve. In 2005, the active-duty Army missed its annual recruiting goal by 6,627 soldiers, falling short of its target for the first time in six years while significantly drawing down its “banked” pool of delayed entry program (DEPs) enlistees. Moreover, this recruiting gap – 8 percent – is the largest percentage shortfall in two decades.

These recent shortfalls have occurred even as the Army has dramatically increased the resources devoted to recruiting. In the past year, the Army has added 1,300 recruiters and sharply increased its budget for recruiting. It is estimated that $639.5 million was spent for recruiting for FY 2005 and that $726.2 million will be spent in FY 2006. The Army currently offers enlistment bonuses of up to $40,000, plus $70,000 in college assistance, and it is considering plans to double this figure for recruits with desired specialties. Recruiters are also offering shorter enlistments: the new minimum service they are offering is 15 months, down from two years. The Pentagon also increased the maximum age of enlistees to 42 from the current ceiling of 35 for active-duty troops and 39 for the Reserves and National Guard.

These recruiting struggles are even more troubling because the Army has also been lowering its standards. In fiscal year 2005, the Army took its least qualified recruits in a decade as measured by educational level and test results. The percentage of new recruits in the Army without a high school diploma has risen to 13 percent, up from 8 percent last year.

The Army is also accepting more “Category 4” applicants, the designation given to those who score lowest (between 16 and 30 out of a possible 99 points) on the Army’s Vocational Aptitude Battery test. In 2005, these low scorers made up 3.9 percent of the force, up from 0.6 percent in 2004; in doing so, the Army abolished the ceiling of 2 percent it had maintained since 1990. In October 2005, the first month of FY 2006, the Army was forced to take in 12 percent of its recruits from Category 4 – the largest number of below-average recruits it has accepted in over 20 years. In large part because of this less qualified entering class, “[t]he overall quality of the force today is lower than it was a year ago,” according to David Segal of the Center for Research on Military Organization.

The experience and capability level of the Army has also been hurt by the discharge of thousands of gay men and women pursuant to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. A number of those discharged were soldiers with critical skills, such as Arabic language abilities.
Quality of Life Undermined. In wartime, every citizen should expect some sacrifices, and this is particularly true for soldiers. However, the Bush administration has exacerbated personnel problems by attempting to cut back benefits needed by members of the military and their families. The timing of these cuts has fueled the perception of disregard for the well-being of the same troops that the administration relies on to defend the country. For example, the administration proposed cutting imminent danger combat pay by one-third for U.S. troops in the war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. It also proposed cutting family separation allowances by nearly two-thirds for those troops away from their home base. Public pressure ultimately forced Congress to reject these White House proposals.

The administration is also not allocating enough resources to the more than 17,000 U.S. soldiers who have been injured in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fewer than 10 percent of applicants to the military’s disability compensation system receive long-term disability payments at the requested level. The majority of
those receiving disability pay leave the military with a one-time, lump-sum payment that is inadequate to make up for the losses suffered. To its credit, the administration – after first threatening to veto the proposal – worked with Congress in 2004 to ensure that retired veterans with moderate to severe disabilities are able to collect disability payments in addition to their normal pensions. Previously, such “concurrent receipt” had been prohibited.

Finally, the Bush administration also requested a 14 percent cut in assistance to public schools on military bases and other federal property. In what one Army commander called an act of betrayal, the civilian leadership at the Pentagon has considered closing or transferring control of the 58 schools it operates on 14 military installations. These decisions threaten not only the quality of education for the children of soldiers, but also the morale and support of military families. Ultimately, these actions threaten the long-term viability of the all-volunteer force.

**Recommendations**

If the United States hopes to have the capabilities to protect the homeland, to conduct major operations in at least one region, as well as to meet its other global commitments while treating the men and women of the military fairly and in a way that encourages them to join and remain in the volunteer Army, it must take the five steps outlined below, steps we have been advocating for more than two years.

While some of these steps require adding money to the Army’s budget, these funds can be found in other parts of the overall baseline defense budget. As discussed elsewhere in this document, programs that can be reduced without undermining the nation’s ability to wage the global war on terror include the National Missile Defense Program, new nuclear weapons research programs, and Cold War-type programs like the F/A-22 fighter and Virginia class submarine.

The cost of adding funds to the Army budget can also be offset by reducing the number of people on active-duty in the Navy and Air Force by cutting one fighter wing from the Air Force and one Navy carrier battle group from their current configuration. This would leave the Navy with ten Carrier Battle Groups and the Air Force with 18 tactical Fighter Wings. Given the increasing capabilities of these forces, such minor reductions will not increase the risk to national security. As Secretary Rumsfeld noted, it is capabilities, not numbers, that count. Furthermore, the end strength of the U.S. Marine Corps should be maintained at 185,000 active troops and 40,000 selected reserve.
Increase the Size of the Total Army. We must acknowledge that even if money is available to implement these steps, there is no guarantee that they can save the all-volunteer Army. This administration has ignored the problem for too long. Hopefully, it will not be too late.

The Army is overstretched and does not have sufficient numbers of active-duty troops trained for non-traditional duties such as nation-building. While we support the Army’s effort to attain “modularity” by increasing the number of active-duty brigades from 37 to 42, this will not increase the number of soldiers on active duty. Furthermore, while these new modular brigades will be more agile and lethal, the war in Iraq has demonstrated that boots on the ground are far more important than firepower for securing the country.

Over the next five years the end strength of the active duty Army should be increased by 86,000 troops while maintaining the current strength of the reserve component. This change could give us the option to sustain a large presence in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the force, as well as enhance the Army’s ability to meet the country’s long-term strategic objectives. These additional troops should be in addition to the increases in end strength already authorized by Congress.

Additionally, new recruits should meet the same standards of quality that the Army has achieved for the past five years, namely that at least 90 percent of all recruits have a high school diploma, and 98 percent score average or above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. We recognize that because of the disastrous policies of the Bush administration it will be difficult to increase the size and quality of the Army. However, with proper leadership and realistic policies, there is a chance that these steps can succeed. But in any case, we must try if we are to protect our security without breaking the all volunteer Army. The new troops should be added as follows:

- Add two division-sized peacekeeping or stabilization units. Because stability operations are now a core military mission equal in importance to full-scale combat, the Army should recruit, train and equip two division-sized units of 13,000 people each that receive training in helping turn a battlefield victory into a political one. In addition to having sufficient combat power, these units would have a greater number of personnel trained in policing, civil affairs, engineering, and medicine than are in the current Army divisions.
• **Double the size of the active-duty Special Forces.** The president should request and the Congress should provide sufficient funds to recruit, train, and equip the 50,000 personnel necessary to double the size of the active-duty Special Forces to 101,000. The secretary of defense must also give higher priority to these elite soldiers within the defense budget by expanding their share from $6.6 billion to at least $10 billion per year, which would enable them to lead the military’s counterterrorism mission more effectively. These steps will have the added benefits of allowing the Pentagon to reduce the number of private contractors in combat areas and enabling the administration to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to transfer control of covert operations from the CIA to the Pentagon.

• **Add 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel to the active-duty force.** The president should direct the secretary of defense to bolster the Army’s capacity for peacekeeping, stabilization and nation-building duties and request sufficient funds in the Army budget to recruit, train, and equip at least 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel for the active-duty force. Such capacity is desperately needed because most of these critical personnel are currently in the reserve.

• **Follow through with current plans to grow the Army’s “operational” branch.** The Army currently plans to increase its operational component over a three-year period by trimming its institutional and administrative positions and reducing the number of people assigned to training at any one time. The Army’s leadership has projected that it will add 40,000 soldiers to the operational force by 2007.

**Amend the “Back Door Draft” Policies.** Because the active Army is too small to meet its responsibilities, the Bush administration has been forced to employ a number of unfair policies that amount to a back door draft. These policies should be modified as follows:

• **Reduce the duration of the military service obligation.** To accomplish this, the Congress should pass legislation to reduce the length of the military service obligation – which by law lasts eight years from the date of initial enlistment – to six years after enlistment or four years of active-duty, whichever comes first. This change would prevent the men and women of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), who have already served their country, from having their lives interrupted after they have completed a
substantial period of active-duty service. Not only is this change desirable as a matter of equity, but it would also increase the willingness of people to join the active-duty Army for a four-year enlistment. Moreover, it would have little negative impact on military readiness, since members of the IRR do not receive any training and therefore have limited military usefulness anyway.

- **Change stop-loss policy implementation.** The president should direct the secretary of defense to change stop-loss policy implementation so that no person is subject to stop-loss on more than one occasion without his or her consent. Furthermore, enlisted people who are affected by stop-loss or whose tours in Iraq or Afghanistan are extended beyond one year should receive a bonus of $2,000 per month for the duration of their extra service.

- **Issue a new executive order on selected reserve recall.** The president should issue an executive order that directs the secretary of defense not to recall a selected reserve unit to active-duty for more than one year out of every six unless the president has declared a national emergency. The current executive order allows the Pentagon to keep a selected reservist on active-duty for up to two years, and does not limit the number of times an individual can be recalled. Activating the Guard and Reserve more than once every six years will have a severe impact on retention as well as on the willingness of individuals to join the Guard and Reserve after leaving active-duty.
Improve Quality-of-Life Issues. Ameliorating troops’ worries about pay and benefits would have a positive impact on morale as well as on retention and reenlistment rates. Moreover, given the sacrifices that American troops are making to protect their country, ensuring a high quality of life for soldiers and their families is also the right thing to do. In particular:

- **Maintain troop pay and benefits.** The administration should also make sure that imminent danger and family separation allowances are adjusted for inflation. He should direct the secretary of defense to maintain quality of life benefits such as special pay, commissaries, and schools on military bases and not institute a backdoor cut in pay by trimming medical benefits for active duty personnel, selected reservists, or military retirees. He should also call a moratorium on studies about closing commissaries and schools on military bases, at least as long as the U.S. military is trying to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.

- **Enable selected reservists and their families to enroll in TRICARE.** Congress should pass legislation that would allow members of the selected reserve to enroll themselves and their families in the military’s healthcare system, known as TRICARE. This should be available regardless of whether or not their units are currently deployed, rather than limiting it to deployed reservists or limiting it to eight years after the reservist is deployed. Enrollment in the TRICARE system would prevent reservists and their families from having to change healthcare plans when they are activated. Moreover, those members of the selected reserve who do not have health insurance would be able to maintain their medical fitness for service without having to pay for it themselves. Such access to the TRICARE system, which is much less costly than most private health care plans, would have a positive impact on both recruiting and retention for the Guard and Reserve. In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost of this benefit, if progressively phased-in, would be about $454 million in the first year and up to $1.8 billion by the fourth year.

- **Compensate federal civilian employees in the National Guard and Reserve for lost pay when their units are summoned to active-duty.** The federal government – the single largest employer of reservists – should pay the differential for its 127,000 civilian employees who serve in the National Guard and Reserve and who would otherwise face pay cuts when their units are activated. Many leading private-sector employers, as well as state and local governments, already provide this benefit.
These changes will obviously not be without additional costs. Adding 86,000 troops to the Army will mean an additional expenditure of about $12 billion a year while the TRICARE benefit will mean an average cost of $1 billion a year over the next five years. Finally, compensating federal civilian employees for lost income when their Guard units are activated could cost up to $200 million per year.

**Repeal the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy.** The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is counterproductive to military readiness. As Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, who retired as Navy Judge Advocate General in 2000, noted, “‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is virtually unworkable in the military – legally, administratively, and socially. Rather than preserving cohesion, it fosters divisiveness.” More than 10,000 people have been discharged because of the policy over the past ten years, including nearly 800 with skills deemed “mission critical,” including pilots, combat engineers, and linguists. These are the very job functions in which the military has had personnel shortfalls and been forced to activate individuals from the Individual Ready Reserve. The economic costs of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy over the previous decade have been almost $320 million.

- Congress should pass the Military Readiness Enhancement Act (H.R. 1059), which would repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that prohibits openly gay men and women from serving in the armed forces.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice is more than adequate to prevent and sanction inappropriate behavior by members of the armed forces, no matter what their sexual orientation. While the issue of gays in the military was certainly very divisive 12 years ago, the opinions of many military personnel have since evolved. Public opinion has also turned decidedly against “don’t ask, don’t tell,” with 79 percent of Americans today supporting a policy that allows gays to serve openly. Even more importantly, 76 percent of potential recruits reported that repealing the ban would have “no effect” on their decision to enlist.

The change should not be a difficult one: an internal Ministry of Defense report from Britain, whose military was forced by the European Court of Human Rights to allow openly gay people to serve even in places like submarines, found that the policy change was a “solid achievement … with fewer problems than might have been expected.” Indeed, beginning in December 2005, gay personnel will be eligible for married housing on British military bases. In the United States, as many as 41,000 new recruits could result from the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” according to some estimates.
RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

Drop the Ban on Women in Combat. Currently, the Army prohibits women from serving in infantry, field artillery, and Special Forces units that directly engage the enemy on the ground. However, as the war in Iraq demonstrates, soldiers in combat support units are in just as much danger as front-line or direct combat units. For example, women soldiers in a support battalion of a Brigade Combat team in the Elite 101st Airborne Division work shoulder to shoulder with infantry soldiers on raids and missions in Iraq. Two female soldiers in the battalion have been nominated for the Combat Action badge, given to those who engage, or are engaged by the enemy during combat operations.90

- The armed services should establish standards for every military occupational specialty and allow those who meet the standards to qualify regardless of gender. This would allow the Army to increase the pool of potential recruits for hard-to-fill combat slots. Women already make up around 10 percent of all U.S. troops serving in Iraq, the highest percentage of women in any war to date.91

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<td>Marine Corps (Personnel)</td>
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<td>Total Uniformed Personnel</td>
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<td>1,500 reserve</td>
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Table 2: Current and Projected Force
Table 3 compares our recommended force structure to the previous defense policy reviews that have been conducted since the end of the Cold War. The internal DoD reviews generally produced few changes, aside from matching smaller (but similar) force structures to a defense spending account that declined nearly 30 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1996, leveled off, then increased slightly in real terms in the last four years of the Clinton administration, and increased dramatically between 2001 and 2005.

Our recommendations envision having an Army and Marine Corps that combined are larger than any of the reviews conducted since 1991. The Base Force Review of 1991 called for a slightly larger Army than we do, but it recommended a Marine Corps with some 31,000 fewer troops. Because of the increased capabilities of today’s lethal capabilities and ships, we believe that a slightly smaller Navy and Air Force will be sufficient to carry out our 1-1-2-3 strategy.

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<td>16 reserve**</td>
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<td>5+ reserve**</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>528 ships</td>
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<td>Air Force (Fighter Wings)</td>
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<td>45,000 reserve</td>
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<td>1,170,000 reserve</td>
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<td>835,000 reserve</td>
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* Accounts for separate brigades and regiments not organized into divisions.
** Accounts for separate brigades not organized into divisions but does not include two cadre divisions.
*** Includes training carrier.
The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a series of problems for the U.S. military’s equipment inventory. First, equipment has worn out much more rapidly than projected due to the harsh topography and climate in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the fast-paced tempo of U.S. operations there. The Department of Defense has found that equipment is being used at two to eight times peacetime rates in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the Pentagon has had to borrow or re-deploy equipment from other areas in order to meet emerging shortfalls in the war zone, in the process drawing down equipment stocks worldwide. These systemic equipment shortages undermine the readiness of the U.S. military to meet current threats both at home and abroad, as well as to deal with future contingencies. Furthermore, DoD procurement processes have not kept up with increased equipment requests, especially for unanticipated needs like body armor.

In order to reset the force to desired levels of capacity, billions of dollars will need to be added to the Pentagon’s procurement account. Over the past four years, several supplemental appropriations bills have provided funds for repairing and refurbishing equipment worn down in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the total cost of resetting the force will both outweigh and outlast the funding available from supplementals. To remedy this problem, the Pentagon will need to dedicate a much larger percentage of its baseline budget toward recapitalizing the force.

Even before operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began, equipment age was a major problem. Some pieces are more than 20 years old, including the Navy’s LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship and the Air Force’s KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. Moreover, there is a shortage of spare parts for many of these older systems. This is a major problem because some systems are so complex that a single malfunction in one component sometimes paralyzes the entire piece of equipment.

The GAO warned that this trend could threaten the ability of the U.S. military to achieve its core mission requirements. An October 2005 review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of 30 equipment items across all branches of the armed services found that due to the heavy use of equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan – as well as ongoing difficulties with maintaining complex

**Systemic equipment shortages undermine the readiness of the U.S. military to meet current threats both at home and abroad, as well as to deal with future contingencies.**
and aging equipment – readiness rates for most of the 30 items had declined between fiscal year 1999 and 2004, and most markedly in 2003 and 2004.94

While the Army and Marine Corps have felt the greatest strains, the Air Force and Navy have also been affected. For example, the heavy use of Air Force planes have shortened their projected lifespans, and the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that equipment depreciation in the Air Force could cost between $1.5 and $2.1 billion for 2005, and in each successive year if operations continue at current rates.95 The Navy’s costs resulting from equipment wear and tear – the smallest costs among all the services – will still reach approximately $150 million a year.96

These shortages are already affecting missions outside of Iraq and Afghanistan and are creating immediate operational risks should another major military conflict emerge. After redirecting substantial flows of maintenance money and hardware toward its operations in the Middle East and South Asia, the U.S. military was left with only 50 to 80 percent of normal levels of heavy weapons and other fighting gear in South Korea, jeopardizing the ability of the U.S. to respond in the event of hostilities with North Korea or another East Asian nation.97 Furthermore, the equipment shortages that became evident during the National Guard’s response to the Hurricane Katrina response effort are another indication of the dangers.

The U.S. Army & Marines. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Army, which furnishes the majority of the boots on the ground in Iraq, has experienced the most severe problems with equipment shortages. Over the past three years, the active Army has deployed more than 40 percent of its equipment to either Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.98 Altogether, the Army’s equipment is being utilized at five to six times the normal peacetime levels.99 Trucks from the Army and the Marines are being driven approximately ten times as many miles per year as usual.100

Operational constraints and the constant state of combat in Iraq provide little time for the basic upkeep of equipment, and even significantly worn-down equipment is sometimes transferred from one unit to the next without replacement or maintenance. Furthermore, the strain on the Army has been further exacerbated by a shortage of maintenance personnel and the advanced age of much of the equipment. Hundreds of thousands of pieces are in need of repair or replacement. Additionally, the Army’s “modularity” initiative, which will increase the number of active brigades from 33 to 42-48 while making existing brigades more lethal, will also increase the amount of required equipment substantially.101
As has been widely reported, the Army and Marines have never had enough body armor for their ground troops or armor for their vehicles. These shortages have been caused by poor planning and a lack of urgency in the procurement process. In response, some families have bought body armor for their sons and daughters in Iraq. In January 2006, reports emerged of a secret Pentagon study that found that as many as 80 percent of Marines who were killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body might have survived if they had had extra body armor. In 2004, a similar scandal erupted when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fielded a question from a National Guardsman who contended that ground troops faced chronic and serious shortages of vehicle armor, needlessly exposing them to greater peril.

The Marines have also experienced shortages in areas other than armor. The Marine Corps’ Inspector General reported in June 2005 that Marines in Iraq do not have “enough weapons, communication gear, or properly outfitted vehicles.” General Michael W. Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2005 that the high operational rate of deployment was wearing out equipment at a very high rate, affecting both equipment availability and unit readiness. As one example, Gen. Hagee noted that the Corps’ HMMWVs (high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles, or “Humvees”), which normally last 13 years, needed replacing in Iraq after just two. Indeed, more than 5,300 major pieces of Marine equipment – including critical transport vehicles like helicopters and trucks – have been either destroyed or degraded to the point that they must be rebuilt or replaced entirely. This pattern of heavy use drives up maintenance costs and strains procurement budgets.

General Hagee also noted that the Corps does not have enough equipment to use in training because most of the Marines’ equipment was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Current readiness rates for the Marines’ ground equipment in the United States average only 81 percent, and the Army lacks sufficient equipment at home as well. Such shortages undermine the long-term readiness of the armed forces by keeping personnel from undertaking the necessary training for future operations.

Army Reserve & National Guard. Equipment shortages are also undermining the ability of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard to train new personnel and to support operations overseas. Given their role as a secondary, follow-on
force, the National Guard and Reserve are not normally 100 percent equipped for overseas missions. Thus, prior to deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve commanders assumed they would have sufficient time to obtain additional equipment.

However, since September 11, theater commanders have deployed units on short timetables with as little as 90 percent of their necessary equipment. These orders have required enormous transfers of equipment from non-deployed units to deployed units.\textsuperscript{110} As of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units deploying overseas, depleting their inventory of key items like radios, generators, and armored Humvees.\textsuperscript{111} From September 2001 to April 2005, the Army Reserve also transferred 235,900 pieces of equipment worth $765 million from non-mobilized to mobilized units.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, like the Marines and the active-duty Army, both the Guard and Reserve have been left without sufficient equipment for training for future missions.

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textbf{One of the most dangerous results} & In summer 2005, the GAO estimated that non-deployed National Guard units only have about 34 percent of their essential equipment, while the Army Reserve reported in February 2005 that it had only 76 percent of the equipment it required.\textsuperscript{113} However, the Reserve’s figure was significantly overstated because it included very old equipment that is essentially incompatible with that of the active component.\textsuperscript{114} \\
\textbf{of these equipment shortages is} & \\
\textbf{that they compromise the National} & \\
\textbf{Guard’s ability to carry out its} & \\
\textbf{homeland security and disaster} & \\
\textbf{response missions.} & \\
\end{tabular}

Equipment problems in the Reserve and the Guard have been aggravated by several other factors. First, as in the active force, reserve equipment used in Iraq has deteriorated much more rapidly than anticipated due to the harsh operational environment and high tempo.

Second, both the Reserves and National Guard often inherit the active Army’s older equipment rather than receiving new equipment, and some of this older equipment cannot actually be used in combat because the Army can no longer provide logistics support for these older items.

Third, both the Guard and the Reserve do not have enough full-time maintenance personnel or staff that can train such personnel. Because of funding constraints, the Reserve has only been authorized to hire only 68 percent of the staff required to perform necessary training and maintenance.\textsuperscript{115}
Finally, Guard and Reserve units returning from Iraq have often been required to leave their equipment in theater, further diminishing equipment inventories among non-deployed units. The Army National Guard has estimated that it has left more than 64,000 items (worth approximately $1.2 billion) overseas since 2003. Even if this equipment is eventually returned, much of it will be significantly worn down.

One of the most dangerous results of these equipment shortages is that they compromise the National Guard’s ability to carry out its homeland security and disaster response missions. This was demonstrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, where Guard officials admitted that their response capacity was diminished because they lacked essential equipment like radios, trucks, helicopters, night-vision goggles, and satellite-based communications devices, all of which had been deployed to Iraq.

**Budgetary Implications.** Experts agree that the costs of resetting the force will be enormous. It has been estimated that rehabilitating the Army equipment used in overseas operations will require spending more than $20 billion over the next four years. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the total cost of equipment wear and tear across all services was approximately $8 billion for 2005 alone, not including a combined backlog of $13 to $18 billion in accrued expenses resulting from past equipment stress and loss. In late 2005, senior Marine officials admitted that, even if the war in Iraq ended the next day, it would still cost nearly $13 billion to reequip their units with the vehicles and gear lost in combat and through wear and tear.

Such maintenance and replacement costs have not been incorporated into the Pentagon’s baseline budget, and many observers have predicted that it will take two years of supplemental appropriations following the completion of operations in Iraq to fully reset the force. If these supplementals cease once the U.S. withdraws from Iraq, the U.S. military – and the Army in particular – will face a major budget crisis, because the costs of resetting the force will have to compete with other priorities both within the DoD (e.g., transformation) and throughout the entire federal government.

**Recommendations**

- *The administration and Congress must continue to provide substantial resources to reset, recapitalize, and modernize the force.* They must ensure that funding for resetting the force will continue following the termination of the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and increase the Army’s share of the baseline budget from 24 to 28 percent in order to pay for the additional troops, as well as resetting the force. These needs should be funded in the baseline defense budget.
The Pentagon must present Congress with an equipment supply plan. This plan should specify how DoD will maintain operational readiness through long-term maintenance and selected replacement of equipment that has been worn down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Pentagon must give higher priority to ensuring that the troops in the field have the proper equipment. To do this, they must improve their planning and procurement processes.
WEAPONS SYSTEMS MISMATCH

Weapons systems must match the missions that the U.S. military is most likely to undertake over the next decade. The weapons system acquisition program of the Department of Defense is broken. Four years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon’s military and civilian leaders are still locked into a Cold War mindset that sees a Soviet-era conventional military as the greatest threat. Instead, America’s enemies engage in new forms of warfare: insurgencies using small arms, suicide bombing, and the Internet to recruit and train terrorists that threaten Americans.

The Pentagon must also plan weapons systems that fit within the fiscal constraints it is likely to experience for the remainder of this decade. The Pentagon procurement plans assume incorrectly that the regular defense budget will continue to increase by about 5 percent per year – in real terms – just as it has for the past four years.120 According to the latest selected acquisition reports, the Pentagon has $1.5 trillion worth of weapons systems in various stages of development.121 Even if there is no additional cost growth in these weapons programs, the Pentagon cannot buy the 80 weapons systems on the drawing board. Furthermore, given the fact that, in the last four years alone, the projected cost of its five major weapons systems has risen by 85 percent, it is likely that they will only grow more expensive.122

In order to replace aging systems and to meet new threats, seven new weapons systems are essential to meeting 21st century threats. Vital programs include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; Future Combat Systems (FCS); the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV); naval vessels such as the CVN-21 aircraft carrier and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and the B-2 heavy bomber.

At the same time, there are at least seven major weapons systems under development that deal with threats from a bygone era or are an unwise use of scarce resources. These obsolete or fiscally imprudent systems include the F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet; the SSN-774 Virginia class submarine; the DD(X) Destroyer; the V-22 Osprey; the C-130J transport aircraft; offensive space-based weapons; obsolete elements of the U.S. nuclear posture; and the deployment of National Missile Defense.
F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

The F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) is an ambitious program to build three related, but slightly different, aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Current plans call for building 2,458 planes at a cost of $256 billion, or about $100 million per plane.123

This aircraft should be built. It is more cost effective to produce the new JSF platform than to buy the F/A-22 or additional F/A-18s to upgrade older systems, which by 2010 will need to be replaced. Moreover, since these variants use common parts and are manufactured on the same production line, it is more affordable than allowing each of the services to develop its own unique aircraft. Finally, since so many other countries are willing to purchase the fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter will improve the ability of the U.S. to use military power in conjunction with allied forces and will lower the unit cost of these fighter jets for the U.S. military.124

To date, the Pentagon has spent $25.6 billion developing the plane and will spend $5 billion more in FY 2006. If the program remains on schedule, the Air Force and Navy will have spent about $100 billion more over the next decade. This program should not be rushed due to the technological challenges of trying to build three different planes from one design. To prevent excess aging in the aircraft fleet before the arrival of the new joint strike fighter, the Pentagon should buy upgraded Block 60 version F-16s. About $3 billion of this $15.3 billion could be allocated to purchasing 100 upgraded F-16s, resulting in a net savings of at least $12.3 billion over four years.125 This country’s overwhelming numerical and qualitative advantages in tactical aircraft will not soon be challenged.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVs)

Up until the war in Afghanistan, many military leaders from the Air Force and Navy resisted full-scale development of unmanned aerial vehicles like the Predator and Global Hawk, because they saw these vehicles as a threat to their manned aircraft. In fact, the majority of the Predators – which were so effective in helping the United States remove the Taliban from power – were CIA aircraft. Both UAVs continue to be used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Pentagon currently has seven different UAV programs in various stages of development. These include two Air Force Programs (Predator and Global Hawk), one Navy program (Fire Scout), one Army program (Shadow), and one Joint program (Joint Unmanned Air Combat System or J-UCAS). These UAVs can do everything from providing real time imagery of the battlefield to carrying out strike missions. They vary in cost from $4.5 million for the Predator to $130 million for the Global Hawk. The total budget for UAVs in FY 2006 is $1.5 billion, a fraction of the cost of the budget for manned combat aircraft, which in fiscal year 2006 amounted to more than $12 billion.

B-2

The 1997 National Defense Panel and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review both concluded that greater emphasis should be placed on long-range precision strike capabilities. This conclusion combined with the important role played by bombers in the conflict in Afghanistan argues for expanding by 15 the existing fleet of 21 B-2s until a new long-range bomber can be developed.

The B-2 plays a vital role in the current security environment. It is able to deliver large payloads (both conventional and nuclear munitions) over long distances because it can fly directly from bases in the United States and rapidly destroy targets halfway across the globe without depending on aircraft carriers, foreign bases, or fighter escorts because of its stealth character. These aircraft reduce the need to establish American military bases abroad or obtain access to foreign bases, which
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has become an increasingly politically difficult and dangerous task, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. This, in turn, can lessen perceptions of American occupation and eliminate the need to partner with undemocratic regimes in order to use their military bases and deliver a payload to a distant target.

Additional bombers can be procured for around $820 million each.\(^\text{134}\) We recommend buying three of these new bombers per year over the next five years. These would give the Air Force a total of 36 B-2 bombers and would cost about $12 billion over the next five years.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)

The Future Combat Systems (FCS) is an Army program to build a group of eighteen combat vehicles and other systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors, which will be linked together into an integrated and very complex system.\(^\text{135}\) The Army intends to begin equipping its first units with the FCS in 2011 and eventually approximately one-third of its troops will utilize the FCS at a cost of about $160 billion.\(^\text{136}\)

The FCS program is necessary for the Army because it will make its units more deployable, lethal, and survivable. However, its current schedule is far too ambitious given the complexity of the program. Of the network of 53 crucial technologies, 52 have not been tested sufficiently to show that they will work in a combat environment.\(^\text{137}\)

STRYKER INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLE (IAV)

The Stryker is intended to provide a relatively light and easily deployable combat vehicle to bridge the gap between today’s lethal but relatively heavy forces, and the more capable and deployable systems being developed under the FCS program.\(^\text{138}\) It is needed now. In fact, a brigade of Strykers has already been rushed to Iraq.\(^\text{139}\) This interim armored vehicle is not only cheaper to operate and maintain than the M-113 A3 armored personnel carrier, but it also provides better protection for the soldiers than the M-113 A3.\(^\text{140}\) While it does not have as great a capability and survivability as the M-1A Abrams tank, it is less expensive and lighter, which means it can be deployed more easily and rapidly. The Army plans to purchase 2,449 of these units for approximately $10 billion.\(^\text{141}\)
NAVAL VESSELS

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, the primary role of the Navy in the 21st century will be to project power ashore. It can accomplish this strategically by launching air strikes from its carriers and tactically by providing fire support in crowded closed-in coastal areas for the troops ashore. It must give priority to building those weapons that perform these functions, as opposed to building ships like the DD(X) for waging open ocean warfare against another major naval power.

NEW AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVN-21)

Aircraft carriers last approximately 30 years. If the Navy is to maintain a force of at least ten aircraft carriers in the near future, it must begin building a new generation of carriers over the next decade. The Navy plans to buy at least three new aircraft carriers to replace those carriers that will reach the end of their useful life in that timeframe. The lead ship of this new class will be designated the CVN-21. It will cost about $12 billion, which is almost half the cost (in inflation-adjusted dollars) than the Nimitz carriers that were built over the last two decades. However, it will be cheaper to operate and will be more capable than the Nimitz Class. Since the CVN-21 will require between 500 and 800 fewer sailors to operate, it will save at least $500 million a year in personnel costs. Finally, CVN-21 will incorporate next generation technologies and have the capacity to launch Navy and Marine Corps Tactical fighters and special operations aircraft.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS)

The Littoral Combat Ship is a new surface combatant intended to focus on performing missions in coastal waters. It is approximately the size of a frigate, about 3,000 tons. The Navy plans to buy at least 60 of the littoral combat ships for $12 billion or $200 million per ship, about 5 percent of the cost of the DD(X). Not only can these versatile ships project firepower ashore, they can launch unmanned aircraft and watercraft under certain conditions and have the capacity to attain speeds of 48 knots.
Unnecessary Programs

F/A-22 RAPTOR

For FY 2006, the Pentagon requested and received $4.3 billion to purchase 24 more F/A-22 Raptor fighter jets.\(^{157}\) It was originally designed to achieve air superiority over Soviet fighter jets that were never built.\(^{158}\) Back in 1985, the Air Force claimed it could build about 750 of these Stealth fighter jets for $35 million each, at a total cost of $26 billion.\(^{159}\) Over the last 20 years, the cost of the total program has continued to grow even as the number of planes to be purchased has declined. Just a year ago, the Air Force said it could purchase 279 raptors for $72 billion, or about $258 million per aircraft.\(^{160}\) The Raptor is arguably the most unnecessary weapon system currently being built by the Pentagon. At the current time, the Pentagon says it can buy 181 planes for $61 billion.\(^{161}\) Assuming no further cost growth, this will mean spending about $337 million for each unnecessary plane, almost an $80 million increase in the unit cost in just one year.

The performance of the current generation of Air Force fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the first Persian Gulf War, makes it clear that the Air Force already has the capability to achieve air superiority easily and quickly against any enemy or nation. Recognizing this strategic reality, the Air Force has added a ground attack or bombing mission to the Raptor. However, using the world’s most expensive fighter for attacking ground targets is neither cost-effective nor technically feasible, given that the jet travels at twice the speed of sound.\(^{162}\)

In the summer of 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld understood this logic and moved to cancel the plane, backing off only when Secretary of the Air Force James Roche threatened to resign.\(^{163}\) To date the Air Force has spent $40 billion on the program.\(^{164}\) Canceling it now would save $15.3 billion in anticipated future costs and would leave the Air Force with about 100 of these planes or about four squadrons.\(^{165}\) This would be more than enough to deal with a future competitor like China who might develop a significant air-to-air capability.

SSN-774 VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE

The Virginia class submarine was originally intended to combat the next generation of Russian submarines, vessels that will never be built.\(^{166}\)
The Navy plans to buy 30 of these boats to replace the SSN-688 Los Angeles class submarines at an estimated cost of $94 billion, or over $3 billion for each submarine.\textsuperscript{167} To date, the Navy has spent about $22 billion developing the SSN-774.\textsuperscript{168} For 2006, the Navy is asking Congress to appropriate approximately $2.6 billion for one boat and plans to build one vessel per year through 2011 and increase to two per year beginning in 2012.\textsuperscript{169}

As these Virginia class submarines are commissioned, the Navy plans to retire the existing Los Angeles class submarines early – that is, before their normal service life is reached.\textsuperscript{170} However, not only is the Virginia class submarine cost ineffective, but it also fails to provide significant new capabilities beyond those of the Los Angeles class. Canceling the Virginia class and refueling the reactors of the Los Angeles class at a cost of $200 million per vessel can save $2.3 billion in 2006 and $65 billion over the next 15 years.\textsuperscript{171}

**DD(X) DESTROYER**

The proposed DD(X) is a new class of surface combatant that is substantially larger than any existing surface ship, such as the cruiser or destroyer, and is sized more for open ocean warfare against another naval superpower than its stated mission of providing fire support in crowded, dangerous coastal areas for forces ashore.\textsuperscript{172} The program that began in 1996 has been beset by technological and cost difficulties and will not be ready before 2015. The House Armed Services Committee, alarmed by the ballooning costs of the DD(X), has considered capping its authorized spending for the DD(X) at $1.7 billion per ship, but it has already risen to $3.3 billion.\textsuperscript{173} However, canceling the program altogether would save $1 billion in 2006 alone and at least $8 billion over the next five years.\textsuperscript{174} Moreover, as we discussed above, the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which is already under development and will cost about $200 million per vessel, is better suited for providing fire support for actual operations ashore.\textsuperscript{175}

**V-22 OSPREY**

From its inception, the V-22 Osprey has been beset by safety, technical, and cost problems. The Pentagon began development of the V-22 Osprey, which takes off and lands like a helicopter and once airborne, flies like a plane, in the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{176} It was originally supposed to be a joint service program, but the Army dropped support for the program in the late 1980s. In 1991, Dick Cheney
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(then secretary of defense) canceled the program because of cost concerns and continuing technical problems.177

Cheney’s decision was overridden by Congress, and with the support of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, the Department of Defense has now spent $18 billion on the program.178 Yet, the Osprey is still in a test phase and not ready for operational deployment until sometime in 2007. Moreover, four accidents, three of which resulted in fatalities, have occurred during this time.179 Finally, the estimated cost of the program has risen from approximately $30 to $50 billion.180

Under current plans, the Pentagon intends to buy 458 Ospreys at a cost of more than $110 million for each aircraft.181 This assumes that the Pentagon can get costs under control and solve the technical problems. Even if this unlikely scenario comes to pass, the Osprey will only be marginally more capable than existing helicopters in terms of speed range and payload, yet cost at least five times as much.182 Canceling the V-22 and buying an equivalent number of existing helicopters like the MH-60S Knighthawks will save $1.4 billion in 2006 and $30 billion over a decade.183

C-130J

The Pentagon has already spent $2.6 billion to purchase 50 C-130J transport aircraft, but none of these planes has met commercial contract specifications.184 The C-130J has 168 deficiencies that could cause severe injury or even death to those flying or on board.185 Consequently, the C-130J cannot perform its intended mission of transporting troops and equipment into combat zones – it can be used only for training. These limitations have prompted concerns by Secretary Rumsfeld, who previously moved to cancel the program.186 Moreover, the older C-130 Hercules model aircraft enjoy an excellent reputation as an aircraft capable of performing missions similar to those assigned to the C-130J.187

During the 1990s, when Congress appropriated more funds for the aircraft than the Pentagon requested, the Air Force contended it did not need the planes. Yet, in 2006, Congress allocated approximately $1 billion to buy 12 more of these aircraft, and the Air Force now contends that it needs the plane. If the Air Force, with the support of Congress, has its way, it would like to purchase 100 planes at a total cost of $16.4 billion or about $164 million per plane.188 Canceling the C-130J now will save $5 billion over the next five years.189
OFFENSIVE SPACE-BASED WEAPONS

The U.S. military already relies heavily on space to conduct its operations. It uses satellites to gather data, speed communications, and conduct electronic eavesdropping. The use of space by the military is considered defensive. However, the Pentagon now wants the president to sign a new national security directive to enable the military to establish and maintain space superiority. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wants the United States to pursue the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats and defend against attacks on U.S. interests, in effect to weaponize space – that is, to launch offensive weapons from space. Under his leadership, the Pentagon has pushed ahead with a multibillion-dollar space weapons program and is developing plans for deployment in the near term.\(^{190}\)

Five space-based offensive weapons are currently being developed by the Pentagon, including:

- Killer satellites that would destroy or disrupt in space an enemy satellite;
- Common Aero Vehicle, or hypersonic aircraft, which can be launched in mid-air and swoop in from space to hit targets up to 3,000 miles away;
- Hypervelocity Rod Bundle (known as “rods from God”) consisting of tungsten bars weighing 100 kg or more, deployed from a permanently orbiting platform and able to hit terrestrial targets at 120 miles a minute (or 7,200 miles an hour) with the force of a small nuclear weapon;
- Space-based Laser, or “Eagle,” which employs space-based relay mirrors to direct rays against ground targets; and
- Program that uses intense radio waves from space to disable enemy communications.\(^{191}\)

However tempting such expanded strike capabilities might appear at first glance, in reality such weapons would not only represent an enormous misallocation of defense resources, but would actually serve to undermine national security.

Space-based offensive weapons would not significantly expand U.S. military superiority. American conventional and nuclear weapons are already capable of destroying any of the ground targets that space-based weapons would, and they can do it at a fraction of the cost. For instance, existing intercontinental ballistic missiles can match the destructive force of the proposed “rods from God” space
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weapons program. Richard Garwin, a dean of America’s national security scientist corps, who played a major role in the development of the hydrogen bomb, has calculated that the cost per target of a space-based laser would be $100 million, versus $600,000 for a Tomahawk cruise missile – a 166-fold cost increase.192

Land, sea, and air-based forces can be repositioned, concealed, or hardened to reduce their vulnerability.193 In addition, space-based weapons, because of their predictable orbits, literally have nowhere to hide and can be easily disrupted. New space-based weapons also have a distinct disadvantage when it comes to dictating the timing of an attack. A space-based laser attack, for instance, would be restricted to the period when the weapon is over enemy territory; thus, after the first orbit, an enemy would know precisely when such an attack would be possible and when it would not.

Finally, deploying space-based weapons is an ineffective way of maintaining the military advantage that the U.S. currently derives from its space assets given the cost. Enemies are not likely to allow themselves to be drawn into an expensive, high-tech space-based weapons race that the United States would surely win. Rather, they will more than likely take a page out of the Iraqi insurgents’ playbook and fight the U.S. with far more cost effective, low-tech, and asymmetric tactics.

This asymmetric battle could be fought by enemies using two simple tools: space mines or ICBMs carrying nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon is capable of wreaking havoc on all assets in low-Earth orbit by littering space with dangerous debris. It can also disrupt satellite operations with its electromagnetic pulse and radiation. Space mines, meanwhile, will be able to neutralize satellites in more distant orbits by simply releasing pellet clouds into a flight path.194

Because these offensive programs are financed in the classified or black budget, it is impossible to tell precisely how much the Pentagon has already spent on them. The best guess is that the Bush administration has already spent at least $20 billion and is requesting $5 billion more in the 2006 budget.195 Canceling these weapons would save $5 billion this year and at least $50 billion over the next decade.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

There is no doubt that this nation needs to be concerned about attacks from ballistic missiles against U.S. troops in the field (Theater Missile Defense or TMD) or against U.S. territory (National Missile Defense or NMD) and, indeed, it has. Since President Reagan gave his 1983 speech that urged the nation to develop a defense against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, this nation has spent more than $130 billion in an attempt to construct such a defense.196
President Bush, who in his 2000 campaign promised to deploy a National Missile Defense before the end of his first term, has spent more than $40 billion on missile defense since taking office.\textsuperscript{197} Indeed, one of his first acts after taking office was to double the size of President Clinton’s ballistic missile defense budget from $5 billion to $10 billion. Later in 2001, President Bush withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, negotiated by the Nixon administration, on the grounds that the agreement would preclude the United States from developing and deploying an effective national missile defense.\textsuperscript{198} For 2006, the administration has obtained another $7.6 billion from Congress for its National Missile Defense program.\textsuperscript{199}

Using the funds already allocated, the Bush administration has placed at least ten ground-based missile interceptors at launch sites in Alaska and California with plans to deploy more over the next two years.\textsuperscript{200} Eventually, the Bush administration would like to deploy a large layered system that will include space-based interceptors. The total cost of the Bush plan over the next 20 years will exceed $200 billion.\textsuperscript{201}

The Bush administration’s approach is a mismatch of resources. For a ballistic missile threat to be credible and for NMD to be a viable defense, two conditions must be met: an adversary with ballistic missiles must be undeterred by U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority; and the real-world national security benefits of NMD must justify the enormous expense of the program.

NMD scores poorly on meeting both conditions. Only two states – China and Russia – have a proven ability to launch land-based ICBMs outfitted with nuclear weapons. There is no reason to think that even if U.S. relations with China and Russia were to deteriorate dramatically that either country would consider using nuclear weapons in a first strike, because the United States could respond with a devastating second strike.

North Korea is frequently cited as the animating concern behind the ballistic missile threat. If the six party talks fail, North Korea’s ICBM and nuclear weapons programs could eventually pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. If and when North Korea acquires a credible nuclear weapons delivery capability, the prospects for deterring North Korean nuclear aggression are very strong. Knowing that a nuclear strike against the United States would spell the end of the
ruling regime, North Korea would be extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless the survival of the regime was imminently threatened. If the regime were so threatened, the United States should expect North Korea to use any nuclear weapons capability it may have. An effective NMD would, in theory, give the president the option of threatening North Korea with regime change without risking a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland.

Unfortunately, however, there is no convincing, independent evidence that NMD will ever offer a credible hedge against a limited nuclear strike. The system has not successfully intercepted a target in any of the three highly scripted tests that have taken place during the past three years. For NMD ever to have an appreciable impact on a U.S. president’s decision to put American cities at risk of a nuclear strike, the stakes would have to be enormously high and NMD would have to offer close to 100 percent reliability. No American president would or should bet an American city on anything less.

No other weapons program has cost so much but delivered so little. By contrast, the United States spends only $1 billion per year on preventing the diversion of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise by locking them down at their source and $1 billion a year on buying new ships and planes for the Coast Guard. President Bush is right when he observes that a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist enemy is the greatest threat. However, a terrorist would be more likely to attempt a strike by smuggling the weapon or its components into the United States, and not via ballistic missile. Due to the relative ease with which nuclear materials can be shielded from detection, terrorists who have acquired nuclear weapons or materials have a high probability of carrying out a successful attack.

The entire Ballistic Missile Defense program can be reduced in 2006 from $8.8 billion to $3 billion, and from $45 billion to $15 billion, over the next five years. This would allow the Pentagon to continue testing National Missile Defense and provide sufficient funding for such Theater Missile Defense programs as the Patriot (PAC-3) program, which protects the troops in the field.

(Please refer to Table 1: Recommendations Balance Sheet on p. 30 for proposed savings from eliminating and slowing down the development of weapons systems.)
THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The U.S. nuclear posture is one element of a broader strategic posture that includes U.S. nuclear and conventional strike forces, defenses, preventive measures such as nonproliferation, and a technical base capable of developing new strategic capabilities in response to unforeseen developments. The U.S. strategic force posture contributes to the national defense by protecting the homeland against nuclear and other threats, deterring conflict, assuring allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, and actively shaping the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. The strategic forces posture must be based on a realistic assessment of current and foreseeable threats, in light of the capabilities a current or potential enemy may use to attack the United States or its interests.

The Cold War mission for nuclear weapons – deterring massive nuclear weapons strikes or conventional assaults by aggressive major powers – has disappeared. The Soviet Union is no more, and thus the United States faces no geopolitical rival with both the intention and the capability to threaten the national existence of the United States as the USSR once did. Instead, the United States faces a diverse range of lesser contingencies and a future that is marked by no small degree of uncertainty.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy against existential threats. Though the United States currently does not currently face any existential threats and is very unlikely to do so in the future, as long as there is some possibility that a new existential threat will emerge, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to have an important role in the overall U.S. strategic posture.

Nuclear weapons also provide the United States with a hedge against sudden, tectonic shifts in the geopolitical environment – specifically, a Russia or China that rejects the path of global economic integration and turns to military force to achieve their strategic objectives. This hedging mission is the only remaining mission for which nuclear weapons are really suited because existing and potential threats – such as nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists or North Korea – can be far more effectively addressed through diplomatic or conventional military means.

The decision to use nuclear weapons rests with the president alone. There is no formula at the president’s disposal for determining whether a nuclear strike is appropriate. Instead, the president would have to make a decision based on two
judgments: a strategic judgment about the military and related costs and benefits of a nuclear strike, and a moral judgment about whether the military stakes justify the tens of thousands, and possibly millions, of civilian casualties that nearly any foreseeable use of nuclear weapons would cause. The president would have to make the call during a period that is likely to be characterized by significant uncertainty and enormous stress, with time being of the essence.

In order to connect nuclear strategy to real-life decision making and ensure that the president has realistic strategic options, the artificial firewall between the moral and strategic dimensions of nuclear strategy must come down. The interaction of the moral and strategic dimensions of nuclear strategy should be elaborated and fully integrated into nuclear planning as much as possible in advance, with the benefit of sober thought and due consideration, and not deferred to a time of crisis when stress is high and time is short.

There are two fundamental principles that as a moral matter should, and as a practical matter would, guide any American president’s decision on whether to use nuclear weapons: a counterforce principle, according to which the United States does not intentionally target civilians; and a proportionality principle, which requires that the military value of destroying a target exceed collateral damage. These principles define the basic parameters of nuclear strategy and anchor the posture in American values, strengthening U.S. and allied confidence in the posture and amplifying the posture’s credibility in the eyes of U.S. adversaries.

The United States has an unmatched and unprecedented ability to shape strategic reality. Uncertainty is and always will be a defining characteristic of the international environment. The United States should use its power to reduce, not amplify it. It must also adopt measures to reduce its vulnerability to strategic surprise by developing weapons, defenses, and infrastructure to nullify the capabilities that any adversary could bring to bear on the United States. Accomplishing these goals requires that U.S. nuclear forces planning be fully integrated with conventional military, diplomatic, and economic efforts to advance both short-term and long-term national security objectives, from deterring conflict and defeating adversaries to shaping the strategic development of China and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States should strive to stabilize other states’ expectations; reduce the chances that major powers clash; and make the consequences of aggression clear to extreme regimes while it is the sole military superpower.
As our defense strategy notes, stability, however, is only one goal of U.S. strategic policy. The United States must be willing and able to take military action against states that harbor terrorists plotting attacks against the United States or its interests, threaten U.S. allies and other interests, and commit atrocities against their people. In the current security environment, there is no realistic role for nuclear weapons against these threats because conventional weapons offer the United States a broad array of options to defeat these targets and because of the enormous collateral damage that nuclear weapons cause.

An analysis of current and likely future threats is vital to ensuring that the United States directs resources to where they are likely to reap the largest security gains. A capabilities approach on its own, however, does not distinguish capabilities that an adversary is more likely to use against us from those that an adversary is less likely to use. Getting this calculation right is an essential component of rational defense planning: despite the fact that the Soviet Union collapsed more than 15 years ago—and with it the real and present danger of total nuclear war—the United States spends more today on nuclear deterrence than it did during the Cold War.

In fiscal year 2006, the Bush administration proposed spending nearly $18 billion on its strategic and tactical nuclear forces: $7 billion on nuclear weapons and activities and $11 billion on delivery vehicles. If one adds the $7.8 billion that the Pentagon wants to spend on missile defense (discussed later), it means that in FY 2006 the United States is spending nearly $26 billion a year on nuclear defense and deterrence.

The United States faces two broad categories of contingencies that are relevant to determining the specific dimensions of the U.S. nuclear posture: immediate and remote. The use of these categories makes planning for U.S. nuclear forces more concrete by tying capabilities to specific threats, enabling clearer judgments about the trade-offs among different policy choices and plausible roles for nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in managing these contingencies.

**Immediate contingencies.** These contingencies are recognized present dangers that could involve the use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its interests. They include the acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials by a terrorist; a North Korean transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists and a North Korean invasion of South Korea; Iranian success at completing a nuclear
fuel cycle; an Islamist revolution in Pakistan that results in religious extremists gaining custody of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal; a Chinese invasion of Taiwan following a Taiwanese declaration of independence; and efforts by other regional powers to use chemical or biological weapons as an instrument for asserting regional hegemony and threatening U.S. interests.

U.S. nuclear forces should have only a marginal role to play in addressing immediate contingencies because of the decisive strategic advantage afforded by U.S. superiority in conventional weapons. The United States has the potential to threaten most adversaries with overwhelming conventional force without having to rely on nuclear weapons to make the threat credible. Moreover, the United States would only use nuclear weapons against military targets that are so critical to the enemy’s ability to harm the United States or its interests that the benefits of a nuclear strike exceed the considerable collateral damage that any nuclear strike would likely cause. Few targets in these countries meet these stringent criteria.

U.S. conventional forces, once reconstituted and revitalized, will serve as an effective deterrent against the use of nuclear and other unconventional weapons against the United States by a wide array of actors. Nonproliferation and related defensive measures – such as strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent states from pursuing nuclear weapons programs under the guise of civilian nuclear energy programs – are essential to neutralize immediate contingencies and contain plausible contingencies. Political, economic, and other non-military measures are also vital.

**Remote contingencies.** These type of contingencies are extremely unlikely to materialize, but would be so grave that planning must account for the possibility that they may materialize. The rise of a militant, aggressive China or Russia that is hostile to the United States or our interests and willing to use violence to achieve its objectives fall in this category.

If these remote contingencies were to evolve into immediate contingencies, U.S. nuclear forces may play a critical role in deterring aggression. China and Russia are in periods of political and economic transition, and their future course is uncertain. While it is not likely that either country will adopt a militant course, the prospect cannot be ruled out. The United States must therefore retain a credible nuclear deterrent and sustain a technical and manufacturing capacity to make adjustments in nuclear forces should the security environment dictate. Due to the existing superiority and readiness of U.S. nuclear forces, however, any such adjustments are likely to be very minor.
At the same time, the United States must work to avoid letting its nuclear superiority cast a shadow over its relationships with these countries. The United States must continue to promote the economic and political integration of these regimes in global institutions. Cooperation on nonproliferation, arms control, and military-to-military exchanges is also critical.

**Recommendations**

A strong conventional force enables the United States to credibly deter, contain, and defeat threats and assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security. Nuclear forces nevertheless serve an important role in U.S. defense strategy by giving the United States the ultimate insurance policy against the re-emergence of an existential or other catastrophic threat. The strategy should follow two principles: military targets are the only legitimate target for nuclear weapons; and any use of nuclear weapons must be proportionate to the threat. It should also strive to reduce strategic uncertainty to minimize surprising developments and the chances of an arms race. The United States must:

- **Field a deployed arsenal of 600 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs, Trident SSBNs, and B-2 and B-52H strategic bombers, with 400 weapons held in reserve.** A generous estimate of the number of critical military targets in China and Russia that only nuclear weapons could effectively hold at risk is several hundred each. A “600+400” arsenal would enable the United States to hold these targets, as well as the very limited number of such targets in extreme regimes, vulnerable with a high degree of certainty. It would also save nearly $5 billion in 2006 and $40 billion over the next decade.

- **Maintain nuclear forces and prepare “surge capacity.”** DoD and the Energy Department should retain the ability to sustain the technological readiness of the current force, and supplement it with additional forces should there be a dramatic shift in the international security environment.

- **Pursue the utility and cost-effectiveness of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.** Any RRW should lead to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by guaranteeing the end of U.S. nuclear testing; resulting in significant long-term cost savings; enabling the permanent, irreversible dismantlement of several existing warheads for every new RRW; and not creating new missions for nuclear weapons.

- **Make reducing strategic uncertainty a top goal of U.S. strategic policy towards Russia and China.** The greatest threats and challenges the United States faces – terrorism, proliferation, international crime, and other global issues – demand close cooperation in highly sensitive areas, such as
intelligence sharing and nuclear weapons policy. A relationship defined at least in part by nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction breeds suspicion and acrimony, and creates unnecessary barriers to the sort of cooperation that countering 21st century threats requires.

- **Revitalize arms control with Russia.** The United States should negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia that codifies further reductions, mandates the permanent dismantlement of excess warheads and creates new verification mechanisms, extends existing transparency and verification measures (which are based on START I, a 1991 U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreement) beyond their 2009 expiration, and includes tactical nuclear weapons in arms reduction.

- **Cease research and development of an advanced, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon (the “Bunker Buster”).** This gratuitous, destabilizing, and expensive weapons system not only lacks any practical use, but also sends precisely the wrong message on nonproliferation efforts.
Homeland Defense

Projecting power abroad to defend the homeland is a vital part of protecting the American people, but it is not sufficient. As the bombings in London and Madrid demonstrate, it is not enough to simply say “We will continue to hunt down terrorists abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home,” as President Bush reiterates.204 Enemies, such as violent extremists, must be confronted in the United States as well. The Department of Defense has a vital role in protecting the homeland, and it must recognize that homeland defense is one of its core missions.

U.S. homeland defense strategy has three primary components: detecting and disrupting potential terrorist attacks while protecting civil liberties; guarding critical infrastructure; and improving emergency planning, response and recovery.205 The Department of Defense has an important role to play in intercepting and defeating the threat before it comes to American shores and assisting in times of overwhelming national crises, as in Katrina or the attacks of September 11.

Recommendations

The Department of Defense should take the following steps:

- The Department of Defense’s budget should be integrated with those of other agencies involved in homeland security. This will allow the president and the Congress to make cost-effective trade-offs across agency lines. Doing this will allow the federal government to see that it is spending far too much money ($9 billion) on deploying an unproven national missile defense system and far too little on Coast Guard modernization ($1 billion), given that a weapon of mass destruction is far more likely to be smuggled into the country in a seaborne container than launched by a ballistic missile with a return address.

- The Pentagon needs to double the funding it allocates to homeland defense in its own budget from $10 to $20 billion. This would allow the Department of Defense to increase its capabilities to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and helping in the recovery from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks.
on the United States. The additional funds will also provide the National Guard with the equipment and training it needs to serve as first responders in an attack on the homeland.

- **The Army National Guard should give more priority to its historic role as chief protector of the homeland against large-scale disasters.** This restructuring will require the Guard to emphasize such units as light infantry and military police as opposed to units with major combat functions such as armor and artillery. Enlarging the size of the active-duty Army, as recommended above, will make this change possible by reducing the Army’s dependency on the National Guard as a strategic reserve. In essence, the Guard should return to its core mission – a mission that it is good at and was created to do.

- **The command structure of the National Guard needs to be strengthened to reflect its expanding real-time responsibilities.** At least two regional commands should be established between existing state headquarters and the National Guard Bureau to enhance homeland defense/disaster response planning and improve coordination with the U.S. Northern Command and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. Placing the National Guard in command of the existing 1st and 5th Army headquarters is one way to accomplish this.

- **The U.S. Northern Command needs to shorten active-duty response times to a catastrophic natural or man-made disaster when the president decides that the scale of the disaster exceeds the capabilities of state and local governments.** While the declaration of a national emergency may be necessary in an extreme case, the military should not routinely be given lead responsibility for disaster planning and execution. When Pentagon assistance is necessary, it should be provided in support of civil authorities. Continuity of local civilian government in a crisis should be preserved whenever possible.

- **DoD must also work more closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to share information and complement each other’s work.** As the 9/11 Commission and others have argued, the United States must move immediately to improve its domestic intelligence agencies, upgrade detection and warning systems, and improve border security. The military can help instill a joint culture within the intelligence community, drawing from its own experience under Goldwater-Nichols over the past 20 years. DoD must also be more willing to use its unique
capabilities to enhance other security priorities, such as expanding its use of unmanned aerial vehicles, improving intelligence gathering and border security, and providing assistance in conducting planning and exercises.

- **At least two active-duty Army divisions and a headquarters unit should have as a collateral mission to take over from the Army National Guard in responding to a catastrophic natural or man-made disaster when the president decides that the scale of the disaster is too much for state and local governments to handle and declares a national emergency.** This collateral duty means that the active divisions and the headquarters’ unit must conduct training and participate in homeland security exercises on a regular basis.

- **The president should direct the secretary of defense to add first responders, such as police and firefighters, to the list of critical jobs that are currently prohibited from joining or remaining in the selected reserve.** Given the ongoing threat to the U.S. homeland, the Pentagon cannot continue to allow individuals with civilian jobs that are important to homeland security to join the National Guard and Reserve. Homeland defense is as integral to national security as combating terrorists abroad, and it requires dedicated personnel who cannot be called to extended duty away from their own communities.

- **The president should direct the secretary of homeland security to work with the governors to establish in each state a non-deployable homeland security corps of volunteer citizens with skills that are central to responding to a terrorist attack as well as to natural disasters.** Such volunteers would include doctors, nurses, construction workers, firefighters, police officers, communications experts, city planners, engineers, and social workers, among others. These units would serve as a back up for National Guard units, which will continue to be deployed away from their home states. The Congress should increase the Department of Homeland Security’s budget by $1 billion to pay for such a program.
RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER
Timely, accurate intelligence is vital to the national defense. Together with command, control, communications, and surveillance, intelligence (C4SI) enables the United States to stay ahead of its enemies and tailor military operations to real threats.

The demands of ongoing military operations and the current international threat environment require the Department of Defense to develop much more robust intelligence capabilities. As in other areas, the military is flush with hardware for intelligence collection but lacks sufficient personnel with critical skills to undertake vital human intelligence operations. Moreover, there is no clear strategy to identify, train, and retain intelligence professionals with the necessary skills for the essential tasks they must perform.

The Intelligence Community is undergoing a massive transformation to adapt to the post-9/11 world. Acting on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which created the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to better coordinate the activities of the 15 agencies of the Intelligence Community, several of which are in the Department of Defense.

Barely a year into this transformation, intelligence reform has produced mixed results. Internecine squabbles, notably between the Pentagon and CIA over covert operations and the Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on budget authority, have hindered progress. Consequently, the United States has yet to achieve the full potential of its intelligence gathering and analytic capabilities.

The Department of Defense must increasingly coordinate its intelligence functions with the DNI. In addition, since approximately 80 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget is allocated to the Department of Defense, it is imperative that the DNI be provided final budget sign-off on DoD programs that support the DNI, such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

For more information, please see, Better Spies, Better Intelligence: A Progressive Strategy for Creating a Professional Intelligence Corps, Center for American Progress, April 2005, available at: http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7B924FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7D/pp_IntelligenceChapterWEB.pdf.
The newly created Strategy Support Branch operates out of the Special Operations Command and is designed to develop new intelligence capabilities beyond battlefield preparations and other traditional military intelligence functions. These clandestine and covert operations would provide the Department of Defense with more responsive human intelligence capacity, including operations more commonly performed by the CIA, such as recruiting, training and managing a network of intelligence assets.

The expansion of human intelligence operations will inevitably bring the Pentagon into new and perhaps unfamiliar operational areas. In order to preserve operation authority, it is vitally important that the Pentagon operates under clear legal authority to conduct these operations and that Congress is fully informed of all covert actions. The National Security Act of 1947 as amended requires that all covert activities be approved by the president and reported to congressional intelligence committees. For certain covert actions and with presidential certification, a briefing can be given only to the majority and minority leaders of both houses and the leadership of the intelligence committees, the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Even in these cases, the full committees must still be briefed at a later date, and a full explanation must be provided for the delay in notification.

This requirement is particularly relevant given the president’s decision to brief only the “Gang of Eight” on the National Security Agency’s warrantless domestic surveillance activities. Although that program was classified, it does not meet the definition of a covert operation – those designed to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad – and therefore the full intelligence committees should have been informed. Additionally, as Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has suggested in this instance, overly aggressive interpretations of legal authority could backfire on the Pentagon, resulting in Congressional action to clarify and in some cases reduce authority to conduct intelligence operations.

DoD intelligence collection efforts must not – and need not – come at undue cost to the privacy rights of Americans. DoD must enhance intelligence collection on threats to military installations in the United States and abroad, but data collected in the course of these operations – specifically, the database of threat information maintained by the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), which contains information on Americans for “threats” in the United States – must comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Recommendations

- Improve coordination between the Department of Defense’s intelligence agencies and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
● **Provide final budget sign-off on DoD intelligence programs to the DNI.**

● **Maximize performance of intelligence personnel and ensure that the right people are recruited and trained for their jobs by developing a Human Capital Plan for DoD intelligence personnel and coordinate activities with the Intelligence Community’s chief human capital officer.** The DNI’s National Intelligence Strategy emphasizes the importance of developing a strategic human capital plan throughout the intelligence community.

The chief human capital officer of the intelligence community should work with the Secretary of Defense to develop a human capital plan for military intelligence and adopt a management system that maximizes the Community’s ability to match personnel decisions with resource needs. A human capital plan can help managers identify resource needs and develop programs to recruit, train, and reward personnel with critical skills; align individual performance with agency goals by rewarding employees and units for achieving organizational goals; and improve coordination between DoD intelligence agencies and other agencies in the Intelligence Community.

● **Coordinate DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) operations with other Intelligence Community HUMINT operations to form a complementary, not competitive or duplicative structure.** The president has designated the CIA as leader of HUMINT for the Intelligence Community and the national human intelligence manager is a CIA official working out of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The Special Support Branch of the Special Operations Command must coordinate its clandestine operations with the chief human intelligence manager. The deputy director of national intelligence has indicated that the Secretary of Defense and the CIA Director has signed a Memorandum of Understanding that seeks to prevent conflicts and overlap between DoD and CIA intelligence activities. DoD HUMINT operations should be limited to current or near-future military requirements. The CIA should retain control of HUMINT operations on all other threats.

● **DoD clandestine operations, both domestic and international, must follow U.S. law and regulations.** The Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 and the Criminal Wiretap Statute (known as Title III) are the exclusive means by which electronic eavesdropping can be conducted in the United States. Regardless of whether the president authorized the NSA to conduct
warrantless domestic surveillance, the law and the Constitution are clear: it is illegal. The extra-legal surveillance undermines the effectiveness of counterterrorism investigations because of the risk that courts will not allow the use of tainted evidence. The program must end immediately.

DoD must conduct regular briefings of the full intelligence committees in the House and the Senate to report on all intelligence operations. It is not sufficient to provide briefings only to the selected Members of Congress that make up the “Gang of Eight.” Necessary and proper oversight requires more. The absence of oversight is a detriment – not a benefit – to our national security. Collection activities about threats to domestic military installations must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law and the maintenance of any databases must comply with the Privacy Act.
**Glossary**

**Total Army**: The Army is composed of over a million volunteers. About half of these men and women are on full-time active-duty. The other half is in the reserve component, which is composed of the selected reserve and the individual ready reserve (IRR). These three groups comprise the total Army.

**Selected Reserve**: The selected reserve, sometimes known as the drilling reserve, consists of people who belong to organized units that train or drill one weekend a month and spend at least two weeks a year on active-duty. The Army’s selected reserve has two branches: the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Both components serve as back-ups to the active-duty Army.

**Army National Guard**: National Guard units, which are in all 50 states, can be used by the states as a militia for natural disasters or civil disorders when they have not been mobilized by the federal government, which pays for more than 90 percent of their costs and thus has first call on their services. It is comprised of combat and combat support units like civil affairs, transportation, and military police.

**Army Reserve**: Army Reserve units are under the control of the Department of the Army and can be mobilized by the secretary of the Army. It is composed mainly of combat support units.

**Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)**: The IRR is composed of individuals who have completed their active-duty service and have not joined a selected reserve unit, but who still have time left on their eight-year military service obligation, which, by law, they incurred when they joined the Army. For example, a person who enlisted in the Army for four years in 1998 would have been released from active-duty in 2002, but would remain in the IRR until 2006. Members of the IRR receive no pay, training, or benefits. Currently there are about 118,000 people in the IRR.

**Special Operations Forces**: These elite or commando units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force are trained to perform clandestine missions behind enemy lines. Currently, there are about 50,000 personnel in these units. About 8,000 special operations forces are deployed in 54 countries.

**Army Organization**: The active Army is organized into ten divisions and the Army National Guard into eight. Each division has between 10,000 and 18,000 people organized into at least three brigades or regiments composed of 3,000 to 5,000 people. These brigades, in turn, consist of battalions of between 500 and 800 people each.
Delayed Entry Pool: Men and women who have enlisted in the military but who will not report for basic training until some time in the future. Normally the service has about 35 percent of its enlistees in this pool at any given time.

Stop-Loss: The policy that prohibits a person in the service from leaving his or her unit to return to civilian life even though his or her term of enlistment has expired. This policy has been invoked for people in units that have received notification of being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan or are already in one of those countries.

Resetting the Force: According to the Army, “resetting the force” means restoring a unit’s equipment to the desired level of combat capability for use in the unit’s next rotation or for other, unknown future contingencies. These actions include repairing existing equipment, replacing lost equipment, and recapitalizing equipment that needs extensive refurbishment.

Recapitalizing the Force: Recapitalization is a long-term maintenance activity that invests in the future readiness of the Army by completing rebuilding used systems and returning them to a like-new, zero-miles standard. Recapitalization is also used to introduce selected upgrades to the current fleet.

Modularity: The “modularity” initiative is a plan to radically transform the Army in order to address the rapidly changing realities of 21st century warfare. This restructuring – the Army’s largest shakeup in fifty years – encompasses both the active and reserve components of the force. The initiative re-organizes ground troops into individually deployable (“modular”) combat brigade teams of around 3,000-4,000 personnel, making them smaller and more flexible than the divisions they replace. Furthermore, by restructuring the force into brigades rather than divisions, the active Army will increase its total number of units of action available for deployment from 10 (divisions) to 42-48 (combat brigades). Achieving modularity will require major changes, including new training programs, equipment, and facilities, as well as a recalibration of the mix of skills and occupational functions among the Army’s personnel.

Military Police: Individuals whose military specialty is performing police functions in a combat environment, for example, arresting and guarding prisoners, stopping lootings, etc.

Civil Affairs Units: Units whose job it is to administer an area that has been conquered until a new civilian government can be established. These units have people with skills in civilian areas such as law, public administration, engineering, and health.
**Term of Enlistment**: An individual joining the armed forces agrees to serve on active-duty for a certain term, normally four years.

**Military Service Obligation**: An individual enlisting in the armed forces incurs an eight-year obligation to the service, regardless of how long he or she agrees to serve on active-duty.

**Imminent Danger Pay**: A pay supplement received by troops in combat zones. Currently about $225 per month.

**Family Separation Allowance**: A pay supplement received by military families to help pay for expenses while troops are away from home. Currently about $250 per month.
ENDNOTES

FOREWORD AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


CONTEXT AND STRATEGY


CURRENT CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Budgetary Situation


Military Readiness and Personnel


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Lawrence J. Korb, “Fixing the Mix: How to Update the Army’s Reserves,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2004 (vol. 83, no. 2).


Individual ready reservists were mobilized to fill vacancies in a variety of combat and support specialties, including drivers, logistical specialists, mechanics, combat engineers, cooks, carpenters, petroleum supply specialists, and administrative specialists. Jim Garamone, “Army to Call Up 5,600 Individual Ready Reservists,” American Forces Press Service, June 30, 2004; Martin C. Evans, “I’m Not Prepared For This,” *Newsday*, December 8, 2005; Will Dunham, “U.S. Army To Boot Reserve Soldiers Who Won’t Fight,” Reuters, January 9, 2006.


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In 2005, the maximum payout from the Army College Fund increased from $50,000 to $70,000.


Edward Epstein, “Troops in Iraq Face Pay Cut; Pentagon Says Tough Duty Bonuses are Budget-Buster,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 13, 2003, p. A1. The proposed cut for imminent danger pay, a monthly pay supplement received by troops in combat zones, was from $225 to $150. The cut for family separation allowance, a monthly sum received by military families to help pay for expenses while troops are away from home, was from $250 to $100.


Seth Robson, “2nd Battalion, 72nd Armor to Be Inactivated,” Stars and Stripes, October 19, 2005.


“Pentagon Urging Added Personnel for SOCom,” St. Petersburg Times, January 7, 2006, p. 3B.

SOCom’s budget for FY 2006 is $6.6 billion, an increase of 80% under the Bush administration. Ibid.


To its credit, the DoD has announced that it will extend military health coverage to the more than 400,000 members of the National Guard and Reserve who have been mobilized since September 11 for up to eight years after returning to civilian life, provided these personnel agree to remain in the Guard or Reserve. “Pentagon To Extend Health Coverage For Reserve Troops,” Associated Press, March 25, 2005.

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RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER


85 Ibid.


Equipment Shortages


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Weapons Systems Mismatch

The cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are funded by supplemental appropriations and not by the regular Defense budget.


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128 Ibid., Summary.


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142 Ibid.

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144 Ibid., pp. 3, 5.


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159 “U.S. Invites Jet Fighter Tenders,” _Financial Times_, October 10, 1985. (The F/A-22 originally was referred to as the Advanced Tactical Fighter.)


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Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 10.


Ibid., p. 23.


Ibid., p. 2.


Ibid., p. 4.


MH-60S Knighthawks cost approximately $28 million each, or $8 billion for 271 units.
Acquiring 458 MH-60S’s would therefore cost around $13 billion, a full $37 billion less than an equivalent number of V-22’s. The cost savings in FY2006 are derived by calculating the number of V-22’s that that year’s budget will allow (i.e., 17 planes at $110 million per unit given a $1.9 billion budget) and then calculating the cost savings from buying an equivalent number of Knighthawks. U.S. Department of Defense, “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables as of June 30, 2005,” August 12, 2005, p. 4, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2005-JUN-SARSUMTAB.pdf.

193 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
The Role of Nuclear Weapons


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208 Ibid.
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